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Introduction 
Gum arabic is the product of Acacia senegal, a tree species which is naturally suitable for 
(semi) arid regions. It is important for its environmental and various domestic and industrial 
functions (Barbier, 1992; Fagg and Allison, 2004; Wickens et al., 1995). Despite the 
availability of natural and synthetic close substitutes (e.g., ARS, 2007), gum arabic still has an 
important international market specially in the European Union. It has wide industrial usage 
in food and medicine such as being an additive in the food industry (in production of 
beverages like Coca-Cola, juices, and confectionary), in the pharmaceutical and cosmetic 
industry as well as in the production of paints, post stamps, matchsticks to name some 
(Rahim, 2006; Rahim et al., 2007). Although gum arabic is just used as one of the ingredients 
in these different industries, this does not make it less important. The current world annual 
demand of gum arabic is estimated between 60,000 and 70,000 tons but its annual supply only 
reaches around 55,000 tons and hence demand is currently not satisfied by the producer 
countries (Chrétin et al., 2008). Furthermore, smaller producer countries such as Senegal 
seem not to be able to increase their international market share which might be associated 
with problems of developing internal markets including the lack of necessary price incentives 
for the collection of gum. 
Gum is generally collected in the dry season and hence the harvesting does not 
coincide with agricultural or pastoral activities thereby being an important additional source 
of income for the rural collectors (Chrétin et al., 2008). It enables collectors to diversify their 
activities and it is also a risk aversion strategy of rural households in face of crop failure, 
sudden death of livestock or other threats to household survival (Chrétin et al., 2008; 
Freudenberger, 1993a).  
However, the viability of Acacia senegal and consequently of gum collection, is faced 
with institutional constraints: the lack of secure and clear property rights to land and Acacia 
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trees, difficult access to market, low prices due to high marketing and transaction costs, and 
supply of low quality. By taking the case of gum arabic collection and commercialisation, this 
research attempts to investigate factors influencing the performance of the supply chain. Two 
themes are the main focus: (1) market effectiveness: including on the one hand, the 
determinants of market access and its influence on collectors’ decisions, and on the other 
hand, the performance of traders in market; and (2) market-driven production effectiveness: 
including the terms of institutionalisation of quality supply and of realising changes in 
resource governance systems.  
1.1 Problem statement  
Gum production and marketing is constrained by the difficult access collectors have to 
efficient markets and their strong belief of being exploited by traders in terms of fixing buying 
prices, unreliable quality of supplied gum and unclear organization of the collection systems. 
Local markets for gum arabic are often informal, with the largest proportion of gum intended 
for the export chain while a smaller proportion of the lowest quality gum or processed gum 
are locally consumed (e.g., in traditional healing, laundry starch, sweets). There are many 
actors at different levels of the gum supply chain: collectors; village traders involved in 
monetary and non-monetary transactions where gum is supplied in exchange of money and/or 
low-value commodities for daily consumption which are often taken ahead of 
harvest/collection; mobile traders who operate in weekly rural markets; transporters; a few 
wholesalers and even fewer exporters and processing companies (DEFCCS, 2005; Chrétin et 
al., 2008). In trading relations, collectors claim to be disadvantaged in terms of low prices 
associated with the lack of information, need for money to cover daily needs, access to 
markets and exploitation by traders. Obviously, as these constraints negatively influence the 
collectors’ production incentives; it is important to understand how producers determine 
participation in a market. 
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The income of the collecting household will also be influenced by the price received 
from primary traders; this price depends on conditions under which traders can buy and sell 
gum and hence on factors of value distribution along the supply chain. Traders are reproached 
to retain excessive margins such that in the end collectors are paid low prices for their 
product. Yet, one needs to realise that traders also are subjected to marketing costs (e.g., 
transport, taxes, storage and grading) and transaction costs (e.g., search, information and 
monitoring, risk premium charged due to asymmetric information on quality supplied, losses 
due to commitment failures by producers and price uncertainty) in addition to the competition 
arising from coexistence of different structures: spot markets; interlocked contracts with 
village traders (exchange of daily commodities for harvested gum); and contracts between 
companies and large transporters. The performance of traders needs to be investigated in 
order to understand the factors influencing the value distribution along the chain and to 
substantiate the claims on their behaviour. 
Senegal’s gum is internationally recognized to be of good quality due to natural 
growing conditions of the Acacia trees; but to respect and maintain these high standards, high 
costs are spent at the wholesale and export level on sorting and grading. Such costs are made 
at the detriment of the income of the collectors who receive low prices partly because despite 
being sensitized on the quality issues, they continue to use inappropriate harvesting tools, to 
mix gum arabic with other types of gum (e.g., gum seyal which is more fragile), to not 
sufficiently dry and inadequately store gum which as a result loses its quality. If quality 
standards were enforced at the producers’ level, costs at the higher levels of the chain could 
be reduced and collectors could get rewarded for supplying good quality gum in terms of 
higher prices. However economically sound this statement may be, enforcing such standards 
might not be directly relevant if quality improvements do not respond to the users’ 
expectations and if no grading system is in place to guide collectors and traders. Therefore, it 
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is pertinent to establish a link between collectors and user in terms of quality specifications 
and investigate what determines supply of quality. 
Furthermore, collection of gum is organized in communal or open access forests 
where land and tree rights are not well defined as reflected by numerous cases of thefts that 
were reported. Formal and customary rights’ coexistence often lead to confusion: property 
rights for land and forest products in general are formally defined by the Forest code, 
however, indigenous acquisitions through lineage and kinship and tacit appropriations are also 
commonly found (Freudenberger, 1993a; DEFCCS, 2005). Such ambiguity may inhibit 
planting and management of Acacia senegal trees, constrain collection and lead to low quality 
of the collected gum. There are emerging cases of private collection systems either by 
individuals or companies which can be associated with efficiency both in terms of collection 
quantity and quality. Understanding the limitations to the transition towards such private 
tenure systems for gum collection helps to understand the reasons of continued wide 
prevalence of communal systems and appropriate conditions needed for changing towards 
these potentially efficient private systems. 
The current research takes a market perspective for studying the effectiveness of 
production in response to market conditions. While the production of gum arabic largely 
depends on exogenous factors including environmental conditions, the market remains 
important as its incentives can determine the quantity and quality that is collected and 
supplied. The selection of Senegal as the study area is motivated as it is one of the gum 
producing countries that was historically trading its gum reputed for being of good quality, 
but that seems unable to increase its current production levels due to institutional market 
inefficiencies.   
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1.2 Study objective and research questions 
The main research objective is to investigate factors that influence the performance of the 
gum arabic supply chain. Specifically, we investigate first the market effectiveness in terms of 
the behaviour and decision making process of gum collectors, and gum traders’ behaviour and 
performance; and second the production effectiveness in response to market conditions in 
terms of quality aspects in marketing of gum and aspects of governance systems of gum 
collection. 
The following research questions are formulated: 
(a) with regard to market effectiveness, 
• what are the determinants of the collector’s decision to collect gum and the amount to 
collect, and consecutively of the choice of a market outlet (sale place)?  
• what are the determinants of value distribution along the gum arabic supply chain in 
relation to traders’ behaviour and performance? 
(b) with regard to market-driven production effectiveness, 
• what is the link between the quality supplied by collectors and users’ quality 
requirements and what are the factors influencing the supply of quality by gum 
collectors? 
• what are factors that influence the transition from communal organisation of collection 
to efficient private collection systems? 
The above research questions are investigated in Senegal where two zones of gum production 
are purposely chosen for the study: the Northern zone which is sylvopastoral with traditional 
gum collection activities in the regions of Louga, Matam and Saint Louis and the Eastern 
zone which is agro-sylvopastoral with recent interest in collection of gum arabic in the region 
of Tambacounda.  
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1.3 Thesis outline 
This thesis follows an outline consistent with the above research questions. Yet, before 
entering in their subject matter, the context of gum arabic collection and trade in Senegal is 
described in chapter 2. The chapter also highlights the livelihood setting of the study area and 
lists the constraints to gum marketing which also limit the people’s incentives to collect gum.  
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the behaviour and performance of market chain actors. 
Chapter 3 tests the hypothesis that if collectors were able to access ‘better and more 
remunerative’ market, it would give them more incentives to collect gum; this is because high 
transaction costs restrain collection and marketing of gum arabic. Results confirm that better 
returns from gum marketing increase collection and high proportional transaction costs 
restrict access to market. Chapter 4 focuses on the sequential chain of gum traders in an 
investigation of whether their oligopsonist structure leads to lower prices in a multiple 
marginalisation tendency. No evidence of oligopsonist power is found; rather the traders’ 
margins positively depend on costs, idiosyncratic and systemic risk, and uncertainty.  
Chapters 5 and 6 shift the focus to aspects that are pertinent to the production 
performance in the gum supply chain. Chapter 5 concentrates on quality of gum arabic. In the 
first stage, the quality assessment by collectors and primary traders is compared to the users’ 
requirements that are measurable in a laboratory and in the second stage, determinants of 
quality supply in terms of two attributes namely the size and cleanliness of gum nodules are 
analysed. Quality as required by the user is not directly linked to the visible quality attributes 
in the field which are influenced, among others, by harvest and post-harvest practices, and by 
price expectations. Chapter 6 investigates factors that influence the currently slow transition 
from communal to private systems of gum collection with mixed systems of coexistence of 
both communal and private tenure found between these extremes. The shift towards private 
forestry systems is initiated when the tree resources are available, markets are developing, 
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labour for collection is available, competition for resources is high, forests where gum is 
collected were located near to the village or market prices are high enough to attract 
occasional collectors who reinforce the effect of competition. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, the main results are discussed and conclusions are drawn from 
the study. Various policy interventions are identified with the purpose of improving the 
performance of the gum supply chain and consequently enhancing the livelihoods of 
collectors and other gum-dependent actors in Senegal. In the light of the limitations to the 
current study, potential areas for future research are suggested 
  
13 
 
The setting: Acacia senegal and gum arabic trade in Senegal 
2.1 Introduction  
Gum arabic is a natural exudate from Acacia trees. There are many types of gum but the best 
gum is produced by Acacia senegal (L.) Willdenow and Acacia seyal Delile; the former is 
considered to yield gum of better quality (Elmqvist et al., 2005). Gum arabic is a natural oil-
in-water emulsifier (Aoki et al., 2007). It is used in production of soft-drinks, including cola-
type drinks as well as in confectionary, pharmaceutics and photography. Small quantities are 
used locally as food, laundry starch and in traditional medicine (Elmqvist et al., 2005).   
Worldwide, Sudan is the largest producer and exporter of gum arabic, followed by 
Chad and Nigeria, together they bring about 45,000 tons of gum arabic to the market each 
year (Partos, 2009). Senegal, which was once a large producer and exporter of gum arabic, 
has seen its market share significantly declined over the years: in the late 50’s, Senegal’s 
exports of gum arabic accounted for more than 10 per cent of the world exports; it is now in 
the rank of small producers whose exports totalise less than 5 per cent of world export (FAO, 
1971; Marfaing, 1991; DEFCCS, 2005; ITC, 2008). Low exports imply low production and a 
loss of opportunity for collectors of gum arabic who now fail to improve their livelihoods 
through income that could be generated from larger sales of gum. Such livelihoods, in the arid 
and semi-arid regions where gum arabic is collected, revolve around short annual rains 
followed by long periods of drought. Economic activities in these regions are pastoralism, 
small-scale agriculture, and forest exploitation. Pastoralism mainly concerns grazing of 
animals in a pattern of transhumance while searching for water and pastures. Agriculture is 
limited by low soil fertility, insufficient water and declining rainfall (Hall, 2007). Exploitation 
of timber and non-timber forest products is done with the purpose of labour diversification 
and consumption smoothing (Ngugi and Nyariki, 2005). Gum arabic, produced by Acacia 
senegal fits into these livelihood strategies: pastoralists use the proceeds from gum sales to 
  
14 
 
rebuild livestock following decimations or thefts; farmers undertake collection of gum to 
compensate for crop failure; or for consumption smoothing (Barbier, 1992; Freudenberger 
1993a; Wickens et al., 1995; Fagg and Allison, 2004; VALEURS, 2005; Chrétin, 2008). For 
producing countries, gum arabic also generates income through its exports thereby 
contributing to diversification of export products and consolidation of these countries’ 
economies (Mbaye, 1988).  
2.2 Acacia senegal and gum arabic 
Acacia trees belong to the botanical family of Leguminosae, a predominant species of the 
group of Mimosaceae. There are more than two hundred species of Acacias, but only a few of 
them produce gums. The only species producing gum arabic, as per FAO definition, are 
Acacia senegal and Acacia seyal which have different properties and are also divided into 
several varieties: for instance senegal, kerensis or rostrata for Acacia senegal and fistula or 
seyal for Acacia seyal (FAO, 1971; Cossalter, 1991; Saint Sauveur, 1994; JECFA, 2006; 
Couteaudier, 2007). The current research specifically concerns gum arabic as the dried 
exudate produced naturally or by tapping from the trunk and branches of Acacia senegal trees.  
Gum arabic exudes from cracks in bark of Acacia senegal trees. These cracks occur 
mostly in the dry season as a result of natural stress factors including high temperatures from 
the hot dry wind, insect or animal wounds, or cuts made into the bark (Giffard, 1966; Webb, 
1985; Freudenberger, 1993a). Gum collection can be classified into simple gathering of 
nodules that have oozed from the tree or deliberate tapping of trees where the collector makes 
a cut and returns to the tree several days later to harvest the gum. Tapping is hence performed 
to ease exudation and extract the maximum quantity of gum from the tree; it however follows 
a particular technique aimed at preventing damage to the tree (Okatahi and Onyibe, 1999). 
Tapping is labour intensive but it is also harsh because of the dense spiny foliage of the gum 
trees; the Acacia thorns scratch the collector as he scrapes the bark (Webb, 1985). While 
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instances of wild gum gathering are still observed in certain gum producing countries (e.g., in 
Kenya (Wekesa et al., 2010) and Namibia (NASSP, 2006)), tapping is mostly practiced in 
natural or artificial plantations (e.g., in Senegal (AGC, 2007)), or in domesticated plantations 
(e.g., in Sudan (Rahim, 2006)). In Cameroon, wild collection coexists with domestication 
undertaken through agroforestry initiatives (Njomaha, 2008; Palou Madi et al., 2009). 
The tree productivity of Acacia senegal ranges from 20 grams to 2 kg of gum arabic 
depending on the tree; it is on average, 250 grams per annum (Iqbal, 1993; Sall, 1997; ITC, 
2008). The highest yields are observed on trees aged from 8 to 13 years (CNI, 2008). 
The oldest records of gum arabic use date from 4000 BC in Egypt where it was used 
for mummification, medicine or making clothing and ink (Alland, 1944; Giffard, 1966; CNI, 
2008). Nowadays, gum is used in food and non-food industries. Food industries absorb about 
80 per cent of the gum market using it for instance as an adhesive, emulsifier, thickener, 
binding and stabilizing agent in confectionery, bakery, beverages, frozen dairy products, etc. 
(Wickens et al., 1995; Fagg and Allison, 2004; CNI, 2008; Phillips, 2012). 
Non-food usage includes pharmaceutical applications in making syrups, tablets and as 
an ingredient in different treatments of haemorrhage, stomach ulcers, obesity, etc. (Khan and 
Abourashed, 2010). Ali et al. (2009) suggest a possible use of gum arabic in dentistry because 
it enhances dental remineralisation and has some antimicrobial activity. Ushida (2012) and 
Osman et al. (2012) propose the use of gum in obesity and gout treatment respectively. In 
photography, lithography, pottery, house building and cosmetics, gum is used to add strength 
and viscosity to raw materials (Barbier, 1992, 2000; Wickens et al., 1995). A substantial local 
market for gum arabic exists in Senegal where it is used as a starch for laundering ceremonial 
clothes (Fagg and Allison, 2004).  
Studies in the 1970s predicted a dark future for gum arabic demand due to the 
availability of natural and synthetic substitutes such as modified starches, algae extracts, 
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xanthan gum, or corn fibber (FAO, 1971). However, these other gums did not fulfil the 
promise and despite that prediction, the wide range of uses explains the continued demand for 
gum arabic (DEFCCS, 2005; ARS, 2007).  
Wood from Acacia senegal is a secondary product to gum. It is usually harvested at 
the end of the gum production cycle after 15 to 25 years. Wood is used for making roofing 
poles, lining wells or framing huts (Fagg and Allison, 2004). The tree also produces firewood 
and makes good quality charcoal (Chrétin et al., 2008). The bark of roots is twisted and 
commonly used as a rope and for making mats (Fagg and Allison, 2004).  
Acacia senegal is rich in proteins and phosphorus (Cossalter, 1991). It is therefore an 
important source of fodder for the herbivores especially during dry periods (Wickens et al., 
1995; Mallet et al., 2002; Fagg and Allison, 2004).  
Acacia senegal trees are also important for the ecology of the arid and semi-arid 
zones. These trees help to fertilise the soil through the decomposition of leaves which 
reinforces the anti-erosive roots of the tree (Mallet et al., 2002). They fix atmospheric 
nitrogen, and serve for windbreak and dune fixation (Giffard, 1966; Gerakis and Tsangarakis, 
1970; Cossalter, 1991; Barbier, 1992; Wickens et al., 1995). 
Acacia senegal trees are prominently found in a production region called the ‘Gum 
belt’, a broad band stretching across sub-Saharan Africa from East to West over 15 countries 
(Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2. 1. The Gum belt in Africa 
Source: Assoumane et al. (2009)  
Acacia senegal trees are also found in southern Africa, India or Pakistan (Cossalter, 1991; 
NGARA, 2008). In Senegal, the gum production zone corresponds to the northern 
Sylvopastoral Zone (SPZ) commonly called the Ferlo and the agro-sylvopastoral zone also 
known as Eastern Senegal (ES) (Figure 2.2)  
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Figure 2. 2. Map of Senegal and study area (Edited)1 
SPZ covers almost all parts of the regions of Louga, Saint Louis and Matam and ES covers 
the region of Tambacounda. ES has high potential for gum arabic but collection is not widely 
undertaken due to lack of knowledge on harvesting techniques. Furthermore, traders 
concentrated their procurement activities in the SPZ with the aim of minimising transport 
costs thereby maximizing their profits. Such choice was not to the advantage of producers in 
the landlocked ES who received low prices and had to abandon gum collection (Asylia Gum, 
Unpublished). Recent initiatives to revive the sector were undertaken by EXPERNA (Entente 
intervillageoise pour la préservation et l’exploitation des ressources naturelles et agricoles 
du Boundou/Gadiaga), a producer association established in ES. Its aim is to valorise the gum 
product by promoting the ownership and management of natural resources in general and 
Acacia senegal trees in particular (EXPERNA, 2006). 
                                                     
1
 Edited based on World Food Programme et al.’s (2011) livelihood zones of Senegal. 
0 25 50 100 150 200 
 Kilometres 
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2.3 Historical context of gum trade in West Africa  
Gum arabic has been traded for several centuries. Webb (1985) documented that before the 
European maritime revolution, gum arabic used in Europe had come from Arabia and South 
Sudan. Portuguese, French and British sailors discovered gum arabic on the West coast of 
Africa in the 15th century and by the 16th century, it was traded at the embouchure of Senegal 
river (Saint Louis) from where it began to reach European markets; it became an important 
commodity in barter systems together with cloth, sugar, tea and metals in exchange for gold, 
gum arabic and ivory (Commissariat de l’AOF, 1931; Webb, 1985; Sène, 1988).  
From the second half of the 17th century, industrial uses of gum arabic in cotton calico 
textile printing factories and in engraving copper plates induced a steady demand for gum 
arabic; it was important such that it was given attention in the explanation of the mercantile 
system of Great Britain (Smith, 1776; Webb, 1995). According to Alland (1944) and FAO 
(1971), the Senegalese gum sector supplied more than 10 per cent of the world demand in the 
17th century. 
In the early 18th century, competition between British and French traders for control 
over gum trade was intense such that in the first half of the century this competition led into 
open hostilities during the 'Gum Wars' (Webb, 1997). Yet, gum exports from western Sahara 
continued to increase, from 500 or 600 tons per year in the early 18th century to nearly double 
that amount by the 1780s. Gum was the principal export product and its value even exceeded 
the value of the slave export trade (Webb, 1985, 1995). Industries in Great Britain and France 
were not the final users of much of the gum they imported; Webb (1995) confirmed that for 
instance of the gum shipped from Senegal in 1832, only 18 per cent was retained for use in 
France; the remainder was re-exported to other countries.  
In the 1830s, gum exports from Senegal averaged 2,000 tons per year. This second 
doubling took place despite the discovery of the dextrin in France. Dextrin was produced at 
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less than half the price of gum but it was difficult to conserve and hence not suitable to 
several uses to which gum was put (Webb, 1985). By 1850s however, the importance of the 
gum sector in Senegal was gradually being eclipsed by the growth of groundnut cultivation, 
which was spreading from the Upper Guinean and Gambian coasts (Webb, 1985). The French 
tried to increase their area of control through conquests such as of the Djolof in 1890, in order 
to open the region to trade in gum arabic (Freudenberger, 1993a).  
In 1922, France imported about 7,000 tons of gum out of which about 4,000 tons were 
from Senegal and the remaining from Kordofan (Marfaing, 1991). Hence, despite the 
increased groundnut production, colonial administration continued to show interest in gum 
production. This interest is also illustrated by the different decrees promulgated by the 
colonial government in 1936, 1937, 1953, 1955 and 1956. These decrees aimed at 
(re)organising marketing of gum by determining the product chain, imposing prices and 
suggesting techniques for improving productivity (Dabo, 1988; Freudenberger, 1988). 
Following such measures, the gum sector continued to grow even after Senegal’s 
independence: in 1971, gum exports were about 10,000 tons which made it the third producer 
on the world market (DEFCCS, 2005). However, in the droughts of 1968-1974 about 70 per 
cent of Acacia senegal trees perished (Poupon 1977 in Freudenberger 1993a). This led to 
drastic declines in gum production and exports: from 1974 to 1991, exports averaged only 
550 tons (computed from DEFCCS, 2005) and in rare cases these exports exceeded 1,000 tons 
such as in 1974 and 1976. Reforestation efforts undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s by public 
and private projects paid off by the mid-1990s, Senegal’s production levels and exports of 
about 740 tons in 1996 climbed to about 1,050 tons in 1997. However, these exports fell 
dramatically again at the end of the millennium mainly due to the lack of regeneration of trees 
as a result of low rainfall levels (Sène and Ndione, 2007). 
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2.4 Recent trends in gum arabic production and trade 
World production of gum arabic potential is estimated at around 60,000 tons per annum, of 
which 50 per cent or more originate from Sudan. Nigeria and Chad alternately dispute the 
second and third ranks among the producing countries (Alter Africa, 2009). The remaining 
world market supply is shared between other countries including of Sahel West Africa and 
East Africa (Iqbal, 1993; ITC, 2008).  
Almost all gum arabic in the Sahelian zone is exported as raw gum. Senegal is an 
exception, where in addition to raw gum exports domestic gum transformation is developed. 
The processed spray-dried gum is exported; sweets and gum of low quality are sold in local 
markets (DEFCCS, 2005). Figure 2.3 shows exports of gum from Senegal in the period 2000-
2009 in comparison with those of Sudan2. 
 
Figure 2. 3. Exports of gum by Senegal and Sudan (2000-2009) 
Source: COMTRADE (2011), FAOSTAT (2011) 
In the period 2000-2009, while Sudan’s exports were high and rising even above 35,000 tons, 
exports of gum from Senegal remained low, below 1,000 tons and on average about 420 tons; 
they were at their lowest level in 2003 at below 1 ton of gum arabic. Sudan’s exports are 
                                                     
2
 Exports data of Senegal are missing for 2000 and  2002; exports data of Sudan are missing for 2007.  
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fluctuating, whereas exports of Senegal were slowly but steadily increasing: about 955 tons 
were exported in 2009; indeed the sector’s revival is taking place since 2003. Diop (2005) 
explained the low production level in Senegal was a consequence of (1) geographical factors 
in production zones including landlockedness and poor infrastructure that constrain transport 
and distribution channels; (2) marketing factors including that market structures may 
constrain transactions, prices, competition, quality, and information; (3) organizational factors 
including the lack of professionalism that constrain transparency and innovation in the gum 
sector; and (4) political factors including government policies, land tenure systems and 
financing that constrain the gum sector development. All these factors reduce incentives for 
collectors to harvest gum. 
Europe remains the largest importer of gum arabic from Senegal accounting for more 
than 80 per cent of Senegal exports (Table 2.1).  
Table 2. 1. Main importers of gum arabic from Senegal in 2000-2009  
Country Total imports (tons) 
France 2,288.7 
India 487.2 
Brazil 69.7 
United Kingdom 48.5 
Germany 20.0 
Source: COMTRADE (2011) 
France is the largest market for Senegalese gum; imports are mainly realized through the 
IRANEX group and its subsidiary CNI (Colloïdes Naturels International). CNI is the largest 
gum trading company in the world specialising in importing, transforming and re-exporting 
gum (CNI, 2008). India is an emerging importer; it processes and re-exports gum to Europe 
and other Asian countries. Other main importers include Brazil, United Kingdom and 
Germany. There are also small occasional importers including Spain, Sweden, United States 
and Greece. 
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Important factors in the market of gum arabic are price, stability of supply, and 
quality. Exporters fix prices in local markets by considering the FOB price of gum and the 
local expenses for buying the gum (transport, packaging, cleaning, storing); the other actors in 
the supply chain apply the same principle in fixing prices in the production regions based on 
their own costs of commercialisation (Balarabe, 2000). FOB prices are determined in relation 
to the price of gum arabic from Sudan. Figure 2.4 compares export prices of gum arabic from 
Senegal to those of Sudan. 
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Figure 2. 4. Price trends in Senegal and Sudan (2000-2009); FOB prices  
Source: COMTRADE (2011) 
The gum from Sudan fetches the highest prices on the international market. Senegal prices of 
gum arabic follow closely the trends set by Sudan. In 2005, prices were at their highest level 
and subsequently decreased to the lower price levels in 2009. It can be noticed that in 2006, 
Sudan’s price collapsed dramatically below the Senegalese level. 
Supply levels affect prices as historical cases showed that world shortages led to high 
international prices (Fagg and Allison, 2004). The supply is affected by production and 
availability of stocks in the exporting countries; such stocks depend on stability of production 
(Mbaye, 1988). Quality requirements for gum arabic vary depending on the various uses of 
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gum; these requirements follow strict quality specifications (CNI, 2008). Grading of raw gum 
is done only at the export level, based on the form of gum nodules, their sizes and colour, but 
Senegal has not institutionalized a grading system as done in Sudan, Nigeria or Chad.  
2.5  Organisation of the gum supply chain in Senegal 
Better organisation of marketing chains has been recognised as a potential contributor to 
improving supply and quality of gum arabic which would be beneficial for countries and 
thereby collectors (Mbaye, 1988). At this moment, the degree of specialization in gum is low 
in Senegal at collection and marketing level: at the collection level, collectors collect in the 
dry season as a secondary activity, and at the market level, traders trade not only in gum 
arabic, but mainly in other goods (food, non-food and other non-timber forest products).  
The supply chain in Senegal is still organised following the traditionally practices of 
colonial times. Private agents act on behalf of wholesalers, processors (Valdafrique) and 
exporters. The sale of gum by collectors to traders is often based on barter exchanges of gum 
in exchange of other commodities, or on informal contracts in which gum repays for credit or 
commodities received earlier in the season. The role of the government is limited to 
institutional support in terms of regulations which determine the supply chains, and fix 
commercial norms including prices (Commissariat de l’AOF, 1931; FAO, 1971; DEFCCS, 
2005).  
A schematic overview of the current gum supply chain in Senegal is given in Figure 
2.5. The main actors are: (a) local gum markets between gum collectors and local and mobile 
traders; (b) transporters commonly called ‘camionneurs’ who own vehicles; (c) wholesalers; 
and (d) exporters and processing company. In addition, a small branch of the chain involves 
retailers for national consumption of the processed gum or gum of low quality. Each group is 
discussed in more detail below. 
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Figure 2. 5. Supply chain of raw and processed gum arabic  
Source: Sène and Ndione (2007), Ndione et al. (2001). (Edited)  
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The group of gum collectors is large and dispersed, apart from some initiatives to form 
associations and other groups for gum marketing. These group initiatives are still young. 
EXPERNA is the only formally registered collectors’ association in ES. 
Village and mobile traders 
Village traders are distinguished from mobile traders. Village traders are also known as 
‘boutiquiers’ (literally small shop owners). They are established in gum producing villages 
and buy gum throughout the harvesting season. Mobile traders are known as ‘banabana’. 
They buy gum in producing villages, directly from collectors or from village traders. They 
also participate in rural weekly markets or towns neighbouring the production zones. As they 
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they do not have the financial ability to own or hire trucks. Banabana can pre-finance the gum 
collection activities mainly through contracting with large collectors. 
Transactions in the village are done either in cash or as part of interlocked contracts. 
These interlocked contracts result from traditional collaborations between gum collectors and 
shop owners. These collaborations are often based on ethnic relations, friendships, or 
appreciation for support in difficult times (Newbury, 1972; DEFCCS, 2005). Traders provide 
money and basic commodities (water, sugar, tea, rice, etc.) during the lean period (Njomaha, 
2008). In exchange, collectors supply gum to traders at prices agreed upon at the time of 
entering into the contract; these prices are often lower than current market prices and they 
include important interest charges (Fagg and Allison, 2004).  
Apart from the village and mobile traders, the Asylia Gum Company buys gum 
directly from the collectors. The Company is established in Senegal, Mauritania and Mali. In 
Senegal, it started its operations in 1999, not only with the purpose of marketing gum arabic 
but also producing it. Hence, in 2005, it established its own plantations of Acacia senegal on 
12,000 hectares in the SPZ (DEFCCS, 2005). However, these plantations are not yet fully 
productive, and the Company may occasionally buy gum from collectors or primary traders 
(Ndiaye and Signaté, pers. communication). 
Transporters  
Village and mobile traders sell their gum to transporters. These transporters have the financial 
ability to own or hire trucks for transport and are hence commonly called ‘camionneurs’. As 
transporters, they can offer paid transport services to other market participants including 
banabanas. These transporters often operate in weekly markets. On these markets not only 
gum is traded, but many other products and commodities are also exchanged. Thus, these 
transporters use their trucks to bring all kinds of bulk products to the market (e.g., rice, sugar, 
cloths, and shoes), and they take non-timber forest products (gum arabic but also baobab 
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fruits and other gums), agricultural products (millet, groundnuts and others), and livestock 
products (goats and sheep) to the cities.  
In buying gum, transporters often rely on brokers (commonly known as ‘coxeurs’) 
whose function is to serve as informants and put the transporters in direct contact with gum 
sellers. With regard to gum arabic sales, camionneurs are often connected to large wholesalers 
established in larger cities. Wholesalers may advance the necessary money or goods to be 
taken to the market by transporters. 
Wholesalers 
Large traders/wholesalers are located in towns or on key trading routes. There are a few 
wholesalers involved in the Senegalese gum sector: entry is primarily limited by high capital 
requirements for the purpose of specialization. Investment costs include the high cost of 
setting up storage houses or for acquiring transportation modes, and the need to acquire 
business skills and build close business relationships. Wholesalers buy bulky gum from the 
transporters and they usually have an annual contract with exporters or processors. They build 
up stocks of gum and they clean, grade and repackage gum (Mallet et al., 2002); the excess 
stocks or gum of low grade is sold to retailers for local use.  
Exporters and processing company 
As of 2009, there were three individuals and three companies that export gum arabic out of 
Senegal (Niang, pers. communication). The companies are, besides Asylia Gum Company, 
Management Communication International (MCI) and Valdafrique. Individual exporters are 
established in Dakar and in Touba. They sort and grade the gum before exporting it. Asylia 
Gum Company, as mentioned, has its own plantations and buys from collectors and primary 
traders. The exact amount of exports by private operators or Asylia Gum Company is not 
known. 
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MCI is a private company that exports gum arabic and other forest products (e.g., gum 
karaya, powder made from baobab fruits). MCI exports on average 120 tons of gum arabic per 
year; it get supplies from wholesalers established in the city of Touba from SPZ and from 
EXPERNA in ES. 
Valdafrique is exports raw gum and processed gum powder. It started its operations in 
1943. Valdafrique specializes in the processing of gum into final products (sweets, medical 
tablets, etc.). It also transforms gum into a semi-raw material product; this is the spry-dried 
gum powder for the gum-using industries. To maintain its supply, Valdafrique deals directly 
with large wholesalers established in Dahra and Linguère with whom the Company signs a 
contract on an annual basis. Valdafrique buys on average 200 tons per year in Senegal (Sakho, 
pers. communication). The raw gum and powdered gum are exported to Europe and to the 
Valda Company in Brazil. The final products from gum and gum of low quality are sold in the 
local markets. 
The lack of organisation of chain actors and the absence of any protection measure for 
collectors has led to unequal distribution of margins, and collectors continue to receive low 
prices which discouraged them from further collection.  
2.6  Description of study area, livelihoods and gum arabic collection  
Data for the current study were collected in SPZ in departments of Linguère (region of 
Louga), Podor (region of Saint Louis), and Ranérou and Matam (region of Matam) and ES in 
departments of Goudiry and Bakel (region of Tambacounda); these are the regions where 
Acacia senegal trees are found and gum arabic is commercially exploited. The survey in the 
SPZ excluded the Djolof because gum is no longer produced in the sub-zone; a southward 
movement of the production zone has been noticed due to changes in climatic conditions 
(Ndiaye, personal communication, 2008). The departments of Bakel and Goudiry have the 
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highest potential for gum arabic exploitation in ES although throughout ES harvesting 
activities are limited due to a lack of knowledge about harvesting techniques (Figure 2.2). 
SPZ is the area located at the south of the Senegal river valley; it covers an area of 
54,380 sq. km (Mbaye, 2008). Administratively, SPZ covers the regions of Saint-Louis, 
Louga and Matam. Based on ecological characteristics of rainfall, soil type, and vegetation, 
SPZ can be subdivided into five ecological sub-zones including the Basse Vallée Ferlo, 
Grands forages, Djolof, Southern Ferlo and Eastern Ferlo (ISRA/BAME, 1999). Dione and 
Sall (1988) had a wider classification that extends the zone to the east of the groundnut basin, 
and the southern floodplain of Senegal river.  
ES is the region around Tambacounda which covers an area of 42,706 sq. km (ANSD, 
2010d). It is an agro-sylvopastoral zone (van den Breemer et al., 1993). Both SPZ and ES are 
sparsely populated, population densities range between 15 and 47 inhabitants per sq. km 
(ANSD, 2010a,b,c,d). 
SPZ is characterised by two main soil types: clay and sandy soils. These soils are 
suitable for rain fed agriculture (millet, groundnut, niébé); the sandy soils are however easily 
depleted by intensive livestock herding and cultivation due to their fragile nature whereas the 
clay soils suffer from leaching and erosion due to rains (ISRA/BAME, 1999; Mbaye, 2008). 
ES’s soil types include sandy-clay soils and rocky soils. These rocky soils are inherently 
fragile, low in carbon and poor in plants nutrients. Due to high wind erosion, soil fertility 
constantly deteriorates and hence the area suitable for agriculture is reducing in the zone 
(Dione and Sall, 1988; van den Breemer et al., 1993; Manlay et al., 2002; ANSD, 2010d). 
 SPZ has a long dry season of nine months and a rainy season of three to four months; 
the average annual cumulated rainfall is between 210 and 520 mm. The rainy season in ES is 
longer, of four to five months; hence the rainfall is higher, between 460 and 680 mm 
(ANAMS, 2011). Variable rainfall in SPZ or ES implies that drought periods are frequent; 
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woody species and herbaceous shrubs that are thorny and adapted to drought (including 
Acacias) are the prominent vegetation.  
In SPZ, pastoralism is important; pastoralists possess both cattle and small ruminants. 
The abundance of forage plants and their essential contribution to the diet of livestock make 
the zone suitable to livestock rearing. The pastoralists’ livelihoods are essentially based on the 
sale of livestock products; hunting is prohibited by law (Ndione et al., 2001; WFP et al., 
2011). In ES, agriculture and small to medium scale livestock herding are both practiced; rain 
fed crops include cereals and groundnut; vegetables are grown in small irrigated fields (van 
den Breemer et al., 1993; WFP et al., 2011).  
The average incidence of poverty ranges between 36 per cent to 56 per cent of 
households in Louga (SPZ) and Tambacounda (ES) respectively. The moderate incidence of 
poverty is mainly due to remittances and livestock breeding (DPS and World Bank, 2004). 
There are variations within these departments across districts (e.g., the percentage of 
households who live below the poverty line is as high as 60 per cent in Ranérou (Matam) 
whereas in other districts of the same department, the incidence of poverty is 49 per cent 
(ANSD, 2010c)). 
Because of the low and variable rainfall and scarcity of soil nutrients, SPZ and ES are 
characterized by a cyclical insecurity in resource availability (ISRA/BAME, 1999). Natural 
ecosystems and livelihood systems adapt to such harsh conditions of arid and semi-arid areas. 
Plants and animals adapt through evolution or by shifting geographic range; human societies 
adapt by evasion (e.g., by seasonal transhumance) or endurance (e.g., through forage 
management, varying livestock types and numbers, water and soil conservation, or finding 
alternative sources of income) (Mortimore, 1998; DPS, 2005; Mbaye, 2008; Running and 
Mills, 2009; Seymour and Desmet, 2009). Collection of non-timber products is also practiced 
for the purpose of adaptation; it enables households to generate off-farm income as these 
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products are widely marketed. Apart from gum arabic werek (Acacia senegal), non-timber 
products collected in the SPZ and ES include soump (Balanites aegyptiaca), bouy or monkey 
bread (Adansonia digitata), mbep (Sterculia setigera), and jujube (Ziziphus mauritania) 
(ISRA/BAME, 1999). Note that the proportion of the non-timber forest products used at home 
is very small.  
Data collected among 422 collectors of gum arabic in SPZ and ES during February-
May 2009 showed that collection of gum arabic is undertaken mainly as a secondary activity 
to pastoralism (68 per cent of respondents in SPZ and 5 per cent in ES) or agriculture (28 per 
cent of respondents in SPZ and 82 per cent in ES). Other activities practiced include petty 
trade and sales of timber (although this is normally regulated by law (Ndione et al., 2001; 
DEFCCS, 2005)). Non-farm remunerated jobs and remittances also contribute to the 
household income (respectively 6 per cent and 3 per cent in SPZ and 3 per cent and 4 per cent 
in ES).  
Ndione et al. (2001) found that revenues from gum sales are used by households for 
consumption smoothing and to buy live animals and seeds; this pattern is still followed 
whether for the purpose of coping with emergencies or accumulating wealth: collectors use 
the income from sale of gum arabic mainly to buy food items (46 per cent of respondents in 
SPZ and 52 per cent in ES), buy livestock (18 per cent in SPZ and 6 per cent in ES), buy 
seeds and other agricultural inputs (4 per cent in SPZ and 10 per cent in ES). Other expenses 
made from gum income include acquisition of household necessities and clothing, payments 
for health services, building houses and even paying-off debts.  
The contribution of gum income to the household’s food access is important as 
households may not be able to sufficiently meet their food requirements especially because, 
the Senegalese society being polygamous, households are quite large. On average, households 
are composed of 9 to 11 members of whom 5 to 7 of these are children. While in rural 
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systems ‘the marginal utility of each additional child is normally strongly positive’ as children 
can assist in home and farming activities (Gould and Brown, 1996 in Mortimore, 1998), in 
gum collection, these children are not an extra source of labour as collection is undertaken 
only by the adult (male) members of the household (the youngest collector in the sample was 
20 years old). This is because of the need to acquire knowledge and skills associated with 
tapping and collection and also due the thorny structure of Acacia trees. These skills are 
mainly acquired through experience which is on average 21 years in SPZ and 6 years in ES.  
Gum collection is indeed a recent activity in ES and collectors learnt about the 
techniques of tapping and collection through trainings organised by EXPERNA (56 per cent 
of respondents) or from their neighbours (37 per cent). In SPZ, collectors mainly learn from 
their parents (82 per cent). Only 4 per cent of respondents in SPZ had attended a training on 
gum collection. Instead of such formal trainings, collectors in SPZ mostly rely on informal 
advices provided by forest agents (71 per cent) or other collectors (26 per cent). The latter are 
also sources of information related to gum marketing including on prices or availability of 
buyers. 
The main constraint of collecting gum in Senegal is that forests where Acacia trees are 
found are mainly community/open access zones which make the allocation and enforcement 
of the rights to ownership and use difficult (Sall, 1997). These forests are located at long 
distances from villages, not easily accessible (as reported by 34 per cent of respondents in 
SPZ and 7 per cent in ES), and insecure due to human or animal attacks (reported by 25 per 
cent of respondents in SPZ and 49 per cent in ES). Due to unclear property rights, thefts cases 
are frequent where after tapping the gum is picked by another person (9 per cent of 
respondents in SPZ and 16 per cent in ES reported being outraged by cases of theft). Such 
cases may even lead to conflicts (Freudenberger 1993a, Sall 1997). Furthermore, livestock 
migration also leads to destruction of trees and other abuses to trees inflicted by shepherds 
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(Cissokho, pers. communication); these actions lead to forest degradation and some collectors 
reported that indeed trees are becoming very sparse or even extinct. Bush fires are another big 
problem especially in ES according to 17 per cent of respondents. If these fires are not 
controlled, they lead to considerable damage both to natural resources and the human habitat 
(CSE, 2009). 
Factors that constrain gum marketing include low prices (reported by 77 per cent in 
SPZ and 49 per cent in ES), difficulties to reach the market (reported by 9 per cent in SPZ), 
and in certain cases there is not even a buyer (20 in SPZ and 9 per cent in ES). Due to low 
quantities bought each year, traders’ strategies are to restrict their area of operation to 
accessible zones in order to reduce transportation costs. Producers in other locations may 
therefore have no access to the market. They are compelled to accept the low prices offered 
by local traders. The consequence of such strategy is that collection in remote areas is 
discouraged. 
Quality is another problem in gum marketing. Collectors deplore the weight loss of 
gum arabic at the time of marketing (63 per cent in SPZ and 3 per cent in ES). Such loss 
occurs often when gum is harvested before it sufficiently matures. This is just one aspect of 
quality deficiency as for instance gum may also be not cleaned of its impurities such as barks 
of trees or dust when picked from the ground.  
The supply chain is not sufficiently developed to pay the collectors according to the 
quality of the gum supplied. They are currently only paid on quantity and hence there is little 
incentive for them to present cleaner gum or to grade the gum.  
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Market considerations for gum arabic collection in Senegal 
Abstract 
Low returns from marketing of non-timber forest products (NTFP) such as gum arabic restrict 
their collection. In this chapter, a hypothesis is tested that access to ‘better and more 
remunerative’ markets would give collectors more incentives to collect and market gum. 
IvTobit models analyse the determinants of gum collection including the endogenous 
expected price. A conditional logit model analyses the determinants of the choice of market 
outlet including proportional transaction costs of marketing gum. Data was collected in 
Northern and Eastern regions of Senegal from 422 gum collectors. Results show that gum 
collection is responsive to price and hence market incentives, by expanding and securing the 
collection area, and by factors improving labour productivity. The choice of a market outlet is 
positively influenced by price but negatively influenced by collectors’ competition or the 
preference for a particular trader, and high proportional transaction costs especially associated 
with transport.  
Keywords: transaction costs, market choice, IvTobit, conditional logit, semi-arid lands, gum 
arabic. 
3.1 Introduction 
Marketing of agricultural products has been the subject of several studies that viewed the 
farmers’ limited participation in markets as a constraint to market-based development 
strategies. These strategies aimed at facilitating wealth creation and poverty reduction 
(Makhura et al., 2001). Goetz (1992), Key et al. (2000), Holloway et al. (2001) and Bellemare 
and Barrett (2006) focused on the market participation decision that involved a choice of 
whether to participate in the market (buy, sell, or remain autarkic), and the volume to transact. 
Their studies assumed that production was already optimized by all households. Recently, 
Burke (2009) insisted on the need to recognise that products may not be produced by all 
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households. This is because households make a conscious decision regarding whether to 
produce or not, which is a step prior to any market related decision. His expanded framework 
thereby addressed the possibility that market participation can partially be determined by 
exogenous factors, as production decisions are made on what and how much to produce. 
We analyse the decision making process of gum collectors as an important non-timber 
forest product in the research area: the participation decision is the decision to collect or not 
and next, the choice is made of where to sell among the available alternative markets. A 
particularity with regards to the collection decision is the open access to forests that a majority 
of the collectors enjoy. The decision to collect can be made instantly at harvest time, with 
labour being the main input. Underlying the decision to collect is the decision to sell because 
of the absence of the own consumption conditions that are found e.g., in Goetz (1992) or 
Bellemare and Barret (2006): in the current study, collection of gum arabic is “always” 
associated with the intention to participate in the market as the household’s own consumption 
of gum is very minimal. The decision to collect hence results in the quantity to collect 
conditional on which, actual market participation takes place. Here collectors choose where to 
transact i.e., in the village or market; this is a decision of the market in which this gum is sold. 
The hypothesis tested in this paper is that if collectors (producers) were able to access a 
‘better’ market, this will give them more incentives to collect (produce) and market gum (their 
products). 
High transaction costs were found to be key reasons for the failure of farmers to 
participate in markets (e.g., Skoufias, 1995; Key et al., 2000) or for the choice between 
different governance structures or different markets (Williamson 1991, 1998; Hobbs, 1997; 
Fafchamps and Hill, 2005; Gong et al., 2006). Transaction costs create deviations between the 
effective buying and selling price (e.g., Sadoulet et al., 1998, Burke, 2009). They also have 
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adverse effects on the amount traded (e.g., Skoufias, 1995) and productivity (e.g., Lanzona 
and Evenson, 1997). 
A distinction can be made between proportional and fixed transaction costs: 
proportional transaction costs vary with the quantity traded whereas fixed transaction costs 
are independent of the quantities traded and are household specific (e.g., de Janvry et al., 
1991; Goetz, 1992; Allen, 2000; Key et al., 2000; Holloway et al., 2001; Vakis et al., 2003; 
Irle and Sass, 2006). Fixed transactions costs include search, information, bargaining and 
monitoring costs (Goetz, 1992; Vakis et al., 2003). Goetz (1992) also included in these costs 
the physical distance to the market and use of transport mode. Proportional transactions costs 
include, for instance, the transport cost per unit of product (Vakis et al., 2003). In market 
participation, a decision to trade is affected by both fixed and proportional transaction costs: 
economies of scale can be gained in fixed transaction costs as quantities increase, whereas, 
once the fixed transaction costs are covered, the extent of participation (i.e., amount traded) 
depends on proportional costs. 
Relationships between trading parties are the instruments of reducing transaction 
costs. They contribute to lowering the risk of opportunistic behaviour by one or more of the 
trading partners such as misrepresenting quality or running away without making payment 
(Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin, 2006). Relationships are fostered by the ability to identify a 
particular trading partner. Yet, this trading partner does not very often change because the 
search and screening costs for a new partner may be too high or the change may not result in 
higher prices than those offered by a regular partner (Eaton et al., 2007). Regularity with 
trading partners extending over a long period of time is also important as it leads to a certain 
level of comprehension and ‘routines’ (Slangen et al., 2008). These routines can reduce 
transaction costs such as in negotiating price or in monitoring informal agreements. Routines 
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are supported by reputation which then becomes an enforcement mechanism (Pint and 
Baldwin, 1997). 
The theory of transaction costs provides a framework for the analysis of gum 
collectors’ decision making process in respect to collection/production and marketing: we 
assume that high transaction costs not only constrain the marketing decision but also 
collection. This is especially relevant in the case of open access resources and where the time 
lag between collection and market decision is short. We assume that fixed transaction costs 
influence the decision to collect and market simultaneously. Therefore, the decision to collect 
and quantity of gum collected depend on collection/production factors (the accessibility of 
trees and the labour effort exerted) and on important fixed transaction costs. We impute 
proportional transaction costs to the market choice stage as the collector, having made the 
choice of collecting gum, is faced with the choice of selling gum either in the village or in a 
distant market. This choice is based on the level of proportional transaction costs. 
In sum, we argue that transaction costs play an important role both at the level of 
collection (production) and the choice of market outlet. A combination of both types of 
transaction costs is of interest from a practical as well as a theoretical point of view. Fixed 
transaction costs which were previously found to have an effect on whether to trade or not, 
may influence the collection decision as this decision is directly associated with the intention 
to participate in the market. Once the fixed transaction costs are covered and the collector 
decides to ‘collect’ a certain amount of gum, the collector needs to sell the gum. Proportional 
transaction costs which were previously associated with the quantity traded, may, in the 
current case, be extended to the choice of market. This is because the quantity to trade is 
already known from the optimisation of collection but markets have different transaction costs 
structures.  
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In Senegal, gum arabic is collected during the dry season from natural forests or 
artificial plantations. Collectors often tap trees (Acacia senegal), by making incisions on the 
branches following specific tapping techniques (see Okatahi and Onyibe (1999) for details). 
Collectors experience problems in collection because of long distances to the collection areas 
and long hours of labour in harsh, dry, dusty and hot sub-Sahel conditions. In marketing, 
problems include difficulties of finding a competitive market (in the few gum markets, traders 
are suspected to exhibit exploitative tendencies), and low and continuously diminishing 
prices. Price incentives to produce more gum or to upgrade its quality are also lacking. The 
objective of this study is to investigate whether better markets are conducive to production in 
terms of the gum collector’s behaviour related to the collection of gum and the amount to 
collect, and consecutively on the choice of a market outlet, i.e., a local village or a more 
distant market. The decisions to collect and market gum influence each other and are almost 
taken simultaneously, but in this study, they are dealt with in separate models. The current 
study takes the case of gum arabic collection, but the investigation is broader as it could 
pertain to production and marketing decisions in other non-timber forestry or agricultural 
sectors. 
3.2 Methodology 
A theoretical model for analysing gum collection and selling 
In this section, a general theoretical model is developed with the aim of setting the economic 
basis for the collector’s decision process to collect and sell gum.  
Consider a household involved in gum collection: the quantity of raw gum collected in 
a certain period () depends on labour hours (ℎ), the local presence of gum trees (), and on 
trading expectations such that: 
	 = 		(ℎ, , ), 	 > 0;		 < 0    (1)  
With 	and 	 as the first and second order conditions respectively. 
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The inclusion of labour assumes that there are no other physical inputs used as is typically the 
case for open access resources. The market wage could be determined seasonally; but 
generally only family labour is involved in gum collection.  
Collectors are mainly members of pastoral communities and gum is collected in the 
dry season when crop production activities are low and livestock has migrated. Hence, the 
problem of competition in terms of labour hours that could jointly involve collection with 
herding activities seldom occurs. As a consequence, collection can only be considered as a 
supplementary activity to pastoralism. Moreover, a ‘professional’ collector is often a person 
different from the herder and other occasional (non-professional) collectors. While the active 
professional collectors know and apply the techniques for sustainable gum collection; 
occasional collectors are interested in immediate gains that may accrue when gum prices are 
high. Herders do not fall in either category, especially due to their young age and 
inexperience. They just wildly ‘pick’ the gum.  
An implicit opportunity cost of labour is leisure in terms of the trade-off between the 
inconvenience of collection and the income that can be generated from collection (Beshai, 
1984).  
The trading behaviour of collectors is examined in steps corresponding to three types 
of transaction costs namely transport costs, search for buyer and frequency of transactions or 
repeated sales  
Place/outlet of sale – town market versus village: 
The gum collected in the period must be sold. It might be sold in the village in which the 
collector resides (distance  ≈ 0), at price  and no extra work such as grading is needed. In 
this case the return to the labour hours is .	If the opportunity costs are , the household 
will extend efforts such that: 
	 =     (2) 
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The gum might also be sold in a distant ‘town’ market, without additional work on the 
product, at a price . Assume that the village price  is lower than the town market price  
( < ); travelling to the town is therefore a way to improve the price that a collector gets. 
(In some cases, however, a unique price may be offered in village and town with the purpose 
of strengthening relationships and maintaining a ‘clientèle’ in gum transactions.)  
Let the difference between village and town price be written as: 
 = ( − )    (3) 
If  is positive, then the collector will sell his gum in the town market and if D is negative, 
the collector will remain in the village. However, 	should take into account costs of 
transporting to and selling gum in town by collectors or of buying gum in the village by 
traders as well as costs incurred in making the transaction. 
Transport costs: 
Let transport costs be: 
	 = 	    (4) 
Where 	is the unit cost of distance for a standard quantity of 1: the transport costs vary with 
the quantity transported through 	Є	[0, 1]. At constant  and at 	 = 	0, the transport cost is 
not affected by the (small) quantity; at 	 = 1, the cost is proportional to the quantity.  
Total transport costs depend on the distance that the collector or trader has to travel 
(). Furthermore, there is a time ($) involved in going to town by the collector or to the 
village by a trader. This time should be multiplied by an opportunity cost of labour (), the 
foregone leisure. For a trader, another opportunity cost is the foregone earnings from other 
villages/markets he could visit (v). If transactions are made in town, we assume that the trader 
will not go the village but he waits for the farmers to come to town; in this case, his cost of 
going to buy in the village is higher than the cost of buying in the market and the collector 
bears the transport costs. 
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Search for buyer:  
The choice of a buyer involves search costs. Suppose for simplicity that the prices prevailing 
in town (with different traders) are distributed homogeneously, over a range from %	to . 
Randomly selecting a trader yields the price: 
& = '( 	(% + )            (5) 
If the collector goes to see two traders, the expected price improves from % + '( ( − %) to 
% + (* ( − %). For  visited traders, the expected price improves to: 
+ = % + ++,' ( − %)    (6) 
If each visit would cost the collector -	hours and each hour cost , then the trade-off of going 
to town or not is the difference between the expected benefits and opportunity costs: 
[% + ++,' ( − %)] − [(- + $)]        (7) 
For the optimal , it should hold that: 
'(+,'). /0 − 12 − - = 0    (8) 
or  
 = 3(45647)89: − 1                         (9) 
Thus, the number of traders visited should increase with larger price ranges and with quantity 
for sale; but it diminishes with wage and time needed to visit a trader. Furthermore, if the 
expected price at town level is not much higher than the expected net price at village level i.e., 
when the value added of going to town is low in comparison to the trade-off between benefits 
and costs of going to town; then logically, collectors will not go to town because this will not 
bring in any extra benefits.  
Note that - can also be interpreted in terms of transaction cost attributes such as 
uncertainty associated with price offers, regularity of transactions or specificity of the asset to 
sell. For instance, when the collector sells his gum in the village, the price offered is assumed 
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to be known, at least negotiable without costs, as the collector sees the village trader often 
enough and hence uncertainty with regard to price is low. In such a situation, a single or few 
traders are present who are the actual buyers of gum in the village and collectors have 
frequent transactions with this (these) trader(s).  
From the above derivations, we see that the value added of going to town i.e., 
expected benefits minus costs over selling in the town, with  buyers visited and the best 
price offer taken, is: 
(+ − ) − [(- + $) + ]	     (10) 
A decision of going to town is positive only if (10) is positive:  
;% + ++,' ( − %) − <  − [(- + $) + ] > 0    (11) 
or  
++,' ( − %) − - > ( − %) + $ + 	                    (12) 
This expression shows how a decision of going to town can be influenced by the quantity to 
transact: increasing Q increases the left hand side (LHS) with increments almost equal to the 
price range in town, and the right hand side (RHS) with increments equal to the difference 
between the village price and the lowest price in town (this may even be negative) plus 
transport costs. 
For  = 1, the expression shows that : 
'( ( + %) − - >  + $ +	=   (13) 
Or that the expected returns to visiting one trader in town should exceed the price paid in the 
village plus the costs of going to town. For larger , the LHS of equation (12) increases by an 
ever smaller share of the spread in sale revenues in town and continuously decreases by the 
fixed costs of visiting extra traders. If the LHS started as positive, then for some  it must turn 
negative. The optimal, feasible  is determined by the minimum of the optimal price 
difference between village and town, as defined by equation (9). 
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Repeated transactions:  
As a final step in the reasoning, I consider repeated transactions. A collector may go to town 
once, find out that prices are unattractive compared to the village shop and decide to sell to 
the village shop for a while. Only after some time, he will undertake another exploratory visit 
to town to see if this would pay off. 
Furthermore, a collector who strikes a good bargain in town may go there again, and 
will not have to incur the costs of finding the best bargain (at least, not until he starts having 
doubts about his counterpart); hence the expenditure on selecting the best trader is regarded as 
an investment. In this case the comparison is made about the quantity of gum to sell and 
between one visit in town and selling to the village shop. We would observe collectors who 
sell in the village because their quantities are too small, their search cost is high, who had no 
luck in finding a better deal in town, or whose opportunity costs of time are too high. 
The model developed above assumes that choice of selling in village or travelling to a 
town market is mutually exclusive. However, collectors may participate in both outlets by 
deciding on distributing the quantities across the different outlets. This decision is not 
included in the current study. The general model also leaves out the quality aspects by which 
the collector could obtain a price premium for e.g., cleaning and grading which may differ 
between the village and town. The quality aspect will be explored in the next chapter 
(findings in the case study area suggest that traders (in the village or town) do not provide any 
quality premium). 
Operationalisation of the model  
The model is operationalised by investigating factors that affect the decision to collect gum 
and amount collected and subsequently the choice of sale outlet. The decision to collect is 
associated with an intention to sell gum but the subsequent actual sale decision is associated 
with the choice of a sale place. We argue that these decisions are affected by a different set of 
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transaction costs: fixed transactions costs have to be covered in the collection decision 
whereas proportional transaction costs affect the extent of participation in terms of the choice 
of sale outlet (as predicted by the model). 
Defining Q 
Collection of gum begins with the exudation that occurs from about four years of tree growth 
depending on exogenous conditions such as rainfall, humidity, temperature, or soil conditions. 
Acacia senegal trees are found in the semi-dry areas, mainly in natural forests and in artificial 
plantations realized by either reforestation projects (majority), or by private companies and 
individuals (Dione, 1998; AGC, 2007; CNI, 2008). Gum is harvested in the dry season. 
Exudation occurs when the bark of the tree breaks due to heat or wind, or by deliberate 
tapping of trees. After 7 to 15 days when the gum has sufficiently matured, it is harvested 
from the tree. Apart from exogenous factors such as heat, wind, or rainfall (and consequently 
the tree water retention), the actual amount of gum collected in a specific location depends on 
factors such as the density of trees and the labour effort involved in collection (Equation (1)).  
For a single collector, the number of trees harvested depends on factors such as tree 
availability, tree accessibility, and distance to plot:  
- availability of Acacia trees is indicated at village level by two variables: (a) Area of Acacia 
senegal which was obtained from the Global Land cover network (GLCN) database of 
Senegal (GLCN, 2009). Acacia senegal trees are found in the classification of trees and 
shrubs taking into account the vegetation distribution within a radius of 15 kilometres around 
the village and (b) Rainfall which is the average of the cumulated rainfall during June-
October in the period 1991-1998; it gives an indication of the normal long-term rainfall level 
in the village (UMR HydroSciences, 2005). While the large Acacia senegal area shows a high 
propensity for gum collection, a high normal rainfall decreases the amount collected due to 
low environmental stress (Blunt, 1926, Elrayah et al., 2012).  
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- access to trees refers to private or common ownership of gum trees and/or plots. Private 
plots are found with collectors who have planted their own Acacia senegal trees or through 
permanent ownership by inheritance, requests from village chiefs, or formal acquisitions from 
local authorities. Communal plots are harvested through formal or informal agreements, with 
or without permit from the forestry service. Field visits do not suggest differences in technical 
management between private and common plots. In the analysis, individual tree accessibility 
is captured by a dummy variable of harvesting on a communal plot, and a variable giving the 
number of collectors who harvest gum in the same plot because competition among producers 
leads to a high risk of theft and hence is expected to have a negative effect on the individual 
quantity of gum collected. 
- distance to the plot: collection at distances closer to the village involves more competition 
than at longer distances. Due to insecure ownership and required protection, collection at 
longer distances may yield smaller quantities than collection at distances closer to the village. 
Furthermore, such long distances have an effect on travel time.  
Furthermore, the quantity harvested will also depend on the collector’s productivity. 
Two variables related to labour productivity are used, namely:  
- collectors’ experience: with more experience, the collector does not spend unnecessary time 
in the plot; he can tap a lot faster with efficient tapping techniques. Hence experience has a 
positive effect on the amount harvested through the potential knowledge acquired over time. 
- number of adult collectors in the household has a positive impact on the quantity collected 
through labour division in the family: the older/more experienced producers can tap and the 
relatively younger collectors can pick the gum from the tree. This division of labour would 
increase the total quantity of gum collected by the household.  
An indication of alternative occupation to gum collection is also included as a proxy of 
the opportunity cost of labour: 
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-livestock values: wealthy pastoralists may not need any income supplement from collecting 
gum as they are already better off; hence for them gum collection might just be a secondary 
activity. For the less wealthy, gum collection may generate substantial revenues that could 
contribute to improving their livelihoods; hence they may keep gum collection as a principal 
activity and realize substantial quantities. Both activities might remain complementary 
especially because they do not involve labour competition. 
Factors influencing expected gum sales-Defining the RHS of equation (12) 
Apart from the above factors directly influencing the quantity of gum collected, a decision to 
collect gum is based on expectations from trading associated with the intention to participate 
in the market. The expected price is a proxy of trading expectations. 
The expected price is the average price obtained from the previous gum harvesting season. 
The current gum price is most often determined by the trader depending on his estimation of 
marketing and transaction costs but also on the quantity supplied in relation to demand. 
Moreover, there are variations in price throughout seasons and across years. Irrespective of 
these variations, the average price obtained by the collectors in the previous season may give 
an indication of the price on which the producer bases his decision. The inclusion of the price 
implies that the collector makes a choice of collection knowing that he wants to sell his gum: 
a collector intends to access a market as he has made the necessary investments in fixed 
transaction costs so that he can reach this market based on the price he expects to get for the 
produce.  
The expected price may be economically endogenous: in the context where access to 
markets improves collection because better prices are offered, reverse causal effects exist 
whereby the quantity supplied on markets is the basis for market development. Statistical 
instruments for the price are : (a) distance to town: this is the physical distance estimated in 
kilometres from the village to the nearest rural town. It indicates that the price to the collector 
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is determined in reference to how remote his village is, the farther the village from town, the 
lower would be the price; (b) interlocked relations: a dummy variable refers to whether the 
collector is involved in interlocked transactions with traders. These traders finance gum arabic 
harvesting activities and other economic operations by providing capital, tools and other basic 
commodities (water, sugar, tea, rice, etc.) for households to get by during the lean period 
(Njomaha, 2008). Collectors pay back in kind at equivalent prices topped-up with important 
credit charges (Fagg and Allison, 2004). Such interlocked relations imply that the market 
where to sell gum is already chosen in advance for the purpose of reimbursing the credit; (c) 
fixed transaction costs arise due to household resources that must be devoted a priori to the 
decision to participate in the market (Holloway et al., 2001). In this study, three variables are 
used to account for these costs: (i) a dummy variable for possession of transport mean: 
whether a bicycle, horse or donkey cart that would facilitate transport to the plots specially if 
they are situated at a long distance from the village, the long distances normally prevent the 
collector from doing frequent visits and if the collector does not possess such means, he may 
be able to collect only in plots located nearby the village; (ii) access to information: given 
high search costs for a buyer and negotiation costs, easy access to information plays an 
important role in the collectors’ decision to collect gum and participate in the market, this 
dummy variable refers to whether or not the collector said he has had information on market 
conditions (the market price and other market requirements, e.g., delivery conditions); and 
(iii) a dummy variable for selling through producers’ group: because the group gives a 
market assurance (e.g., the association or group might secure a sale contract with a company 
or exporter) and better prices (e.g., through higher bargaining power). 
Economically, better collectors may group with each other and being in a group may 
entail high production; this would imply a self-selection choice of being in the group. Thus, 
the choice of participating in a group is instrumented by age (older producers may be attracted 
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by the group due to the experience acquired); household size (large households may need not 
to participate in a group as they have power on their own); education (relatively more 
educated farmer can correctly evaluate the advantages of group marketing); and dummies for 
the perception of whether it is easy to collect gum in terms of distance to the collection plot or 
access to trees. It is assumed that becoming part of a group is a response to perceiving such 
accessibility problems. Hence, these dummies indicate whether the collector has indeed the 
possibility to collect gum given the difficulties involved in travelling to the collection areas 
and finding trees, but also that he can expect to be the collector of the gum exudating from the 
incision made by him with relatively low risk of theft. The higher the perceived ease, the 
higher will be the probability of belonging to a group.  
Market choice behaviour 
Similar to other non-timber forest products, gum is traded in relatively small volumes and 
production is dispersed over wide areas; hence the quantity and quality of these products can 
be very unreliable within and across season (Belcher and Schreckenberg, 2007; Ros-Tonen, 
2011). As collection of these products is done in remote areas, with poorly developed 
communications and transportation infrastructure, it makes it difficult and costly to move 
products to distant physical markets. Sales may be made in the village if a village buyer is 
there or an itinerant buyer is willing to come to the village.  
The gum chain in Senegal comprises of three components (Figure 2.5): transactions 
are made between (a) gum collectors and village/mobile traders; (b) village/mobile traders 
and transporters (c) transporters and wholesalers and (d) wholesalers and private exporters or 
processing companies. A small branch of the chain involves the distribution of processed gum 
through retailers for national consumption. Local markets are the entry into the gum supply 
chain. These markets include exchanges in the village or at distant markets in rural town. 
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Village traders are the established shop-owners (boutiquiers); mobile traders go to different 
villages or markets, buying directly from farmers or boutiquiers.  
More than 70 per cent of transactions in gum arabic are done on weekly markets, held 
in relatively commercialized rural towns (Diop, 2005). Apart from gum arabic, village 
inhabitants in general take the opportunity to participate in such weekly markets in order to 
sell their products (from farming or handicrafts). In exchange, they obtain from mobile 
traders, commercial goods including rice, sugar, salt, shoes, cloth or items related to livestock 
keeping, etc. These mobile traders form a link between the remote villages and the rural 
towns. They attend several markets in a week mainly depending on the accessibility of these 
markets and possibility to minimize transport costs. The markets are also a time for social 
gathering.  
As predicted by our theoretical model, collectors will choose to sell either in the 
village or distant town market by comparing the respective net benefits in terms of 
convenience and economic profitability to the cost of transacting. Fafchamps and Hill (2005) 
dealt with a similar decision of market outlet by farmers whether to sell at farm-gate or to 
transport their produce to the market. They found that the preference to go to the market 
entails a higher price for the crop in relation to wealth (wealth was measured as the value of 
all non-land wealth of the household including the value of buildings), but that one has to 
consider the quantity to sell, the distance to the market and the cost associated with 
transportation. 
Factors influencing the choice of gum sales place- determining the LHS of equation (12) 
Having collected the gum, an actual decision of going to the market or staying in the village is 
made. Following our theoretical model and in light of literature, the variables included to 
investigate the choice of sale place are categorized into choice specific variables, proportional 
transaction costs and individual related variables: 
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- choice specific variables are the variables that do not vary between individuals but with 
respect to the specific option of selling in the village or at a distant town market. These 
variables are (a) sale price: as the model would predict, a higher sale price at any selling 
point, ceteris paribus, is more attractive to the collector; (b) number of potential buyers is the 
total number of traders in a physical market or village who trade in gum arabic. It indicates 
buyers’ competition which raises the price thereby increasing the probability of selling. Yet, 
buyers may also collude and offer a lower price especially because they have higher 
bargaining power in comparison to collectors; and, (c) number of sellers in the market is the 
approximate number of other collectors who regularly sell in the village or at the market. 
- market specific proportional transaction costs  are calculated per unit of the quantity 
supplied. They include (a) transport cost per unit of product which was calculated by 
assuming that a collector would hire a donkey cart for transporting his gum to the market and 
taking into account the distance to the selling place at an estimated flat rate of 75 CFA per 
kilometre divided by the quantity to transact; (b) transaction time per unit of product: this is 
the time spent delivering a unit of the product to the market obtained by the square of the 
reported time (in minutes) divided by the quantity to transact. The squared time indicates that 
time is expected to be a decreasing function of the quantity supplied; and (c) frequency of sale 
which is the reported number of times of transacting with a buyer. Frequency has the effect of 
reducing the cost of transacting through the relationships established with the trader as 
proposed in literature (Pint and Baldwin, 1997; Eaton et al., 2007; Slangen et al., 2008). Note 
that the transport cost per unit of product and transaction time per unit of product are 
potentially endogenous because they are inversely proportional to the quantity to transact 
which would then be a determinant for the market choice. In the absence of proper 
instruments of these variables, a careful relational interpretation is therefore more appropriate.    
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- individual specific variables are the variables that vary across individuals but remain 
unchanged for the specific market choice. The variables include (a) household size: the 
collector may make the choice between the market and village based on other commodities 
the household needs. Arguably, a large household has a wide range of needs for food, 
medicines, and other products. This will increase the probability to go to the market where he 
will acquire them; and (b) age: we assume that the old collectors might prefer to stay in the 
village. 
Table 3. 1 summarizes the factors influencing gum collection and choice of sale outlet. 
Table 3. 1. Summary of factors influencing gum collection and choice of sale outlet 
Variable Expected influence 
1. Decision to collect and quantity collected 
Availability of A. senegal (village variables)  
Area of A. senegal (sq.km) + 
Average rainfall (‘000 mm) - 
Access to trees  
Common plot management (1:common property) - 
Number of collectors in same plot (persons) - 
Distance to plot (km) -/+ 
Labour productivity  
Collection experience (years) + 
Number of adult collectors in household (persons) + 
Wealth of livestock (‘00000 CFA) -/+ 
Expected price (CFA/kg) + 
2. The choice of sale place 
Choice specific factors  
Sale price (CFA/kg) + 
Number of potential buyers (person) + 
Number of sellers (person) - 
Proportional choice specific transaction costs  
Transport cost per unit (CFA/kg) - 
Time to transact (minute/kg) - 
Frequency of sale (1: more than one time transaction) + 
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Individual specific factors  
Household size (persons) + 
Age (years) - 
Econometric modelling 
The model design follows stages in the collector’s decision. In the first stage, the collector 
decides about whether to collect or not based on an intention to participate in the market and 
simultaneously, the optimal quantity to collect. In the second stage, having collected gum, the 
choice is about actual market participation that involves a choice of sale place (outlet). 
The decision to collect and quantity collected can be assumed to be a single decision 
such that collectors are solving an optimization problem of the amount to collect based on the 
net price (as the expected returns minus all costs). Thus,  is an observable outcome that 
takes on the value 0 with positive probability. Hence it is a continuous random variable over 
strictly positive values; for some of these collectors, the optimal choice will be the corner 
solution i.e.,  = 	0. As Wooldridge (2002) explained, censoring is not the issue in such 
context as there are no unobservable characteristics associated with the particular decision of 
whether to collect or not. Yet, least squares estimations cannot be applied as they may 
produce negative predictions and are not efficient. A Tobit type 1 model should be used. In 
this study, an instrumental variable tobit (IvTobit) model is applied where the amount 
collected is determined by the production factors and the endogenous expected price.  
In the second stage, the choice is made of actual market participation whereby the 
collector decides of a sale place (whether in the village or at a distant market). A binary 
choice model would normally be used to analyse the determinants of such choice. Here, we 
take advantage of availability of information on variables related to both market alternatives 
and not just on the chosen alternative, and estimate a conditional logit model. As clarified by 
McFadden (1974), the choice behaviour in conditional logit is specifically explained by the 
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attributes of alternatives available to individuals making the decision and characteristics of 
these individuals. 
The conditional logit model follows a random utility model (Greene, 2008): there are 
>	alternatives among which a choice is made; ?= represents a vector of choice-specific 
attributes such that the utility level of choosing @	for an individual A is 
B=C = D?=C + E=C   (14) 
D is constant across choices. Hence @ is chosen if it has the highest utility among all > choices: 
B=C > B=F  for all G ≠ @  (15) 
The choice of place to sell is influenced by characteristics of the sale place (distance, price) 
and proportional transaction costs associated with the outlet (such as transport per unit). In 
addition, this decision might also be influenced by the collector’s characteristics. Because 
these individual-specific variables do not change within each case, the alternative-specific 
conditional logit is used. 
Data and sampling 
Data was collected during February-June 2009 in the Sylvopastoral Zone (SPZ) and Eastern 
region of Senegal (ES). In the Sylvopastoral zone, the survey focused on town markets, 
sixteen such markets were visited. In Eastern Senegal, three town markets and thirteen 
villages were also visited. Structural interviews were held with 183 producers in the 
Sylvopastoral and 239 producers in the Eastern region. 
3.3 Results  
A large percentage of collectors of gum arabic had decided to collect in the 2009 season but 
they differ in terms of collection variables. Differences between SPZ and ES are also 
observed (Table 3.2).  
  
  
54 
 
Table 3. 2. Overview of mean values of determinants of gum collection, group 
membership and choice of sale place by regiona 
Variable Senegal 
(422) 
SPZ  
(183) 
ES 
(239) 
Equality testd 
bQuantity collected (kg) 446.4 
(693.08) 
875.2 
(879.39) 
120.7 
(115.60) 
164.93*** 
Tree availability (village variables) 
Area of A. senegal trees (‘000 
sq.km) 
0.33 
(0.890) 
0.64 
(1.321). 
0.16 
(0.192) 
30.19** 
Rainfall (‘000mm) 0.53 
(0.113) 
0.42 
(0.055) 
0.62 
(0.051) 
1419.57*** 
Access to trees     
Common plot management 
(1:common property) 
0.78 
(0.418) 
0.51 
(0.501) 
0.98 
(0.156) 
127.76*** 
Number of collectors in same plot 
(persons) 
13 
(11.100) 
8 
(9.199) 
20 
(10.406) 
107.091*** 
Distance to plot (km) 9.4 
(10.432) 
11.3 
(13.244) 
7.9 
(7.338) 
11.26*** 
Labour productivity     
Collection experience (years) 12.3 
(11.616) 
20.8 
(11.745) 
6.0 
(6.213) 
275.66*** 
Number of adult collectors in 
household (persons) 
1 
(0.986) 
2 
(1.281) 
1 
(0.556) 
51.32*** 
Wealth of livestock (‘00000 CFA) 28.6 
(37.249)   
45.6 
(42.442)   
15.6 
(26.239)    
79.39*** 
Expected price (CFA/kg) 626.0 
(303.803)    
425.9 
(86.394) 
777.7 
(321.4330 
206.62*** 
Distance to nearest town(km) 47.07 
(36.632) 
70.36 
(38.274) 
29.24 
(22.744) 
188.83*** 
Interlocked relations (1: yes) 0.41 
(0.491) 
0.61 
(0.489) 
0.25 
(0.485) 
64.98*** 
Fixed transaction costs     
Possession of transport mean 
(1:yes) 
0.67 
(0.469) 
0.96 
(0.206) 
0.46 
(0.499) 
115.695*** 
Access to information (1:yes) 0.78 
(0.418) 
0.73 
(0.448) 
0.81 
(0.391) 
4.51** 
Trading through 
group/association (1:yes) 
0.65 
(0.477) 
0.43 
(0.496) 
0.82 
(0.384) 
70.07*** 
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cAge (years) 44 
(11.487) 
46 
(12.276) 
43 
(10.672) 
7.79 *** 
Education level (1: formal 
education) 
0.52 
(0.500) 
0.50 
(0.499) 
0.49 
(0.501) 
1.62 
cHousehold size (persons) 10 
(7.369) 
9 
(5.182) 
11 
(8.609 
6.19** 
Perception of relative distance (1: 
easy to reach the plot) 
0.76 
(0.430) 
0.57 
(0.497) 
0.90 
(0.301) 
62.61*** 
Perception of relative access to 
trees (1: easy access) 
0.31 
(0.463) 
0.49 
(0.501) 
0.18 
(0.381) 
47.68*** 
aMean values for continuous variables (percentage for categorical variables) are given and their corresponding 
standard deviations (standard errors) are indicated in parentheses.  
bMean quantity is computed on actual collection (N=403) 
cAge and household size are also individual-specific determinants of sale place.  
dEquality test refers to ANOVA test for continuous variables and Pearson chi-square test for categorical 
variables.  
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level. 
In SPZ, the quantity of gum collected is much higher than the quantity collected in ES. The 
differences in the quantities are probably due to differences in tree availability but also in the 
interest, experience and motivation to collect gum. According to an unpublished report by 
Asylia Gum Company (AGC, 2007), gum exploitation in ES was not widely undertaken due 
to lack of knowledge about harvesting techniques but also because of the landlockedness of 
this production zone that discouraged traders to get their supplies in this region. As a result, 
collectors just abandoned the activity. Through recent initiatives, collection in the region is 
being revived. 
The area of Acacia senegal is larger but rainfall is lower in SPZ than in ES. The 
proportion of collectors who collect gum in communal plots is higher in ES where the number 
of persons collecting in the same plot is higher than in SPZ. In SPZ, collectors travel longer 
distances to the collection plots than collectors in ES. In SPZ, collectors are more experienced 
in tapping, involve more household members and seem to be more involved in pastoralism as 
the value of their livestock is higher than in ES. 
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Collectors of gum in ES have a higher expectation on the price they would receive if 
they sell their gum. This is mainly due to the presence of the association EXPERNA that 
bargains sale contracts on behalf of collectors. Consequently, they also have easier access to 
information and a higher proportion of them is trading or has traded through the association or 
any other group than in SPZ. In SPZ, a higher proportion is involved in interlocked relations 
with traders than ES. Moreover, a higher proportion of these collectors in SPZ own some 
transport mean (e.g., donkey cart, horse cart, and bicycle) than collectors in Eastern Senegal. 
Apart from differences in production variables, collectors in ES and SPZ also differ in 
terms of characteristics and behaviour towards gum marketing. The proportion of collectors 
who sell their gum in villages is lower in SPZ than in ES, this may be due to sampling. Table 
3.3 shows descriptive statistics for the choice-specific variables. 
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Table 3. 3. Overview of mean values of choice-specific determinants of the choice of sale place by region and sale placea 
Variable 
Village Market Equality testb 
Senegal 
(422) 
SPZ 
(183) 
ES 
(239) 
Senegal 
(422) 
SPZ 
(183) 
ES 
(239) 
Region Sale 
place 
Region X 
Sale place 
Main sale place 0.72 
(0.022) 
0.55 
(0.038) 
0.82 
(0.025) 
0.28 
(0.022) 
0.45 
(0.038) 
0.18 
(0.025) 
35.7***
Sale price (CFA/kg) 865.5 
(553.043) 
548.2 
(130.301) 
1108.4 
(625.629) 
813.4 
(402.099) 
544.7 
(112.563) 
1019.2 
(422.225) 
329.1*** 2.4+ 112.1***
Number of potential buyers 
(person) 
2 
(1.874) 
4 
(1.904) 
1 
(1.118) 
5 
(2.329) 
6 
(2.008) 
4 
(2.029) 
218.5*** 344.0*** 275.7***
Number of sellers (person) 10 
(4.136) 
9 
(4.860) 
10 
(3.458) 
21 
(7.853) 
20 
(7.582) 
22 
(8.022) 
3.2* 700.5*** 236.8***
Transport cost per unit 
(CFA/kg) 
66.1 
(85.256) 
27.1 
(57.905) 
96.0 
(90.716) 
179.4 
(223.199) 
116.6 
(165.726) 
227.4 
(248.551) 
63.05*** 95.4*** 3.4*
Time to transact 
(minute/kg) 
1.5 
(2.314) 
0.8 
(0.848) 
2.1 
(2.864) 
1.6 
(2.144) 
1.0 
(1.126) 
2.1 
(2.571) 
64.93*** 0.38 0.30
Frequency of sale (1: more 
than one time transaction) 
0.56 
(0.498) 
0.45 
(0.499) 
0.64 
(0.483) 
0.44 
(0.498) 
0.55 
(0.499) 
0.36 
(0.483) 
0.02 6.93*** 28.8***
aMean values are given and their corresponding standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.  
bEquality test refers to ANOVA test for continuous variables and Pearson chi-square test for categorical variables.  
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.       
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Table 3.3 shows that village and market characteristics are different across zones. In general, 
against all expectations, the price received in the village is on average 6 per cent higher than in 
the market. This observation is probably affected by the different functioning of markets in ES. In 
SPZ, almost the same average price is offered in the village and market. However, the village 
price in ES is higher presumably because of the presence of the association EXPERNA that has 
agents in the villages; the price variability in ES is also higher because of the small number of 
traders. On the number of market participants, we observe that potential buyers (i.e., traders) in 
the village are fewer than in the market in either zone; and sellers (i.e., collectors) in the village 
are fewer than in the market. 
With regard to the proportional transaction costs, transport costs per unit are obviously 
higher in travelling to the market than to the village. Scale economies can be significant in SPZ 
where this cost is lower than in ES (either in the village or market) despite that the longer 
distances in SPZ are higher than in ES. This is because the quantities transacted are larger in SPZ 
than in ES. The time to transact a unit of the product (i.e., conclude a transaction) in village is 
generally smaller in SPZ than in ES in both markets. On average, transactions are more frequent 
in the village than in the market especially in ES whereas in SPZ, repeated transactions are more 
frequent in the market than in the village. Individual-specific variables used in this model were 
described in Table 3.2: collectors in the SPZ are older and have smaller households than 
collectors in ES. 
As we have observed that the characteristics and behaviour of collectors of gum in SPZ 
are significantly different from collectors in ES, the model results are presented both for a pooled 
sample of Senegal by including a regional dummy and for the two regions separately.  
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Group membership 
A preliminary estimation is done for the choice of group membership because of the possibility 
of self-selection in relation to the choice of group and consequently in gum collection. A probit 
model for group membership is estimated and generates results that are used in estimating the 
quantity collected (Table 3.4). 
Table 3. 4. Probit results of the choice for being in a group (1: being in a group; 0: not being 
in a group) 
Variable Marginal Effect (Standard error) 
Senegal 
(422) 
SPZ 
(183) 
ES 
(239) 
Age (years) 0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Education level (1: formal education) 0.020 
(0.049) 
-0.059 
(0.077) 
0.067+ 
(0.048) 
Household size (persons) -0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.004* 
(0.003) 
Perception of relative distance (1: easy to 
reach the plot) 
0.079 
(0.064) 
0.101+ 
(0.077) 
0.026 
(0.090) 
Perception of relative access to trees (1: easy 
access) 
-0.085+ 
(0.057) 
-0.027 
0.077 
-0.148* 
0.085) 
Region (1: Eastern Senegal) 0.396*** 
(0.051) 
  
Log likelihood -224.670                             -117.20803                             -104.210                             
LR chi-square 93.27*** 12.46** 13.78** 
Pseudo R square      0.172 0.051 0.062 
Predicted probability 0.68 0.42 0.84  
Correctly classified (percentage) 72 61 81 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.       
The model correctly classifies 72 per cent of the cases in pooled Senegal sample, 61 and 81 per 
cent in SPZ and ES respectively. With regard to the determinants of the choice of group 
marketing by collectors in overall Senegal, we first notice that collectors in the ES are more 
likely to be in a group, these results confirm the presence of a strong producer association in the 
area. Age is the other significant variable that positively influences the choice for being part of 
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the group while the group choice is negatively affected by the size of the household and the 
perception of easy accessibility. In other words, the choice of the group would be associated with 
the expectation that a group would provide easier access to the trees for gum collection while 
large households, especially with young (perhaps more energetic) collectors, can harvest and 
market substantial quantities on their own. 
Across the regions we observe that in SPZ group membership is significantly more 
attractive to older farmers and collectors who can relatively easily reach the collection plots. In 
ES however, we observe a positive influence of education on the choice of group membership 
and a negative influence of ease of accessibility and large households, similar to the findings 
presented above for the pooled sample of Senegal.  
Gum collection 
Estimation of gum collection is done with a Tobit type 1 model (Tobit) for the amount collected 
with instrumental variables for the expected price. The IvTobit was performed both for the 
pooled data and over the collection zones of Senegal (Table 3.5). 
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Table 3. 5. Estimation results for gum quantity: IvTobit model (quantity collected (log))a  
Variable Senegal SPZ ES 
Expected price (log)b 5.264* 
(3.026) 
1.623+ 
(1.892) 
1.968* 
(1.880) 
Area for Acacia senegal (‘000 sq.km) 0.751 + 
(1.203) 
2.16 4+ 
(1.152) 
0.866+ 
(.582) 
 Rainfall (‘000mm) -4.007+ 
(2.974) 
-0.033 
(2.517 
-3.142 + 
(1.241) 
Common plot management (1:common 
property) 
0.982** 
 (0.460) 
0.177 
(0.426) 
-1.609** 
(0.658)  
Number of collectors in same plot 
(persons) 
-0.000 
(0.016) 
-0.044* 
(0.025) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
Distance to plot (km) -0.003 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
Collection experience (years) 0.016* 
(0.016) 
0.008* 
(0.012) 
0.005+ 
(0.023) 
Number of adult collectors in household 
(persons) 
0.050 
(0.165) 
0.057 
(0.112) 
0.022 
(0.183) 
Wealth from livestock (‘00000 CFA) 0.006 
(0.035) 
0.086 
(0.151) 
0.013 
(0.019) 
Region dummy(1:Eastern Senegal) -0.447 
(0.921) 
  
Constant -27.614 
(19.389) 
-6.524 
(12.337) 
-7.596*** 
(11.210) 
Wald Chi-square 54.98*** 23.24*** 21.05** 
Wald test of exogeneity 12.02*** 5.41+ 2.31** 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimumc  4.078 
(0.396) 
12.833  
(0.112) 
5.070 
(0.280) 
 Uncensored observations 403 174 229 
aCoefficients (Standard error) 
bInstruments are : access to information, transport means, interlocked relation, distance to town, group,  
cP-value in parentheses  
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.       
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Results from IvTobit bring out the effect of the expected price on collection. The Wald test of 
exogeneity is significant implying that the expected price is indeed an endogenous variable. The 
test of the validity of the instruments with the Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-square 
statistic shows that the instruments seem not to have a direct effect on the dependent variable and 
hence are valid (perhaps weakly valid in SPZ). The effect of the expected price is positive, 
confirming that better prices lead to better production. 
Collection of gum is influenced by availability of trees: the area of Acacia senegal 
increases the potential for gum collection but the high long-term rainfall leads to low production 
because the rainfall would reduce the aridity conditions. Collection in common plots has an 
unexpected positive influence on the quantity collected which can be attributed to that communal 
areas are more productive. Yet, competition in common plots reduces the individual quantity (see 
also chapter 6). A significantly positive effect of the collector’s experience on quantity is 
observed. 
There are differences between the gum producing regions captured mainly by village 
effects. The effect of expected price, area of Acacia senegal and rainfall is robust in ES but in 
SPZ the difference in rainfall between collection areas is not significant. The unexpectedly 
positive effect of collection in common plots might have come from the SPZ where the area 
covered Acacia senegal is very large; a strong negative effect of collection in communal plots is 
observed in ES. Increased competition over tree resources (when the number of collectors in the 
same plot increases) leads to low individual quantities. This effect is probably due to occasional 
collectors who rush to 'the -freely accessible- communal plots' to collect gum especially when 
prices increase, thereby reducing the individual quantity as mentioned. This may lead to 
overexploitation and abuse of gum trees in order to obtain substantial quantities. The collector’s 
experience remains significant either in SPZ or ES. 
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Choice of gum sale place 
The next question to solve in this study is the choice of the place of gum sales. A conditional 
logit model is used to analyse the collector’s decision to sell gum in the village or in a town 
market. The analysis was performed for the cases where collection has actually been done, since 
these are the collectors who need to make a choice of where to sell. Explanatory variables include 
market specific characteristics, market proportional transaction costs, and individual 
characteristics. To include the individual variables where no within-case variability is observed, 
an alternative-specific conditional logit (asclogit) model was used (Table 3.6).  
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Table 3. 6. Estimates of alternative-specific conditional logit model of sale place choice 
(village (0) or market (1))a  
Variable 
Model 1b Model2c 
Senegal SPZ ES Senegal SPZ ES 
Sale price (CFA) 
-0.000
(0.000)
0.010***
(0.003)
-0.000+ 
(0.000) 
-0.000
(0.000)
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.000)
Number of potential buyers 
(person) 
-0.153***
(0.047)
-0.151**
(0.069)
-0.092 
(0.084) 
-0.059+
(0.054)
-0.107+ 
(0.077) 
0.162+ 
(0.123) 
Number of sellers (person) 
-0.023**
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.019)
-0.076*** 
(0.017) 
0.008
(0.015)
0.013 
(0.024) 
-0.030+ 
(0.024) 
Transport cost per unit 
(CFA/kg) 
-0.020*
(0.011)
0.023
(0.020)
-0.046*** 
(0.020) 
-0.010+
(0.011)
-0.030+ 
(0.022) 
-0.038* 
(0.020) 
Time to transact 
(minute/kg) 
0.045**
(0.018)
0.047**
(0.023)
0.046 
(0.040) 
0.045**
(0.019)
0.052** 
(0.024) 
0.013 
(0.043) 
Frequency of sale (1:  more 
than one time transaction) 
0.707***
(0.118)
1.138***
(0.200)
0.097 
(0.184) 
0.745***
(0.122)
1.097*** 
(0.204) 
0.193 
(0.193) 
Household size (person) 
 
-0.002
(0.017)
0.062+ 
(0.040) 
0.003 
(0.022) 
Age (years)    -0.014* 
(0.011) 
-0.030* 
(0.017) 
-0.018+ 
(0.018) 
Constant 
 
-0.178
(0.571)
0.280** 
(0.844) 
-0.648 
(0.988) 
Log likelihood -224.220 -88.645 -107.926 -217.799 -85.510 -102.145 
Pseudo R-squared 0.193 0.261 0.317 0.107 0.282 0.050 
LR Chi-square 107.46*** 62.54*** 100.22***   
Wald Chi-square  45.70*** 42.27*** 9.47+ 
Number of observations 802 346 456 802 346 456
aOdd ratio (Standard Errors) 
bModel 1 shows clogit results with choice-specific variables and proportional transaction costs variables specific to 
the choice.  
cModel 2 shows asclogit results with choice-specific and individual-specific variables where sale place is the 
alternative variable including two alternatives (village or market). Village choice is the base alternative. 
dR-square is manually computed for asclogit model: Pseudo-R-square =1-Log likelihood Full model/ Log likelihood 
Intercept-only Model 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.       
65 
 
Model 1 includes the choice-specific variables directly related to market outlet and 
proportional transaction costs. We notice first that holding other variables constant, the effect 
of the number of buyers on choice of market outlet is unexpected: an increase in the number 
of buyers can normally lead to increase in competition and consequently increase in demand 
for gum arabic and prices that are attractive to collectors. However, the negative effects 
suggests that collectors tend to avoid larger markets. It also points to the reliance of collectors 
to a ‘preferred’ regular buyer. This explanation may be more relevant in the interlocked 
context or when prices offered by different traders are not different. Secondly,  the increase in 
the number of sellers decreases the likelihood of selling in a market place because of 
competition. This competition would give to buyers additional power to ‘dictate’ the price 
especially because these collectors have individually low bargaining power. Thirdly, an 
increase in the transport cost per unit of product is associated with a decrease in the likelihood 
of selling in the market but an increase in transaction time per unit of gum is associated with 
an increase the likelihood of selling in the market. An increase in the frequency of transaction 
would increase the likelihood of selling in the market. This would indicate that the physical 
transport cost is particularly constraining, but time is not. Hence, spending time is not 
regarded as inefficient but rather as an investment in a good relationship with the buyer.  
A focus on the regions shows that in SPZ, an increase in the price in the village or 
market leads to an increase in the probability of selling in that particular place while an 
increase in the number of buyers decreases the likelihood of selling in the village or market, 
holding other variables constant. Also, an increase in the time to transact is associated with an 
increase the likelihood of selling in that place. Furthermore, an increase in frequency of 
transactions increases the likelihood of selling in that place. In ES however, an increase in 
price, number of buyers, and number of sellers in the village or market, holding other 
variables constant, leads to a decrease in the probability of choosing to sell either in the 
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village or market. Moreover, an increase in transport cost per unit is associated with a 
decrease in the likelihood of selling in the village or market. 
Model 2 includes the individual-specific variables in addition to the choice-specific 
variables. With respect to choice-specific variables, the above discussed results of Model 1 
are robust for most variables. Individual-specific factors are also important in influencing the 
choice of selling gum in the village or transporting it to a town market. For the pooled sample 
of collectors in Senegal, relative to the probability of choosing to sell in the village (base 
alternative), the negative coefficient of the age variable shows that markets seem to attract 
younger collectors. Specific to SPZ, we notice that the probability of selling in the market 
increases with household size. Collectors with larger families may go to the market to sell 
gum and on the way back home bring marketable items needed by the household. Similar to 
the pooled sample, in SPZ, age decreases the probability of selling in the market. Specific to 
ES, age is also significant and decreases the likelihood of selling in the market. 
The Wald chi-square test of whether all regressors are jointly significant is only 
weakly significant for Model 2 in ES. This implies that caution is to be taken in interpreting 
the results which are not significant.  
3.4 Discussion and conclusion 
The above findings confirm several theoretical propositions and previous empirical findings. 
First, they confirm that the collector tries to maximize his net returns by outweighing the 
production and market decisions. Hence, improving the net returns by way of higher prices 
and related incentives by reducing costs can contribute to an improvement of collection. 
These returns are assessed from the expected price in relation to the distance to the town, 
being in interlocked relations and the extent of fixed transaction costs. The interlocked 
relations imply that collection is intended to make payments to the debt contracted by a 
collector and hence a choice of market and trading partner is made prior to the collection. 
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Fixed transaction costs are also important in the decision process; if they are very high, they 
might make the collector decide not collect the gum (Goetz, 1992; Holloway et al., 2001). 
The possession of transport means, the access to information and participation in groups or 
associations for marketing may help in reducing such transaction costs (Poulton et al., 2006, 
Jagwe et al., 2010). These groups/associations attract the old collectors, with small 
households, or who have expectations that the group/association will provide easy access to 
the tree resources.  
Secondly, collection is in line with production function stipulations: gum collection 
can increase through the expansion of area Acacia senegal area especially where rainfall 
levels are not very high; Elrayah et al. (2012) confirm that while good rains are a signal of 
good production, continuously high rainfall is bad for production. Collection can also be 
increased through the use of more inputs (labour and its experience) and the expansion of the 
‘farm’ size (here the area covered by Acacia trees). However since this area is exploited in 
forests managed in a communal setting, accessibility to such trees for gum collection should 
be secured, implying that property rights need to be well defined and enforced as the current 
governance system does not successfully achieve the exclusion of occasional collectors. This 
is because the non-exclusion allows competition over forests that lead to the decline in 
individual collections with potential to overuse and abuse tree resources which may lead to a 
tragedy of commons as described by Hardin (1968) or Oates (1999). The main reason for such 
competition is the price incentives offered indiscriminately to the professional and occasional 
gum collectors. 
Thirdly, collectors sell in the village because the differences between village and 
market price are not large enough to allow collectors to evaluate benefits of going to the 
market unless other activities can be combined with travelling to the market such as acquiring 
the products that a household needs. While the price is generally a motivating factor to sell in 
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the market, the constraining factors include the competition with other collectors who sell 
gum and maintenance for a particular trader who buy gum. The relationship with a trading 
partner is maintained most probably because there are no (large) differences in prices paid by 
different traders on the market. 
Fourthly, proportional transaction costs that vary with the quantity to sell remain 
influential in the decision of where to sell (Vakis et al., 2003). On the one hand, the transport 
cost is associated with a decline in the probability to sell at distant markets; here, the state of 
the rural roads infrastructure is to be looked at, as these roads are impassable. Hence, given 
the problem of transport costs, collectors who have to sell larger quantities would rather stay 
in the village instead of going to the market (Fafchamps and Hill, 2005). On the other hand, 
the time to transact a unit of the product was not a deterring factor in selling. Here the social, 
linguistic and cultural elements are at play rather than the urge to conclude a transaction. The 
frequency of transactions increases the likelihood of selling with the advantage that this 
frequency reduces transaction costs involved in the search for a buyer mainly through 
established relationships. Such relationships also increase reputation and are a basis for 
building trust (Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin, 2006). 
Finally, the aged collectors prefer to stay in the village. Going to the market seems 
more attractive to the collectors with large households who would then combine gum selling 
with acquiring items of necessity to their household needs.  
All in all, the results suggest that there is a link between collection and marketing of 
gum, and by extension NTFPs. Through an evaluation of the net returns: a decision is made 
about collection and consequently of an efficient market where the collected gum can be 
profitably sold. In other words, collection can be restricted by market failures. Given that the 
Acacia trees are available in open access areas and that the markets are not specialized in gum 
trading, it means that unless the collector has already closed a deal with a buyer beforehand, 
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he decides to collect, goes to the forest and takes gum depending on his possibilities to put in 
labour time and cover fixed transaction costs. He then decides on which market to which he 
sells this gum given the amount he has collected in consideration of proportional transaction 
costs and household characteristics. This is also because the market of gum is not a 
specialised market, but one that is used for exchanges of other goods. The analysis also goes 
in line with predictions of our theoretical model, that costs incurred in finding a good market 
can be regarded as an investment, whereby the collector may continue to transact with the 
same trading partner (and hence in the same market). Yet, a revision of the choices may be 
done at some point depending on the quantity (e.g., if the quantity collected is smaller or 
larger than expected) and other related proportional costs.  
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Behaviour and performance of traders in the gum arabic supply chain in Senegal: 
investigating oligopsonistic myths. 
Abstract 
Farmers face monopsonist/oligopsonist structures in agricultural or forest products markets 
because of the limited choice of traders/buyers. As a consequence, these farmers and traders 
alike, in successive transactions along the supply chain, may get lower prices in selling their 
products. This leads to a problem of double (or even multiple) marginalisation. We 
investigate oligopsonist tendencies in the trade of gum arabic, a non-timber forest product 
which is widely used as an additive in food and non-food industries. We compute traders’ 
shares and a corresponding Herfindahl index in primary, transport and wholesale markets of 
gum arabic in Senegal to analyse the market concentration; through a gllamm procedure we 
analyse determinants of these market shares and finally by a weighted least square regression, 
we analyse determinants of marketing margins of individual traders. The computed 
Herfindahl index was found too low to have any influence on margins and hence oligopsonist 
powers could not be confirmed. Instead traders’ margins depend on costs, risk and uncertainty 
that they face. Consequently, traders were not found exploitative; their power is derived from 
access to capital and market characteristics. 
Key words: oligopsony, double marginalisation, Herfindahl index, market accession, market 
exit, risk, marketing margins. 
4.1 Introduction 
Markets of agricultural or forest products are often imperfect, especially in developing 
countries. Towards the consumer end of the supply chain, monopolies or oligopolies are 
found with many consumers buying from a limited number of retailers. On the other side of 
the chain, farmers often face monopsonies or oligopsonies because they have a limited choice 
of traders to whom they can sell. Furthermore, within the supply chain, the number of buyers 
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at different intermediary levels, from producers to the processing and/or export level, is 
successively often smaller than the number of sellers. This might imply imperfect competitive 
market structures with successive oligopsonist tendencies. Due to these successive 
oligopsonies, buyers may offer lower prices compared to what they would pay if they were in 
a competitive market, because they also face lower prices in the markets where they sell. As a 
consequence, the traded volumes are smaller than if the market was perfectly competitive. 
Furthermore, the market power with successive oligopsonies applied at each level of the 
supply chain results in a fall in the prices consecutively paid and quantities consecutively 
traded along the chain. This problem was first described by Spengler (1950) and has become 
known as ‘double marginalisation’ in reference to a simultaneous exercise of market power 
by trading agents against each other. Arguably, double marginalisation does not only 
determine the price levels in the chain and the volume marketed, but it also affects marketing 
margins (Spengler, 1950; Lantz, 2009).   
The specific role of traders and intermediaries in agricultural markets in developing 
countries has been subject of many studies in context of their different roles and functions: as 
intermediaries in searching for a trading partner (e.g., Gabre-Madhin, 2001); as brokers in 
improving market efficiency (e.g., Gabre-Madhin, 2001); or as risk bearers in exploring or 
creating market exchange opportunities (e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1987; Gadde and 
Snehota, 2001). However, claims were often made that these traders exploit farmers by 
capturing excessive ‘monopsonist rents’ (McMillan et al., 2002; Fafchamps and Gabre-
Madhin, 2006; Fafchamps and Hill, 2008) or by colluding (Batt, 2004). Yet, empirical studies 
such as Batt et al. (2009) or Mose (2007) fail to substantiate such exploitation. In the presence 
of competition among traders in the maize market in Kenya studied by Mose (2007), no 
evidence of such exploitation was found.  
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Fafchamps and Hill (2008) explained that the perception of farmers’ exploitation by 
traders is associated with traders taking advantage of the farmers’ low bargaining power and 
their ignorance on price movements but also with high transport and transaction costs in 
marketing that these traders face. Lele (1981) explained that these marketing costs result from 
the long chain of intermediaries from producer to consumer. Some large traders can handle a 
large share of marketed quantities and surpluses, yet rural traders are often found to work on 
low margins and earn a meagre income; in fact they are ‘just rational and acting under 
constrained efficiency’ (Fafchamps et al., 2003). These small rural traders transact small 
quantities because of limited access to working capital, limited storage facilities, and high 
marketing and transaction costs due to extensive travelling on poor roads and inadequate 
transport infrastructure and services in rural areas (World Bank, 2007) 
Poor infrastructure not only increases costs of transportation; it also causes delays in 
transport and consequently decreases profitability (Schroeter and Azzam, 1991; Fafchamps 
and Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Shackleton and Shackleton, 2004; Eskola, 2006). Price uncertainty, 
inconsistent government policies and continued suspicion of trader activity are also found to 
seriously constrain trade (Schroeter and Azzam, 1991). These constraints not only increase 
marketing costs, but also determine the environment in which traders operate. This 
environment in turn influences traders’ behaviour including the distribution of market power 
and profits or margins earned in the market (Raper et al., 2000; Myers et al., 2010). 
Despite the importance given to marketing costs and the distribution of market power, 
both issues have seldom been investigated in the context of oligopsonies and double 
marginalisation problem. In this chapter we address this gap by studying the case of the 
performance of traders in the supply chain of gum arabic in Senegal. We investigate the gum 
market structure and assess its impacts on market outcomes (marketing margins).  
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Different categories of intermediaries in the Senegalese supply chain of gum arabic 
and in extenso of many raw agricultural and forestry products can be distinguished, namely: 
(a) a primary category of village traders and mobile traders; (b) an intermediate category of 
transporters; and (c) a high category of wholesalers, exporters and processors (Figure 2.5). A 
successive oligopsonistic market structure in the gum arabic chain is observed as local traders 
purchase gum from many producers but they sell this gum to fewer transporters, whose main 
function is to move the gum. They in turn sell to fewer wholesalers; and in this high category, 
the number of local processors and exporters is very limited. We focus our analysis on those 
primary traders who move between producing villages or weekly markets to buy gum from 
the collectors, on transporters who move to rural markets in production regions to buy gum 
from primary traders, and on wholesalers who are established in cities neighbouring the 
production zones. We describe their role and analyse how the market structures in which they 
operate influence their performance in the gum business. We specifically investigate whether 
the variations in the marketing margins are indeed a result of market power as predicted by 
the double marginalisation. We base this analysis on data collected from the Sylvopastoral 
and Eastern regions of Senegal from 124 traders who are village, mobile, transporters and 
wholesale traders.  
In the next section we develop a theoretical framework to analyse oligopsonies and to 
explain the theoretical consequences of the double marginalisation problem. Next the 
structure of the supply chain of gum arabic in Senegal is explored. This is followed by a 
methodology and a results section. Finally we discuss these results, and give conclusions.  
4.2 Oligopsony markets  
As mentioned in the introduction, the agricultural marketing system in most developing 
countries is characterised by oligopolistic and oligopsonistic structures. On the side of outputs 
markets, oligopolistic systems are observed where there are relatively few distributors and 
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numerous consumers (Mendoza and Rosegrant, 1995). Markets of raw agricultural and forest 
products mainly exhibit oligopsonistic features as there are numerous farmers or collectors, 
and relatively few traders. Along supply chains of raw products, successive intermediaries 
function in similar oligopsonies that are associated with the presence of non-competitive 
buyers at the different levels of the market namely primary and intermediate traders, 
wholesalers, or processors (Lele, 1981).  
Generally in oligopsonistic markets, numerous sellers compete to sell their product to 
a small number of (often larger and more powerful) buyers (Jehle and Reny, 2000). The most 
important characteristics of oligopsonies are that: (1) these markets are dominated by a small 
number of buyers; (2) sellers face few alternatives to sell their goods and if other alternative 
buyers exist, these tend to be less desirable for instance because markets are inaccessible; and 
(3) the market shows significant barriers to entry that enable buyers to attain and retain 
market control (Rogers and Sexton, 1994; Bergman and Brännlund, 1995). Barriers to market 
entry can be natural, formal or informal. Menzie and Prentice (1987) explain that natural 
barriers include ‘natural’ or geographic barriers such as being remote or landlocked. Formal 
trade barriers are defined as any direct action that restricts trade such as a government policy 
or regulation (Ackah and Morrissey, 2005), and may include patents, taxes, quantitative 
restrictions, and quality requirements (Menzie and Prentice, 1987). Informal trade barriers 
impact on trade indirectly. These include individual constraints such as difficult access to 
credit, lack of capital to expand the business or to engage in storing the products, lack of or 
limited business skills/knowledge, and problems due to the institutional framework such as 
long supply chains or lack of established rules of transaction. Other informal barriers include 
social, linguistic or cultural differences which have an effect on negotiation (Kherallah et al., 
2000; Eskola, 2006).  
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Oligopsonistic market structures have received relatively little attention in agricultural 
economics literature. Early in the 20th century, economists started to recognize the imbalance 
of power between farmers and the system of sale for their produce. Cooperation for joint 
performance (cooperatives, associations) was considered as a way to correct these imbalances 
(Nourse, 1922). The Structure-Conduct-Performance approach was occasionally used to 
analyse oligopoly power and its impacts on consumers in the context of industrial 
organisation studies; yet, it is only the ‘New Empirical Industrial Organization’ (NEIO) 
theory that investigated the relevance of traders’ oligopsony power over farmers in inputs 
markets (Myers et al., 2010). A few studies that focused on oligopsonies laid emphasis on 
testing, measuring or determining this oligopsony power in different industries and markets 
(e.g., Ukrainian milk processing industry (Perekhozhuk et al., 2009), U.S. Paper Industry 
(Mei and Sun, 2008), and UK Salmon markets (Fofana and Shabbar, 2008)). Other studies 
focused on finding measures or strategies for mitigating this oligopsony power, e.g., 
theoretically through vertical integration (Loertscher and Reisinger, 2009) or empirically 
through Fair Trade in the coffee market (Piyapromdee et al, 2008). Some authors analysed the 
price determination in oligopsonic markets while others focussed on issues of double 
marginalisation as a consequence of repeated oligopsonies in the chain. We take a closer look 
at the literature on both issues in the next sections. 
Studies by Just and Chern (1980), Sexton (1990), Chen and Lent (1992), Rogers and 
Sexton (1994), and Myers et al. (2010) provide guidelines on modelling oligopsony 
relationships between firms and industries. Firms operating within oligopsonies exhibit 
strategic behaviour as each firm has to be aware of the actions of the other market 
participants. When firms decide to cooperate, collusion takes place within the industry (e.g., 
explicitly through cartels) or price leadership occurs when one firm is followed by other firms 
in the industry.  
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Profits for an oligopsonist depend not only on demand and supply but also on the 
behaviour of competing traders. The more the competitors buy, the lower the market price 
will be. This is due to a ‘payoff interdependency’ as explained by Church and Ware (1999). 
Since traders operate in a strategic context, to determine the profit-maximizing quantity, each 
trader has to figure out how much his competitor is going to buy and sell while recognizing 
that the competitor is also going through the same thinking process. Each buyer knows that if 
he can unilaterally increase his market share by acquiring more products, his profits will 
increase. However, if all firms exercise their power and compete aggressively for more 
market share, even if they are fewer on the market, they will all be worse off: the resulting 
low prices will lower both aggregate and individual profits.  
Successive oligopsonies in supply chain: the double marginalisation problem  
The general double marginalisation problem in supply chains occurs when two (or more) 
independent firms have large market power and exercise this power to set up prices at mark 
ups different than MC: monopolies’ prices are above MC and monopsonies’ prices are below 
MC; these deviations yield deadweight losses. With successive market imperfections, actors 
reduce their combined profit by simultaneously exercising their market power and as such no 
stable equilibrium is reached in the market (Lantz, 2009). In the next paragraphs the problem 
of double marginalisation is illustrated by taking the case of successive monopsonies instead 
of oligopsonies to facilitate graphical clarity. 
Consider the case of a monopsony and three successive stages of marketing: (1) the 
acquisition of the product by a trader from farmers in a particular village; (2) a trader supplies 
the product from the village to a wholesaler; and (3) a wholesaler supplies to an exporter or a 
processor who aims at maximizing his profits in the transformation of the raw product and 
there is no vertical integration. Figure 4.1 illustrates the analysis of double marginalisation 
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with successive monopsonies3; this model is not tested in the paper, but it is important to 
show the effects of the characteristics of market power. Let PV, Pw, and Pe, represent the 
prices offered by a village trader to farmers, a wholesaler to a trader and an exporter to 
wholesaler respectively in a supply chain. Sf and Sv are the farm and trader supply curves, 
respectively. MCv and MCw are the trader and wholesaler’s marginal cost curves, 
respectively, derived from total cost functions. MRv and MRw are the trader and wholesaler’s 
marginal revenue curves. Because a monopsonist is a price maker with extensive market 
control, he buys the quantity that equates marginal cost and marginal revenue and he pays a 
lower price for each unit of the product. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1. The problem of double marginalisation for successive monopsonies 
Q is the quantity bought by a monopsonistic trader from farmers (in the village) at price pv. 
The village trader supplies to the wholesaler. This wholesaler is also a monopsonist; hence he 
pays a price Pw that is lower than the competitive price. The exporter pays Pe and the quantity 
supplied by a wholesaler is Q.  
                                                     
3
 Figure 4.1 of successive monopsonies relaxes the assumptions of oligopsony for the purpose of clarity. These 
assumptions relate to the MR curves, and the fact that here the price determination depends only on MR/MC of 
the single monopsonist buyer and not on based on the actions of the other buyers. 
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The farmer’s surplus is pvAX, the village trader’s surplus is pvAYPw. and the 
wholesaler’ s surplus is PwYZPe. Hence with successive monopsonies, the aggregate surplus 
earned along the chain is XAZPe which is obtained from trading Q quantity of the product.  
If the respective traders along the chain were operating in perfectly competitive 
conditions, the quantity purchased and price to the producer would be greater than in the 
presence of monopsonies. For instance at the export price Pe, a farmer in a competitive setting 
could supply Qc and the surplus throughout the chain would be XBPe. This competitive 
surplus is greater than the aggregate monopsonists’ surplus.  
As the number of imperfect marketing stages increases, the effect of such 
imperfections on the farmer(price) becomes even more pronounced because each trader in 
each stage aims at earning a monopsonistic profit (McMillan et al., 2002).  
In successive oligopsonies, the impact of double marginalisation in depressing prices, 
quantity traded and overall surplus in the chain will depend on market concentration and the 
type of interaction allowed between traders. 
The generally proposed solution to the double marginalisation problem is vertical 
integration which should lead to higher chain profits (Spengler, 1950, Gaudet and Van Long, 
1995). Vertical integration eliminates some of the monopoly (monopsony) mark-ups, leading 
to a lower sale (higher buying) price and an increase in welfare (West, 2000). From a New 
Institutional Economics perspective, vertical integration may also act positively on profits 
through minimization of transaction costs. 
While surpluses for traders have been explained above by market power in relation to 
the prices and quantities in transaction, it is important to consider that these surpluses may 
also depend on the determinants of the marginal costs which are associated with functions 
performed by these traders. These are outlined in the next section. 
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Functions and costs of trading  
The role of a trader is to transport, grade, bring to market and sell products to consumers 
(Eaton et al. 2007).  Kotler (1997) listed nine market functions: (1) information collection and 
dissemination; (2) development and dissemination of persuasive communications about 
offers; (3) negotiation attempts to reach final agreement on price and other items of the offers; 
(4) ordering backward communication of intentions to buy; (5) financing acquisition and 
allocation of funds required to finance the carrying of inventory; (6) risk taking in connection 
with carrying out channel work; (7) successive storage, processing and movement of physical 
products; (8) payment of bills; and (9) actual transfers of title of goods. All these marketing 
functions are associated with marketing costs and transaction costs including the cost of 
searching for an exchange partner (Gabre-Madhin, 1999); the cost of acquiring information 
specially in the context of information asymmetries (Ellis, 1988; Hobbs, 1996; Upton, 1996); 
and negotiation costs and costs for concluding and enforcing a contract (Hobbs, 1996). 
As mentioned in the introduction, marketing costs are especially high in developing 
countries due poor infrastructure and inefficient transport system, inadequate storage capacity, 
lack of reliable market information or modern communication facilities, and significant 
variations in product form, variety and quality (Rogers and Sexton, 1994; Harris-White, 1997; 
Batt, 2004). These factors also make trade in developing countries very risky. In the markets 
of non-timber forest products such as gum arabic, costs are even higher because producers are 
often dispersed over large areas and markets are located in marginalized areas characterized 
by poorly developed transport and communication infrastructure. 
Social capital and the use of intermediaries may reduce transaction costs and risk. 
According to Fafchamps and Minten (2001), social capital through kinship or networks may 
help economize on transactions costs by speeding up the search for trading partners, 
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providing insurance in order to enforce contracts and facilitating the circulation of 
information (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001; Le Goulven, 2001).  
Finally, it should be noted that in addition to marketing functions and costs, other 
factors influence marketing margins. Wohlgenant (2001) summarized several studies and 
identified these factors as technical and structural changes, cooperative behaviour, 
government programs, product quality and seasonality. 
Structure of gum arabic supply chain in Senegal  
Similar to agricultural markets in Africa studied by Fafchamps (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten, 
1998, 2000; Fafchamps et al., 2003; Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin, 2006), markets for raw 
gum arabic are characterized by a large number of gum collectors and relatively few traders 
and companies as described in Figure 2.5.  
Table 4.1. summarizes the features of gum trade for different categories of traders in 
relation to the supply of gum arabic (i.e., factors that influence the supply of gum on the 
market), demand for gum arabic(i.e., factors that influence the supply of gum on the market), 
transaction costs (i.e., factors that determine the extent of transaction costs in markets of gum 
arabic), risks and uncertainty(i.e., factors that influence the magnitude of risk or uncertainty in 
marketing gum arabic), and quality requirements (i.e., requirements for quality improvement 
and maintenance).  
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Table 4. 1. Features and determinants of gum arabic trade 
Determinants of trade Primary traders Transporters  Wholesalers  Processors and exporters 
 Supply of gum  -Production potential 
-Labour time and opportunity 
costs 
-Price offered  to gum 
collectors 
-Other incentives to collectors 
to supply gum 
-Interlocked contracts 
-Number of markets and seller 
-Price offered  to primary 
traders 
-Quantities gathered by 
transporters  
-Price offered  to gum 
transporters  
-Quantities gathered in the 
production zone 
-Price offered to wholesalers 
 
Demand of gum -Price offered by transporters 
-Buyers’ access to working 
capital, credit, marketing 
costs  
-Price offered by wholesalers 
-Buyers’ access to working 
capital, credit, marketing 
costs 
--Price offered by exporters 
and processors 
--Buyers’ access to working 
capital, credit, marketing 
costs 
-International prices 
-Own capital, possibility to 
access credit, marketing and 
shipping costs 
-Contracts 
Transaction costs  -Production widely dispersed 
-Opportunistic behaviour 
-Road connection and means 
of transport  
-Dispersed markets 
-Opportunistic behaviour 
-Loading and unloading 
sacks, quality monitoring, 
and payment of road fees 
-Opportunistic behaviour 
Loading and unloading sacks, 
quality monitoring, and 
payment of road fees 
Risk and uncertainty -Contract and market  
-Production failure  
-Competition over supply 
-Price uncertainty 
-Loading, discharge capacity 
and delays 
-Contract and market 
-Competition over supply 
-Price uncertainty 
-Loading, discharge capacity 
and delays 
-Contract enforcement  
-Loading, discharge capacity 
and delays 
-Contract enforcement 
Quality requirements    Sorting and grading has to be 
done  
Investment in machinery for 
grading 
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4.3 Methodology 
As explained above, the behaviour and performance of a trader in a supply chain structured as 
successive oligopsony are influenced by his action and his strategy towards his competitors. 
The current section details the theoretical framework which identifies the role of market 
power to the analysis of oligopsonistic behaviour. Empirical specifications are also presented. 
Theoretical framework  
Gum collectors are assumed to be homogeneous and distributed uniformly. Traders are 
homogeneous and price takers in their selling markets. The final customer in the market chain 
is considered to be the exporter of raw gum or a processor who uses raw gum to manufacture 
various products; however the processing or exporting levels are outside the scope of the 
current study.  
Let us assume that the market for gum arabic is composed of  traders (i.e., the 
buyers) facing numerous sellers (i.e., collectors or traders at successive levels in the chain). 
The trader maximizes profits at: 
I= = (% − 9)J= − (J=)           (1) 
where I= is profit of trader i, %and	9 are his selling and buying prices, qi is the quantity 
traded and c(qi) the cost function of trading this quantity, with (J) > 0. Typically, 9 is an 
endogenous variable for a trader in an oligopsonistic position. The value of 9depends on his 
activities, but also on the quantities bought by other traders so that 9 = 	()	and		Q=∑J= . 
Maximization gives as first-order condition: 
(J=) = (% − 9) − J=	 P4QPRS            (2) 
If the trader wants to buy a larger quantity, he offers a higher price, hence the last term is 
positive, making marginal cost somewhat lower than the gross margin. Lower (J)	implies 
lower values of qi, hence the trader buys smaller quantities than he would have done if 9 was 
not responsive to his actions. 
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As it is, the effect of qi on 9 can be written as P4QP8 . 84Q . 4Q8 . P8PRS . The first two factors are 
the inverse of the supply elasticity E. The last factor shows how total quantity responds to a 
unit change in i’s purchases. Given that Q=∑J=	, that factor is : 
P8PRS = 1 + ∑ PRTPRSCU= ≡ 1 + D                       (3) 
For simplicity we assume that D, a measure for the degree of collusion, is constant over all A, 
By replacing the elasticity and equation (3) into the formula for c’(qi), this then becomes: 
(J=) = % − 9 − 9 ',WX RS8            (4) 
Following Chen and Lent (1992) we can multiply both sides by RS8  and sum over all I and by 
assuming that the marginal costs are insensitive to market shares, the result for an average 
trader can be written as: 
(J) = % − 9 − 9 ',WX ∑YRS8Z(          (5) 
or 
(J) = % − 9 − 9 ',WX H           (6) 
where H is the Herfindahl index of market power. It is a measure of the relative average size 
of traders in relation to the market and an indicator of the amount of competition among them 
(Chen and Lent, 1992). If [ = 1 ⁄ , there is perfect competition or all traders are of equal 
size and if [	 = 1, the market behaves as a pure monopsony. Increases in the Herfindahl 
index indicate a decrease in competition while reductions in the Herfindahl index indicate an 
increase in competition. Values of [ between 1 ⁄  and 1 correspond to different degrees of 
oligopsony. Equation (6) shows that the higher is H (i.e., the larger and more unequal the 
market shares), and the higher the level of collusion (D),  the lower will be (J) and 
therefore q itself. By implication,  will be lower too, and less will be bought, thus depressing 
the buying prices, while enlarging the gross margins at the trader’s level.   
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Empirical specifications 
The empirical application of the profit maximisation model in oligopsony markets of gum 
arabic is made in reference to equations (1) and (6); where we explore the magnitude of 
market power and the margins and explain determinants of market power (in terms of the 
share of traders in market) and marketing margins. First, we compute market shares of traders 
based on the transaction quantity of each trader in proportion to the total size of transactions 
in that market; and on the basis of these market shares, a Herfindahl index of power in each 
market is derived. We then analyse on the individual level the factors that influence the 
traders’ market share and derive an interpretation for market accession. Secondly, we 
compute gross margins per unit of transaction based on the buying and selling prices and then 
net margins subtracting the fixed and variable costs involved in buying and selling. Finally, at 
the market level, we analyse the factors that influence the marketing margins and derive an 
interpretation for market exit. 
(1) Computing market share and deriving the Herfindahl index 
The Herfindahl index (H) is a measure of market power, and it involves the calculation of the 
market share of each trader as a ratio of the total quantity of his transactions on the total 
quantity of transactions conducted in each market.  
Since data on the total quantities corresponding to transactions in primary, 
transporting and wholesale markets were not directly available 4, the total size of each market 
was estimated using one of the different approaches described below: (a) in case all traders 
operating in a market were interviewed and each trader indicated the total quantity of his 
transactions in the market, the sum of quantities of all traders was obtained (e.g., primary 
markets of Barkédji, Labgar, Séno Youpé); (b) in case all traders in a primary market could 
not be interviewed, total quantities supplied by producers were calculated based on the 
                                                     
4
 Secondary data is scarce and that it was not possible to interview all traders in all markets due to their absence 
or reluctance to accept interviews. 
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average number of producers who sell in a particular market and the average quantity 
supplied by producers in that market; (c) the average annual transactions in some markets 
were available from secondary sources (CSE (2006) and EXPERNA (2008) in the period 
2011-2004 and 2005-2006 in the SPZ and ES respectively. Such averages served as an 
estimate of the current market size assuming that transactions followed similar trends over 
time (e.g., Linguère, Kamb); (d) in transporting markets, the aggregation of quantities from 
primary markets is computed; and (e) in wholesale markets, the weighted average production 
of the last five years (COMTRADE, 2011) served as an estimate of the current exports. 
Weights in the wholesale markets of the SPZ and ES were derived as 55 and 5 per cent of the 
exports from SPZ and ES respectively (the remaining 40 per cent exports are from the 
Northern region (DEFCCS, 2005; Diop 2005)).  
A trader‘s share is computed as the proportion of his total transaction quantities over 
the total market size: 
Sharei = J=/ such that ∑ RS8 = 1          (7) 
In the second step, the Herfindahl index is calculated by taking into account the number of 
traders and variance between their shares: 
H = '^ + NV	             (8) 
where N is the number of traders in the market and V is the statistical variance of traders’ 
shares defined as: 
V = ∑ (RS6	' a⁄ ).bScd ^             (9) 
If all traders have equal shares, then e is zero and [ equals 1/. If the number of firms in the 
market is held constant, a higher share dispersion will result in a higher index value. As such 
computed, the value of the Herfindahl ranges from 1/ to 1 where a very low index implies 
competition while an index close to 1 implies high concentration ( refer to equation (6)). 
A normalised Herfindahl index is computed so that it ranges between 0 and 1: 
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[∗	 = g6'/a'6'/a            (10) 
When [ = 1, [	∗ = 1, which is the case of pure monopsony. If traders have equal shares, 
[ = 	1/ and [	∗ = 0 (there is no dispersion meaning that e = 0), which is the case of 
perfect competition. 
There are other measures of market power at the market level including the four-firm 
concentration ratio5. Unlike this concentration ratio, the Herfindahl index reflects both the 
distribution of the market shares of the top four firms and the composition of the market 
outside the top four firms. It also gives proportionately greater weight to the market shares of 
the larger firms, in accordance with their relative importance in competitive interactions 
(Kelly, 1981). 
(2) Computing margins 
Two types of unit margins are computed as follows: 
Gross margin = % − 9          (11) 
Net margin = Gross margin – (J)        (12) 
With: 
-  Selling price (%): the price at which the trader (a primary trader, transporter or 
wholesaler) sells the gum to a ‘superior’ trader (a transporter, wholesaler or exporter 
respectively). In the sale market, the trader is considered to be a price-taker, thereby having 
no influence on the determination of this price; 
- Buying price (9): the price at which the buyer (primary trader, transporter or wholesaler) 
obtains gum either from gum collectors in the case of primary traders and subsequently in the 
chain from an ‘inferior’ trader (primary trader or transporter).  
Marketing costs ((J)) include: 
                                                     
5
 The Lerner index is another measure of power at the firm level. It measures the extent to which a given firm’s 
buying prices exceed marginal costs (Rogers and Sexton, 1994). 
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- Transport cost: is a combination of distance and transport mode. Primary traders often use 
horse or donkey carts in travelling to villages or hire public transport in travelling to town 
market. Transporters or wholesalers who travel to rural markets use trucks. The transport 
function reflects a fixed cost that varies only with distance and a proportional cost that varies 
with the quantity to transport (refer to chapter 4); 
- Storage cost: while building up the volumes, hoarding stocks in order to get a good price or 
waiting for a buyer, traders will incur a storage cost. This the actual or imputed cost for hiring 
a room in which to store gum for the duration of gum harvesting season; 
- Cleaning and sorting cost: in order to improve its value, traders may clean gum by 
removing impurities and mixtures, and grade gum based on visible qualities of gum including 
the size of nodules and their colour; 
- Hired labour cost: depends on the average daily wages, the number of days that a trader 
hires labourers and the number of labourers hired in the season; 
- Other costs: mainly communication and road fees as given by traders.  
Data 
A survey of traders involved in gum arabic marketing was conducted in Senegal in the two 
major gum producing areas namely the Sylvopastoral Zone and Eastern regions between 
February and May 2009. The sample of traders was designed to be representative of all the 
traders involved in the gum arabic supply chain in these two regions of study where gum 
arabic is actually produced and marketed. Traders interviewed in each region comprised of 
primary traders (village and mobile traders), transporters and wholesalers. These traders were 
interviewed using a questionnaire which pertained to individual characteristics of the traders, 
market characteristics, and marketing elements. Additional informal interviews were held 
with exporters and processors.   
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In total, a random sample of 124 traders were formally interviewed; 90 in SPZ and 34 
in ES. The distribution of traders reflects the interest in gum production and trade in SPZ. In 
the past, traders limited their procurement activities to SPZ with the aim of minimising 
transport costs thereby maximizing their profits; production and trade in the more remote ES 
was low (AGC, 2007). 
Secondary data sources were also used. These include the Atlas published by the 
Ministry of Environment (CSE, 2006) on the markets statistics in SPZ and the EXPERNA 
report on production statistics in ES (EXPERNA, 2008).   
(1) Explaining individual shares of traders in a market 
The determinants of the market share of a trader are analysed. We distinguish trader and 
market characteristics. Human capital, social capital, and wealth are variables that have been 
recurrent in the study of various aspects of trading (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten, 1998, 2001); 
however, market factors were not previously given attention. 
(a) Variables associated with trader characteristics are:  
- Education: this is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the trader has received some form of 
education whether in the Coranic or formal schools or 0 otherwise. The educated traders 
might have knowledge in running their business and thereby earn high margins; 
- Trader’s experience: this is the number of years that the trader has spent in the gum 
business. The more experienced traders can take advantage of their knowledge and business 
skills to have high shares in the market; 
- Wealth: this wealth substitutes the accessibility to capital because formal institutions that 
would supply credit are quasi-inexistent in the rural areas. Two variables proxy the trader’s 
wealth: (1) the value of livestock owned by the trader and (2) the number of houses that the 
trader possesses. These proxies are exogenous to market share because they are based on 
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historical decisions and not causally related to the trade of gum. The higher the wealth, the 
higher the possibility to have funds and therefore the higher would be the market share; 
- Number of family relatives involved in gum business: this number indicates the range of 
trader’s network. Such network facilitates the access to information regarding the supply and 
demand markets;  
- Number of language spoken: this indicates the ease of communication which facilitates 
transactions especially in a multilingual society like in Senegal. The more languages spoken 
by a particular trader, the higher would be his market share; 
- Possession of a telephone: this is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a trader 
possesses a (mobile) telephone or 0 otherwise. The possession of a telephone facilitates 
communication in terms of accessing information on markets, prices and transactions. Hence 
if a trader has a telephone, he might have a higher share of the market than a trader who does 
not have the telephone; and, 
- Area of operation: rural markets in Senegal held on different days in the week, hence the 
area of operation is represented by the number of markets (and villages) in which traders 
could have their supplies. The area of operation is exogenous to market share; a large market 
share does not mean that a trader operates in several market. Instead, the larger is the area, the 
larger may be the quantity of trader’s transactions. 
(b) Variables associated with market characteristics are: 
- Market size: this is the total of the quantities transacted in that market. This size is 
expected to have a positive effect on the market share; 
- Number of buyers: this is the number of all traders who operate in a particular market. This 
number is expected to have a decreasing effect on the market share as it implies competition 
over the transactions; 
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- Distance of the market or village from the nearest town: this is the distance in kilometres 
from the town to the market or village. The longer the distance, the lower would be the 
buying price; 
- Distance from Dakar: this is the distance in kilometres from Dakar to the buying place. 
The longer the distance, the lower would be the buying price because of the higher costs for a 
buyer to transport to Dakar;  
- The existence of storage in the market: this is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
storage is available in the market or 0 otherwise. This variable indicates that in the market 
where storage is provided, traders might take advantage of storage in terms of building-up 
volumes or waiting for buyers thereby increasing their market share.  
Due to the presence of explanatory variables at two levels namely the low level of 
traders and the high level of market, the generalized linear latent and mixed models (gllamm) 
procedure is used instead of a standard regression. This gllamm procedure takes into account 
the hierarchical structure of the data by explicitly allowing a random effect of the higher level 
at the market and thereby correcting for the independence of observation. This is because 
traders of a certain category who are drawn from a market would be more homogeneous than 
if traders were randomly sampled from a larger population (see Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004) for 
details on gllamm).  
(2) Explaining marketing margins 
We test the correlation between marketing margins and market power and investigate 
determinants of these margins. Following our theoretical model and studies by Wohlgenant 
(2001) and Fafchamps, et al. (2003), the following determinants of marketing margins are 
included: 
- Marketing costs ((J)) include all the costs spent by trader in selling gum. As mentioned 
above, these include the transport, storage, cleaning and sorting, labour, and other costs. 
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These costs were computed per kg of gum arabic sold. The costs have a decreasing marginal 
effect on the margins and hence are expressed as a quadratic form. 
- Distance to sell: this is the physical distance in kilometres from the trader’s business (base) 
to the selling market. Margins are expected to increase with distance. 
- Price uncertainty: this was calculated as the deviation of the price received by the trader 
from the mean sale price in each market in the previous season. The higher this deviation and 
hence the uncertainty, the higher would be the margin retained by the trader. 
- Risk: traders in gum arabic face a number of risks that can be idiosyncratic risk or systemic 
market risk. Idiosyncratic risk affects an individual trader and includes for instance the failure 
to obtain gum as contractual payment, finding a buyer, or delays; systemic market risk affects 
almost all traders in the market in a similar way and includes for instance production failure, 
competition over supplies, or unpredictable price variations. The individual and market risk 
are each indicated by a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a trader has indicated in the 
interviews concern for any component of this risk or 0 otherwise6. 
Due to the heteroskedasticity of the total costs variable with respect to marketing 
margins, the weighted least square estimation is used instead of standard regression. Greene 
(2008) defines the weighted least square estimator as: 
Dh = 	∑ =i=j=+=k' ∑ =i=i=+=k'l          (13) 
Where the weight = = 1 m=(n . Here, observations with smaller variances receive a larger 
weight in the computations of the sums and therefore have greater influence in the estimates 
obtained. Analytical weights were used by estimating a regression based on 1 m=(n  because the 
variance is not constant. 
                                                     
6
 Due to the difficulty of quantifying risk, we relied on an indication of perception of risk related to the gum 
trading. 
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 Having explained the variables included in the study, we now present the results of 
our empirical analysis. 
4.4 Results 
There are differences in characteristics of market transactions, market power and the exercise 
of this power towards achieving performance between primary traders, transporters and 
wholesalers. In this section we first present an overview of characteristics of gum arabic 
market in terms of traders’ transactions and test the concentration of market power. This leads 
us to analysing determinants of such market power and discussing their potential effect. 
Characteristics of the groups of traders 
In terms of transactions, an overview of quantities, prices, costs and margins associated with 
buying and selling gum shows differences between zones and categories of traders (Table 
4.2). Because the gum production in the two zones (SPZ and ES) is different, they are 
reported separately. 
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Table 4. 2. Descriptive statistics of gum trade components 
 
All traders Primary traders Transporters Wholesalers Equality test 
Senegal 
(124) 
SPZ 
(90) 
ES 
(34) 
Senegal 
(88) 
SPZ 
 (69) 
ES 
(19) 
Senegal 
(29) 
SPZ 
 (16) 
ES 
(13) 
Senegal 
(7) 
SPZ 
 (5) 
ES 
(2) Category Region  
Region X 
category 
Quantities (tons)              
Total quantity   5.27 
(18.2) 
6.52 
(21.2) 
1.97 
(2.7) 
1.49 
(1.9) 
1.71 
(2.0) 
0.68 
(0.9) 
5.00 
(7.5) 
6.73 
(9.8) 
2.89 
(1.8) 
53.93 
(59.5) 
72.20 
(61.9) 
8.25 
(8.1) 
 27.3*** 35.9** 17.9*** 
Quantity per 
transaction   
1.15 
(5.9) 
1.42 
(6.9) 
0.43 
(0.5) 
0.14 
(0.2) 
0.13 
(0.2) 
0.17 
(0.3) 
0.83 
(1.3) 
0.98 
(1.7) 
0.63 
(0.5) 
15.14 
(21.6) 
20.57 
(23.9) 
1.58 
(1.1) 
15.8*** 20.8*** 12.2*** 
Prices (CFA/kg) 
Buying price  568.95 
(206.5) 
453.89 
(67.4) 
873.53 
(122.6) 
511.70 
(175.2) 
427.25 
(50.6) 
818.42 
(109.6) 
705.86 
(198.9) 
535.63 
(27.6) 
915.38 
(71.8) 
721.43 
(281.1) 
560.00 
(41.8) 
1125.0 
(106.1) 
47.8*** 482.2*** 5.3*** 
Selling price  670.29 
(222.4) 
549.07 
(71.5) 
991.18 
(156.4) 
611.45 
(176.9) 
526.93 
(58.6) 
918.42 
(107.0) 
794.83 
(235.0) 
596.88 
(12.5) 
1038.4 
(110.2) 
894.04 
(344.4) 
701.66 
(90.2) 
1375.0 
(176.8) 
55.2*** 453.1*** 9.7*** 
Marketing costs (CFA/kg)             
Transport cost 
to buy 
10.61 
(28.5) 
13.56 
(32.7) 
2.79 
(6.5) 
6.72 
(16.0) 
7.38 
(17.5) 
4.31 
(8.3) 
24.47 
(50.0) 
43.54 
(61.6) 
1.00 
(2.4) 
2.11 
(2.8) 
2.95 
(2.9) 
0.00 
(0.0) 
4.3** 3.9** 5.8*** 
Transport cost 
to sell  
14.91 
(20.4) 
16.13 
(21.2) 
11.67 
(18.3) 
16.29 
(23.3) 
17.03 
(23.6) 
13.62 
(22.5) 
10.04 
(8.5) 
13.59 
(10.2) 
5.66 
(0.4) 
17.63 
(14.4) 
11.83 
(5.2) 
32.15 
(23.3) 
1.22 0.21 1.14 
Storage cost  
 
2.32 
(5.7) 
2.29 
(2.4) 
2.39 
(2.1) 
2.05 
(6.3) 
2.08 
(7.1) 
1.91 
(2.1) 
1.88 
(2.4) 
1.07 
(2.4) 
2.88 
(2.2) 
7.5 
(5.8) 
9.00 
(6.3) 
3.75 
(1.8) 
1.6+ 0.4 1.0 
Sort cost  
 
1.69 
(2.7) 
1.13 
(2.4) 
3.18 
(3.0) 
1.57 
(2.6) 
1.04 
(2.3) 
3.47 
(3.0) 
2.07 
(2.9) 
1.13 
(2.4) 
3.23 
(3.1) 
1.71 
(2.9) 
2.40 
(3.3) 
0.00 
(0.0) 
0.4 0.8 2.3* 
Hired labour 
cost  
 
18.94 
(30.6) 
16.87 
(26.1) 
24.43 
(40.3) 
17.77 
(28.5) 
19.27 
(28.7) 
12.33 
(27.8) 
21.05 
(36.6) 
9.04 
(12.3) 
35.84 
(50.1) 
24.88 
(33.2) 
8.77 
(6.9) 
65.14 
(43.6) 
1.6 7.2*** 5.2*** 
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Other expenses  8.07 
(10.6) 
8.12 
(9.3) 
7.93 
(13.5) 
8.23 
(11.2) 
8.25 
(9.7) 
8.17 
(15.8) 
6.41 
(8.6) 
5.69 
(6.8) 
7.30 
(10.6) 
12.83 
(9.6) 
14.07 
(9.6) 
9.74 
(12.2) 
0.7 0.1 0.2 
Margins (CFA/kg) 
Gross margin  
 
101.34 
(60.8) 
95.18 
(58.4) 
117.65 
(65.0) 
99.75 
(53.1) 
99.68 
(56.2) 
100.00 
(40.8) 
88.97 
(60.5) 
61.25 
(28.5) 
123.08 
(72.5) 
172.61 
(105.9) 
141.66 
(106.7) 
250.00 
(70.7) 
8.5*** 10.2*** 4.6** 
Net margin  
 
55.42 
(55.5) 
50.64 
(53.1) 
68.06 
(60.5) 
53.84 
(50.7) 
52.00 
(52.8) 
60.50 
(43.0) 
47.51 
(53.2) 
30.73 
(32.9) 
68.16 
(66.5) 
108.06 
(95.6) 
95.60 
(85.3) 
139.24 
(151.6) 
3.8** 3.0* 0.8 
Note: Mean values are given and their corresponding standard deviations are indicated in parentheses Equality test is the ANOVA.  
Significance: *** for 1%; ** for 5%, * for 10%, + for 15% 
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The different categories of traders are significantly different in characteristics of their 
transactions including quantities, prices and costs. Traders of gum arabic in the Sylvopastoral 
zone (SPZ) are significantly different from traders in Eastern Senegal (ES) in quantities (the 
total quantity and the average quantity per each transaction are higher in SPZ than in ES); 
buying and selling prices (gum traders in SPZ buy and in turn sell gum at lower prices than 
traders in ES; and price variations un ES are larger compared to SPZ which could also be due 
to the fewer number of traders interviewed in ES); unit transport cost to buying within regions 
(traders in SPZ have a higher cost of transportation per unit to the buying villages and 
markets than traders in ES); labour cost per unit (traders in SPZ have a lower labour cost per 
unit than traders in ES); and margins (traders in SPZ have lower gross and net margins than 
traders in ES).  
The above differences across the zones can be explained by the differences in the 
magnitude of gum collection activities and the nature of gum businesses. Collection of gum 
has been done in the Sylvopastoral zone for several centuries (Webb, 1985). This zone is 
easily accessible from Dakar, its main town Linguère is about 260 kilometres from Dakar 
with a well-built off-season road infrastructure. The cities situated along the road from 
Linguère to Dakar are also important transaction points for gum trade such as Dahra and 
Touba where most wholesalers and some exporters are found.  
Collection of gum is a recent activity in Eastern Senegal, undertaken following the 
raised awareness that the region has enormous potential in terms of the presence and 
productivity of Acacia senegal trees (DEFCCS, 2005). However, collection is still done at a 
very small scale and small quantities are obtained by harvesters. Furthermore, the region is 
landlocked, situated at about 600 kilometres from Dakar and without proper road 
infrastructure7. Apart from EXPERNA (an association of gum collectors), the other large 
                                                     
7
 The road stretching from the city of Kaolack to Tambacounda (280 kilometres) was only constructed in 2008-
2009. 
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traders operating in ES are found in markets in Bakel and Goudiry. These traders transact 
with large wholesalers found in the region or in Kaolack.  
The presence of EXPERNA seems to lead to higher prices in the region compared to 
the Sylvopastoral zone because the association bargains better conditions directly with 
exporters or foreign companies. Traders are forced to match the EXPERNA prices whereas 
the lack of organisation in SPZ leaves collectors dependent on traders in terms of prices. 
Significant differences are also observed within categories of traders across regions 
with respect to the quantities traded, prices, costs and margins. Figure 4.3 compares prices, 
costs and margins for the different categories of traders in the gum production zones.  
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Figure 4. 2a. Prices, costs and margins per categories of traders in the Sylvopastoral Zone 
 
Figure 4. 2b. Prices, costs and margins per categories of traders in Eastern Senegal
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In SPZ, the buy and sell prices (9 and %) increase from one category of trader to another. 
Moreover, transporters buy at the selling price of primary traders; but on average, wholesalers 
can buy at a price slightly lower than the selling price of transporters. As the quantity 
increases, the gross margin (% − 9)	would normally increase and the costs reduce because 
of economies of scale. The gross margins are lowest for transporters, but so are also their total 
costs. This enables them to earn a sufficient a margin that is proportionate to the value added. 
Wholesalers, who have total costs that are almost the same as those of primary traders, have 
the largest margins.  
A comparison of the net margins and the buying price (pb) shows that on average pb 
shifts upward along the different categories of traders and the net margins also increase except 
for transporters whose net margin is lower.  
In Eastern Senegal, the buying and selling prices vary in the same direction from one 
category of trader to another, and wholesalers can buy at a price slightly higher than the 
average selling price of transporters. We observe that the total costs and gross margins also 
increase consecutively for the different categories of traders. However the gross margins are 
largest for wholesalers. A comparison between the buying price and net margins shows that 
on average, the real buying price and net margins increase throughout for different categories 
of traders.  
On the market share and Herfindahl index 
According to theory, it is expected that traders who operate in oligopsonistic markets 
acquire gum arabic at a price below the competitive market price. To investigate the presence 
of oligopsonistic tendencies, market shares for individual traders and the Herfindahl index (H) 
were calculated following equations (7) to (10) (Table 4.3 and disaggregated results for 
markets in Table 4A.1 in appendix). 
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Table 4. 3. Average individual shares and normalised Herfindahl indices in gum 
marketsa 
 Number of 
markets 
Number of 
traders 
Mean individual share 
(percentage) 
Normalised 
Herfindahl index 
All traders     
All markets 30 124 14.3(12.05) 0.130 (0.12) 
Primary traders 21 88 13.2 (11.31) 0.127 (0.14) 
Transporters  7 29 16.4 (12.18) 0.135 (0.09) 
Wholesalers  2 7 25.0 (19.37) 0.148 (0.00) 
Sylvopastoral Zone     
All markets 21 90 13.3 (11.02) 0.132 (0.14) 
Primary traders 15 69 12.0 (9.88) 0.129 (0.15)  
Transporters 5 16 18.1 (13.35) 0.139 (0.11) 
Wholesalers  1 5 20.1 (17.20) 0.148  
Eastern Senegal     
All markets 9 34 17.3 (14.42) 0.125 (0.08) 
Primary traders 6 19 17.6 (14.83) 0.121 (0.10)  
Transporters 2 13 13.3 (9.39) 0.125 (0.03) 
Wholesalers  1 2 33.3 (23.57) 0.148  
a
 Mean values are given and their corresponding standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. 
The shares of individual traders and Herfindahl index of market power vary between markets; 
while some markets display competitive tendencies, other markets display (strong) 
oligopsonistic features.  
A comparison between the Sylvopastoral zone and Eastern Senegal shows that the 
average market share of traders in the SPZ is lower than that of traders in ES. Furthermore, 
the average individual shares of traders are lower in SPZ than in ES except for transporters. 
The average Herfindahl index of markets in the SPZ is higher than that of markets in ES 
because this normalised index adjusts for the number of traders which is smaller in ES than in 
SPZ. Furthermore, the average Herfindahl indices in primary traders’ and transporters’ 
markets are higher in SPZ than in ES, while the average Herfindahl index of wholesalers is 
the same in both regions. As on average the indices are low, we observe the presence of 
competition or at the most, moderate concentration. In both regions, the Herfindahl index 
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increases as trading of gum moves along the supply chain: it is lowest in primary markets and 
highest in wholesale market. This situation is realistic because the move along the chain is 
associated with fewer and fewer buyers, with relatively ‘stronger’ (oligopsony) power. 
In sum, the computations of market power revealed that on average there are no or at 
the most low oligopsonist tendencies. Yet, it remains important to investigate factors that 
might influence this market power through the distribution of individual shares of traders.  
Individual shares of trader in a market 
Market shares express the relative size of the trader’s transactions; these shares vary in 
accordance to several factors including the market size and the number of buyers. However, 
the question arises as to why there are wide differences in the computed shares, implying that 
besides the market size and the number of buyers there are other factors at play. These factors 
are grouped into trader characteristics and market characteristics (Tables 4.4 and 4.5).  
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Table 4. 4. Descriptive statistics of trader characteristics influencing market sharea 
 
All traders Primary traders Transporters Wholesalers Equality testb 
Senegal 
(124) 
SPZ 
(90) 
ES 
(34) 
Senegal 
(88) 
SPZ 
 (69) 
ES 
(19) 
Senegal 
(29) 
SPZ 
 (16) 
ES 
(13) 
Senegal 
(7) 
SPZ 
 (5) 
ES 
(2) Trader  Region 
Region X 
category 
 Education  (1:  
 formal  education) 
0.68 
(0.04) 
0.61 
(0.05) 
0.85 
(0.06) 
0.69 
(0.05) 
0.61 
(0.06) 
1 
(0.00) 
0.62 
(0.09) 
0.63 
(0.12) 
0.62 
(0.14) 
0.71 
(0.18) 
0.60 
(0.24) 
1 
(0.00) 
0.6 6.6*** 12.1** 
 Experience in  
 gum  business  
 years) 
13.0 
(9.15) 
16.0 
(8.63) 
4.9 
(4.45) 
13.2 
(9.37) 
15.8 
(8.88) 
3.7 
(2.56) 
15.0 
(1.29) 
16.7 
(7.44) 
6.7 
(6.26) 
13.4 
(10.06) 
16.6 
(10.38) 
5.5 
(0.71) 
0.6 19.9*** 0.2 
 Wealth  (‘000000  
 CFA livestock   
  value) 
5.1 
(4.70) 
5.4 
(4.42) 
4.3 
(5.37) 
4.5 
(4.11) 
4.6 
(3.84) 
2.2 
(5.06) 
5.9 
(5.52) 
6.8 
(4.89) 
4.7 
(6.24) 
9.0 
(6.33) 
12.0 
(4.44) 
1.5 
(2.18) 
1.3+ 8.9*** 3.5** 
 Number of  
 houses 
1 
(0.59) 
1 
(0.63) 
1 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.47) 
1 
(0.47) 
1 
(0.45) 
2 
(0.74) 
2 
(0.75) 
1 
(0.60) 
2 
(0.90) 
2 
(0.84) 
1 
(0.00) 
3.5** 11.2 6.0*** 
 Family relatives  
 in gum business  
 (persons) 
1 
(1.06) 
1 
(1.08) 
0 
(0.29) 
1 
(1.13) 
1 
(1.12) 
0 
(0.23) 
1 
(0.86) 
1 
(0.97) 
0 
(0.38) 
1 
(0.53) 
1 
(0.45) 
0 
(0.00) 
0.4 10.9*** 0.7 
 Languages  
 spoken 
(language) 
2 
(0.75) 
1 
(1.08) 
2 
(0.63) 
2 
(0.72) 
2 
(0.73) 
2 
(0.71) 
2 
(0.67) 
2 
(0.77) 
2 
(0.48) 
3 
(0.90) 
3 
(1.09) 
3 
(0.00) 
4.5** 0.1 0.6 
 Possession of  
 telephone (1:  
 owns a phone) 
0.65 
(0.04) 
0.66 
(0.05) 
0.62 
(0.08) 
0.64 
(0.05) 
0.61 
(0.06) 
0.74 
(0.10) 
0.59 
(0.09) 
0.75 
(0.11) 
0.38 
(0.14) 
1 
(0.00) 
1 
(0.00) 
1 
(0.00) 
4.3* 0.2 9.6* 
 Operation area  
 (markets) 
3 
(1.93) 
3 
(1.97) 
2 
(1.77) 
2 
(1.61) 
3 
(1.64) 
2 
(1.49) 
3 
(2.18) 
3 
(2.30) 
2 
(2.11) 
1 
(1.29) 
1 
(1.74) 
1 
(0.00) 
4.3** 0.6+ 0.4 
a
 Mean values are given and their corresponding standard deviations or standard errors are indicated in parentheses respectively for continuous variables or categorical 
variables.  
b
 Equality test refers to two-way ANOVA test for continuous variables or  Chi-square test for categorical variables. 
Significance: *** for 1%; ** for 5%, * for 10%, + for 15%. 
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Table 4. 5. Descriptive statistics of market characteristics influencing market sharea 
 
All markets Primary  Transporting  Wholesale Equality testb 
Senegal 
(30) 
SPZ 
(21) 
ES 
(9) 
Senegal 
(21) 
SPZ 
 (15) 
ES 
(6) 
Senegal 
(7) 
SPZ 
 (5) 
ES 
(2) 
Senegal 
(2) 
SPZ 
 (1) 
ES 
(1) 
Trader 
Category Region 
Region X 
category 
Market size 
(ton) 
34.0 
(68.54) 
42.5 
(78.70) 
11.5 
(9.53) 
16.8 
(11.29) 
20.4 
(10.02) 
3.6 
(1.13) 
30.2 
(17.90) 
38.5 
(40.88) 
20 
(0.00) 
266.3 
(160.05) 
360.0 
 
32.0 
 
778.2*** 1283.8*** 570.7*** 
Buyers 
(persons) 
7 
(2.15) 
7 
(2.09) 
7 
(2.34) 
8 
(2.13) 
8 
(1.90) 
7 
(2.85) 
6 
(1.86) 
6 
(2.50) 
7 
(0.00) 
4 
(0.98) 
5 
 
3 
 
8.3*** 0.6 1.2 
Distance to 
nearest town 
(km) 
54.1 
(50.93) 
63.3 
(51.25) 
29.8 
(41.80) 
64.7 
(54.74) 
73.6 
(52.89) 
32.4 
(50.14) 
33.0 
(25.24) 
38.4 
(20.47) 
26.3 
(29.58) 
8.1 
(21.54) 
0 
 
285 
 
3.2** 0.3+ 2.1+ 
Distance to 
Dakar (km) 
420.9 
(130.45) 
351.3 
(62.09) 
605.5 
(68.60) 
413.5 
(119.57) 
360.9 
(64.87) 
604.8 
(62.77) 
461.7 
(149.57) 
338.4 
(20.47) 
613.5 
(80.43) 
345.7 
(147.41) 
260 
 
560.0 
 
3.7** 197.2*** 1.0 
Storage 
(1: available)  
0.38 
(0.04) 
0.40 
(0.05) 
0.32 
(0.08) 
0.41 
(0.05) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.53 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.07) 
0.31 
(0.12) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.86 
(0.14) 
1 
 
0.50 
 
12.4*** 0.6 18.3*** 
a Mean values are given and their corresponding standard deviations or standard errors are indicated in parentheses respectively for continuous variables or categorical 
variables.  
b Equality test refers to two-way ANOVA test for continuous variables or  Chi-square test for categorical variables.  
Significance: *** for 1%; ** for 5%, * for 10%, + for 15%. 
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On average the proportion of traders who are educated is smaller in SPZ than in ES; not 
surprisingly traders in SPZ have longer experience in gum business than traders in ES; in 
terms of livestock values, traders in SPZ are wealthier than traders in ES; traders in SPZ have 
more relatives involved in gum business than traders in ES; and the area of operation of 
traders in the SPZ is larger than in ES.  
There are also significant differences in characteristics of traders across different 
market type. For instance, in terms of livestock ownership value, primary traders are less 
wealthy especially compared to wholesalers. Primary traders have less relatives involved in 
the business; wholesalers speak on average 2 languages; the proportion of traders who own a 
telephone is smallest for transporters; and primary traders operate in most markets. 
Nevertheless, there are significant differences within categories of traders across regions with 
respect to education, wealth, house ownership and possession of telephone.  
Furthermore, there are significant differences in market characteristics across the 
zones. Markets in the SPZ are larger as the average quantity transacted is higher than in ES; 
markets in the SPZ are nearer to Dakar than in ES; and markets in the SPZ are further from 
towns than in ES. There are also significant differences across market categories. For 
instance, primary markets are smallest and wholesale markets are largest in size; buyers are 
most numerous in primary markets and least numerous in wholesale markets; primary 
markets are located furthest from the town and wholesale markets are located nearest to town; 
and transporters buy in markets that are located furthest from Dakar. Furthermore, the lowest 
proportion of transporting markets have adequate storage. Market categories across regions 
differ with respect to market size, distance to nearest town and availability of adequate 
storage. 
The influence of trader and market characteristics on the trader’s individual share in 
the market are shown in table 4.6.  
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Table 4. 6. Gllamm results for traders’ market shares (percentage)a  
 All traders Primary traders Transporters 
Senegal SPZ ES Senegal SPZ ES Senegal SPZ ES 
Education  (1:  formal 
education) 
3.033+ 
(2.301) 
2.6481+ 
(2.398) 
0.340 
(6.273) 
3.605+ 
(2.455) 
3.844* 
(2.015) 
0.038 
(0.505) 
-2.005 
(3.922) 
16.391** 
(8.235) 
8.485*** 
(1.846) 
Experience in gum business 
(years) 
0.195** 
(0.107) 
0.154* 
(0.116) 
0.319 
(0.261) 
0.290*** 
(0.107) 
0.263** 
(0.100) 
1.420*** 
(0.411) 
0.341+ 
(0.228) 
0.995** 
(0.444) 
0.333*** 
(0.121) 
Wealth (log livestock value) 1.117+ 
(0.954) 
0.198 
(1.032) 
3.387* 
(1.931) 
2.310** 
(0.973) 
1.611* 
(0.865) 
7.358** 
(3.151) 
-0.643 
(1.860) 
0.350 
(3.083) 
1.882** 
(0.975) 
Number of houses (houses) 1.259 
(1.954) 
3.415* 
(2.167) 
-1.710 
(4.598) 
3.762+ 
(2.484) 
3.626+ 
(2.322) 
3.283 
(6.356) 
4.434+ 
(3.006) 
8.762* 
(4.485) 
3.646** 
(1.964) 
Family relatives in gum 
business (persons) 
0.198 
(1.222) 
0.325 
(1.080) 
0.728 
(6.931) 
1.315* 
(1.063) 
1.270+ 
(0.881) 
2.304* 
(12.978) 
-2.900 
(2.771) 
6.112+ 
(3.912) 
2.825 
(2.433) 
Languages spoken (language) 5.475*** 
(1.500) 
5.478*** 
(1.520) 
6.445+ 
(4.634) 
7.154*** 
(1.516) 
7.075*** 
(1.322) 
-4.635 
(6.868) 
0.237 
(2.979) 
2.450 
(3.939) 
13.277*** 
(3.216) 
Possession of a telephone (1: 
owns a phone) 
6.321*** 
(2.014) 
4.714** 
(2.117) 
10.465* 
(5.732) 
4.444** 
(2.050) 
4.621** 
(1.783) 
8.987*** 
(9.526) 
10.397*** 
(3.228) 
6.891* 
(4.277) 
3.034+ 
(2.760) 
Area of operation (markets) 0.070 
(0.502) 
0.104+ 
(0.514) 
1.709+ 
(1.663) 
1.112** 
(0.503) 
1.405*** 
(0.335) 
0.316 
(2.103) 
0.222 
(0.754) 
-0.871 
(2.001) 
0.235 
(0.913) 
Market size (ton) -0.023 
(0.017) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
0.158 
(0.284) 
0.313** 
(0.133) 
0.278+ 
(0.117) 
5.685* 
(3.274) 
0.143+ 
(0.121) 
0.138+ 
(0.138) 
-0.025 
(0.402) 
Buyers (persons) -0.980** 
(0.479) 
-0.762+ 
(0.535) 
-0.101 
(1.488) 
-1.261** 
(0.504) 
-1.298** 
(0.539) 
-0.936 
(1.701) 
-1.117* 
(1.158) 
-0.340 
(1.484) 
-0.004 
(0.867) 
Distance to nearest town (km) 0.049* 
(0.029) 
0.033 
(0.081) 
0.171* 
(0.081) 
0.093*** 
(0.034) 
0.059 
(0.069) 
0.429* 
(0. 980) 
0.232** 
(0.103) 
0.382 
(1.327) 
0.002 
(0.343) 
Distance to Dakar (km) -0.048** 
(0.022) 
-0.045 
(0.067) 
-0.011 
(0.049) 
-0.071*** 
(0.026) 
-0.047 
(0.055) 
0.158* 
(0.092) 
0.155*** 
(0.055) 
0.002 
(0.613) 
0.030 
(2.621) 
105 
 
Storage (1:available storage) 5.529* 
(2.355) 
2.266* 
(2.725) 
8.877* 
(4.302) 
1.876 
(2.631) 
3.327+ 
(2.590) 
14.959** 
(6.151) 
0.205 
(3.798) 
6.056 
(6.498) 
5.924*** 
(2.070) 
Zone (1:ES) 18.390*** 
(6.914) 
  28.266*** 
(9.172) 
  -34.015** 
(14.834) 
  
Constant -4.206 
(16.618) 
12.824 
(24.333) 
-56.530 
(56.203) 
-8.296 
(17.141) 
-3.065 
(20.116) 
-235.580 
(50.545) 
-56.018* 
(33.858) 
-44.812 
(18.398) 
65.900 
(16.726) 
F 3.39*** 2.53*** 1.80+ 4.68*** 3.84*** 1.54+ 1.47* 0.83+ 2.18+ 
Adjusted R-squared 0.202 0.171 0.225 0.355 0.334 0.248 0.179 0.138 0.470 
Number of traders  124 90 34 88 69 19 29 16 13 
Number of markets 30 21 9 21 15 6 7 5 2 
Variance at traders’ level  108.708 
(13.809) 
90.573 
(13.502) 
103.349 
(25.071) 
78.789 
(11.879) 
50.862 
(8.659) 
82.586 
(26.795) 
55.660 
(14.619) 
56.803 
(20.058) 
5.309 
(2.082) 
Variance at market level  0.000 
(0.0001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.0001) 
0.000 
(0.0001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
a
 Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Significance: *** for 1%; ** for 5%, * for 10%, + for 15%  
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The results show a large variance at the traders’ level but a close to zero variance at the 
market level. Pooled over all types of traders, the market share of an individual trader is 
positively influenced in a significant way by education, experience in gum business, wealth in 
livestock value, knowledge of languages and possession of a telephone that is used to gather 
market information; these possibly refer to communication and negotiation skills. A large 
number of buyers operating in a market has a negative effect on the individual market share. 
Traders’ individual market shares evolve with increased physical distance of the market from 
the town, and better availability of storage facilities. But the longer the physical distance of 
the market from Dakar, the smaller is the trader’s individual market share; this would be the 
effect of primary markets in SPZ. Furthermore, the regional dummy indicates that individual 
market shares in Eastern Senegal are larger than shares in the SPZ.  
Specifically for traders in SPZ, the individual market share is positively influenced by 
education, experience in gum business, his wealth in number of houses possessed, knowledge 
of languages, possession of a telephone that is used to gather the market information, and area 
of operation. The lower the number of buyers who operate in a market and the better the 
availability of storage facilities in a market, the larger would be the trader’s individual market 
share. Specifically for traders in ES, the individual market share is positively influenced by 
wealth in value of livestock owned, knowledge of languages and possession of a telephone 
that is used to gather the market information, and the area of operation. The longer the 
distance to the nearest town, the larger would be the trader’s individual market share. 
Variables that have a positive influence on the market share of an individual traders in 
primary markets are education, experience in gum business, and access to funds as 
represented by the wealth in livestock value owned and house possessed, family network in 
business, knowledge of languages, possession of a telephone, area of operation, size of the 
market and distance to nearest town. The variables that have a negative influence are the 
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number of buyers who operate in a market and distance of the market from Dakar. 
Furthermore, the regional dummy indicates that individual market shares in ES are larger than 
shares in the SPZ in primary markets. Within these primary markets, the influential 
determinants may differ in the SPZ than ES. 
Variables that have a positive influence on the market share of an individual traders in 
transport markets are experience in gum business, access to funds as represented by the 
houses possessed, knowledge of languages, possession of a telephone that is used to gather 
the market information, the size of the market, distance to nearest town, distance to Dakar and 
availability of storage. The number of buyers who operate in a market has a negative 
influence on the market share. Furthermore, the regional dummy indicates that individual 
market shares in ES are smaller than shares in the SPZ in transport markets. Also within these 
transport markets, the influential determinants differ between the SPZ and ES. 
The significant influence of variables vary within markets or zones, and even if data 
set was not large enough to elicit the determinants of wholesalers’ market shares, the results 
above enable us to substantiate that all in all there is positive influence of education and 
business experience of the trader (these factors can be designated as human capital); access to 
funds represented by ownership of livestock or houses (financial capital); the network of 
relatives who are also involved in gum business (social capital); information accessibility 
represented by the number of languages spoken and telephone ownership (communication 
capital); and area of operation (physical capital). Market characteristics such as market size 
and availability of storage have a positive impact on the individual market shares whereas 
competition over transactions indicated by the number of buyers reduces the market share. If 
the market is physically located far away from town, it might attract only a few buyers and 
hence lead to large individual shares in the market. Primary traders who are located nearer to 
Dakar have larger individual market shares. Transporters who are located further away from 
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Dakar have larger individual market shares. The latter can be explained by the function of 
transporters.  
Interpretation on the accession to gum arabic markets 
The relatively low levels of concentration of market power observed in gum arabic markets 
might be an indication of free entry in these markets. However, in some markets high entry 
requirements are set implying that there may be barriers restricting market accession and 
expansion within the market or expansion of the area of operation. Such barriers determine 
not only the structure of the market but also the performance of the market actors. Here, we 
re-interpret determinants of the market share distribution in terms of factors influencing 
market accession bearing in mind that the importance of such factors varies along stages of 
the gum supply chain. 
Market accession may be influenced by access to capital: (1) human capital: while 
education might be or not always be important in starting a gum business, at least some 
experience in general business is a prerequisite as an indication of the skills to transact in gum 
markets; (2) financial capital: with difficulties to access credit especially in rural areas, the 
backup of own (old) capital is needed to start or expand the business; (3) social capital: most 
gum business are families directly or indirectly supported by a system of networks of family 
relatives. These networks serve not only the purpose of information provider but can also act 
as transaction partners; (4) communication capital: information systems play an important 
role in determinant market shares. Such information systems pertain to the markets, prices 
and gum-transaction related conditions. and (5) physical capital. Other influences of market 
accession may include geographical barriers reflected by distances to towns or Dakar. These 
barriers imply that there are high transport costs which are intensified by missing roads or the 
generally bad conditions of rural roads. As the gum producers are dispersed, extending the 
area of operation may be very difficult for a trader. Furthermore, legal requirements must be 
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fulfilled in order to start and register the business in terms of start-up capital and further fiscal 
duties (AEPC, 2007). These requirements may be difficult to achieve for individuals and even 
companies. 
Marketing margins  
Computations of the market power revealed no or at the most low oligopsonist tendencies. 
This would imply that little evidence is found for oligopsonistic margins while determining 
their buying prices. We explored, at the market level, whether the margins observed are 
associated with market power and found no correlation between the margins and market 
power.  
The net margins as proportions of selling price are 17.3, 9.6 and 18.5 per cent in 
primary, transporting and wholesale markets respectively. The above margins were compared 
to margins earned in other markets for agricultural inputs or products, or for non-timber forest 
products. For instance, in the yellow maize market of Mozambique, Zucula and Massinga 
(1993) found that net margins ranged from 8.3 to 19 per cent of the total price for the 
retailers; in the fertilizer market in Uganda, Omamo (2003) found that retail margins ranged 
from 5 (in Bukedea) to 28 per cent (in Kabale); in the market of non-timber forests in 
Cameroon, Ndoye et al. (1998) found that the marketing margins obtained by traders varied 
between 16 per cent for African pear (Dacryodes edulis) and 30 per cent for wild mangoes 
(Irvingia spp.) of the value of sales; in the market of frankincense in Tigray, Kassa et al. 
(2011) found that the wholesalers earned marketing margins of 41.1 per cent and 31.4 per 
cent in 2007 and 2010 respectively. This comparison implies that the margins earned by 
traders in the gum arabic sector are not as excessive as in the comparison cases, and these 
traders might hence not just be labelled as exploitative. 
Even if the exercise of market power by buyers could not be confirmed, the question 
remains as to why these margins are large, at least in some markets, even larger in comparison 
  
110 
 
to the costs involved in trade. The reason might be that these margins depend on the supply 
conditions prevailing in the market but also on the need to cover for the uncertainty associated 
with volatility in the gum price or quality variations and the risk involved in trade either at the 
individual or market level. We investigate the influence of such sale costs, price uncertainty 
and risk on the gross margins. Table 4.7 presents these factors’ descriptive statistics. A 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity rejected the null hypothesis of constant variance 
(o((1) = 15.13***); the weighted least square regression is used to correct for this 
heteroskedasticity, analytical weights are used with the total cost as the weight variable (the 
weight is equal to inverse of squared total costs). Table 4.8 presents the regression results for 
determining the gross margins. 
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Table 4. 7. Descriptive statistics of trade characteristics influencing gross marginsa 
 
All traders Primary traders Transporters Wholesalers Equality testc 
Senegal 
(124) 
SPZ 
(90) 
ES 
(34) 
Senegal 
(88) 
SPZ 
 (69) 
ES 
(19) 
Senegal 
(29) 
SPZ 
 (16) 
ES 
(13) 
Senegal 
(7) 
SPZ 
 (5) 
ES 
(2) 
Categor
y 
Region Region 
X 
Gross margin  
(CFA/kg) 
 101.34 
 (60.85) 
 95.18 
 (58.40) 
 117.65 
 (65.00) 
 99.75 
 (53.09) 
 99.68 
 (56.25) 
 100.00 
 (40.82) 
 88.97 
 (60.55) 
 61.25 
 (28.49) 
 123.08 
 (72.50) 
 172.61 
 (105.93) 
 141.66 
 (106.72) 
 250.00 
 (70.71) 
8.5*** 10.2*** 4.6**
Total marketing 
costs (CFA/kg) 
 45.62 
 (39.73) 
 44.54 
 (35.86) 
 49.59 
 (48.95) 
 45.91 
 (37.66) 
 47.68 
 (39.17) 
 39.50 
 (31.68) 
 41.46 
 (43.27) 
 30.52 
 (15.30) 
 54.92 
 (61.00) 
 64.55 
 (50.54) 
 46.06 
 (26.44) 
 110.76 
 (80.92) 
2.2+ 4.7** 3.4**
Distance to sell 
(km) 
 47.7 
 (83.36) 
 43.0 
 (64.08) 
 60.0 
 (120.9) 
 46.6 
 (89.54) 
 33.7 
 (58.30) 
 93.3 
 (151.6) 
 32.3 
 (42.29) 
 52.9 
 (43.92) 
 4.5 
 (15.76) 
 124.7 
 (98.85) 
 132.6 
 (119.47) 
 105.0 
 (21.21) 
3.7** 0.1 5.0***
Price uncertainty  
(CFA/kg)b 
 -13.77 
 131.45) 
 -13.77 
 136.30) 
 32.69 
 (119.6) 
 -13.77 
 (109.8) 
 -13.77 
 (102.4) 
 50.00 
 (136.4) 
 -34.61 
 (191.7) 
 -21.87 
 (243.9)      
 -34.61 
(106.8) 
 0.00 
 (89.44) 
 70.00 
 (109.54) 
 0.00 
 (0.00) 
1.2 0.3 3.1 
Idiosyncratic risk 
(1:recognised) 
 0.56 
 (0.50) 
 0.69 
 (0.46) 
 0.21 
 (0.41) 
 0.59 
 (0.49) 
 0.70 
 (0.46) 
 0.21 
 (0.42) 
 0.41 
 (0.50) 
 0.62 
 (0.50) 
 0.15 
 (0.37) 
 0.71 
 (0.49) 
 0.80 
 (0.45) 
 0.50 
 (0.71) 
3.5+ 23.3*** 24.7*** 
Systemic 
market risk 
(1:recognised) 
 0.52 
 (0.50) 
 0.51 
 (0.50) 
 0.56 
 (0.50) 
 0.46 
 (0.50) 
 0.46 
 (0.50) 
 0.47 
 (0.51) 
 0.76 
 (0.43) 
 0.81 
 (0.40) 
 0.69 
 (0.48) 
 0.29 
 (0.49) 
 0.20 
 (0.45) 
 0.50 
 (0.71) 
9.2*** 0.2 10.1* 
a Mean values are given and their corresponding standard deviations or standard errors are indicated in parentheses respectively for continuous variables or categorical 
variables.  
b
 Median value is given for the price uncertainty variable because the mean value is 0.  
c
 Equality test refers to two-way ANOVA test for continuous variables or  Chi-square test for categorical variables.  
Significance: *** for 1%; ** for 5%, * for 10%, + for 15%. 
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Table 4. 8. Weighted least square regression results for traders’ gross margins (CFA/kg)a   
 
All traders Primary traders Transporters 
Senegal 
(124) 
SPZ 
(90) 
ES 
(34) 
Senegal 
(88) 
SPZ 
(69) 
Senegal 
(29) 
Total costs 1.060*** 
(0.314) 
1.202*** 
(0.389) 
0.774+ 
(0.632) 
1.112*** 
(0.415) 
1.120*** 
(0.536) 
-0.187 
(2.104) 
Total costs squared/200 -0.412* 
(0.327) 
-0.670* 
(0.451) 
-0.082 
(0.558) 
-0.652*** 
(0.595) 
-0.721** 
(0.815) 
0.559 
(5.495) 
Distance to sell (km) 0.109+ 
(0.077) 
0.143** 
(0.094) 
0.033+ 
(0.057) 
0.037+ 
(0.041) 
0.072+ 
(0.108) 
0.631*** 
(0.182) 
Price uncertainty (CFA/kg) 0.015 
(0.036) 
0.036+ 
(0.041) 
-0.024 
(0.132) 
-0.016 
(0.056) 
-0.000 
(0.071) 
0.033+ 
(0.039) 
Idiosyncratic market risk 
(1:recognised) 
25.733** 
(12.950) 
18.305+ 
(14.240) 
31.842 
(45.628) 
33.141** 
(16.378) 
32.394* 
(19.356) 
5.395 
(20.025) 
Systemic market risk 
(1:recognised) 
27.111** 
(11.031) 
14.298+ 
(13.879) 
41.841* 
(22.771) 
30.211** 
(13.918) 
30.832* 
(17.872) 
21.760+ 
(23.559) 
Zone (1:ES) 29.567** 
(13.717) 
  18.845+ 
(13.640) 
 88.514*** 
(25.189) 
Constant 18.363* 
(17.592) 
25.734 
(21.323) 
49.290* 
(29.459) 
20.708 
(21.950) 
16.992 
(27.566) 
8.058 
(50.681) 
F 5.47*** 3.00*** 3.16*** 4.05*** 3.54*** 3.95*** 
R-squared 0.315 0.286 0.397 0.307 0.309 0.583 
aAnalytical weights are used. The weight variable is the total costs.  
Robust standard errors with corrected heteroskedasticity are in parentheses.  
Significance: *** for 1%; ** for 5%, * for 10%, + for 15%   
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As mentioned above, traders in ES earn a higher gross margin than traders in SPZ; the gross 
margin is highest for wholesalers. The cost of selling gum is lower in SPZ than in ES, while 
the concern for individual risk is indicated by a higher proportion of traders in SPZ than in 
ES, and the concern for market risks is more pronounced among traders in ES. 
There are also significant differences in characteristics of trade across different market 
types. For instance, transporters have the lowest cost of selling gum especially compared to 
wholesalers; the distance to sell is lowest among transporters and highest among wholesalers; 
the proportion of traders who indicated concern for individual risk is lowest with transporters 
and highest with wholesalers; and the proportion of traders who indicated concern for market 
risk is highest with transporters and lowest with wholesalers. Furthermore, there are 
significant differences within categories of traders across regions with respect to cost of 
selling gum, distance to sell, and concerns for individual and market risk. 
In general and specifically in SPZ, the gross margin will increase with price 
uncertainty, distance to sale place and concerns for individual and market risk. The gross 
margin also increases with the costs however at decreasing rate. In ES, larger margins are 
typically retained than in SPZ. Specifically in ES, longer distance to sale and higher concerns 
for individual and market risk significantly increase the need for retaining larger margins. 
Gross margins for traders in primary markets and specifically in SPZ are positively 
influenced by distance to sale, concerns for individual and market risk, and costs. Primary 
traders in ES retain larger margins; the most influential factor for these traders is market risk. 
Gross margins for transporters are positively influenced by the distance to sale, price 
uncertainty, and concerns for individual risk. These margins are a decreasing function of cost 
involved in selling. In the SPZ, the significant variables influencing gross margins are price 
uncertainty, distance to sale, and concerns for individual and market risk. Transporters in ES 
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retain larger margins; the most influential factors for these traders are the distance to sale, and 
concerns for market risk. 
Influential factors could not be determined for wholesalers. However, the analysis 
suggests that gum traders retain margins due to high marketing costs, long distances to sale, 
high price uncertainty, and higher perception of idiosyncratic and systemic market risk. 
According to the traders during the interviews, marketing costs in the gum arabic are high due 
poor infrastructure and inefficient transport system, and lack of market information. Trade in 
markets involves a lot of price uncertainty and high risks especially in terms of regularity of 
supply that can be associated with production failure, finding a market, and inability or high 
costs of enforcing contract. These factors make trade in gum arabic not only costly but also 
very risky and due to risk averseness, traders retain higher margins. 
Interpretation on the exit from gum arabic markets 
We did not interview traders who withdrew from gum trade.  However, the analysis of factors 
influencing the traders’ margins enables us to reflect on potential causes of exit of traders 
from gum arabic markets. Therefore, we re-interpret the determinants of the gross margins in 
terms of factors influencing market exit bearing in mind that the importance of such factors 
varies along stages of the gum supply chain.  
 Market exit results from the unprofitability of business: for the pooled data, the fixed 
cost was estimated at 45 CFA per kilogram of gum arabic bought (less than 10 per cent of the 
buying price); hence it is not excessively high to drive a trader out of business. The 
infrastructural problem as reflected by the distance and the uncertainty could lay some strain 
on the trader’s profitability; and the importance of risk is certainly noticeable. In the systemic 
context, supply shortages may be the main causes of exit: if there are recurrent production 
failures, traders may move out of the gum arabic sector and invest their time and money 
elsewhere; the low production levels implying large variable costs may cause losses to traders 
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especially if they cannot negotiate higher selling prices. On an individual level, the risk of 
contract defaulting is important especially at the primary trading level: a trader who has 
offered commodities or funds to be reimbursed by the supply of gum in an interlocked system 
is often deceived by the collector who side-sells his product to another buyer (DEFCCS, 
2005). Such repetitive defaults may seriously jeopardize the trader’s profitability as he may 
even need to incur some cost to enforce the contract if at all he wants to stay in business. 
4.5 Discussion and conclusions  
This study investigates the behaviour and performance of gum traders in the oligopsonistic 
market for gum arabic in Senegal. Oligopsonic markets are characterised by a small number 
of buyers who face a relatively larger number of sellers; this is a situation that is often 
observed in the marketing of raw agricultural or forest products in developing regions and 
specially in the rural areas where accessibility to the production zones, high transaction costs 
and various other barriers significantly restrict entry and expansion of traders. Institutions 
such as associations/cooperatives or contracts which could change the structure of markets in 
such a way that buyers and sellers get equivalent market power, are often missing in these 
areas. Oligopoly markets for the supply of consumable products have received attention; 
however, despite that the oligopsonist situation is commonly observed on the production side, 
it seemed not to have caught the interest of researchers who at times merely confirmed the 
common belief that traders are exploitative. Such idea of exploitation is usually associated 
with the fact that even in markets where traders could act competitively, they would choose to 
collude or excessively exert their market power in order to bring down the price.  
As oligopsonies are observed at the consecutive levels of the supply chain, the 
tendencies to drive-down the buying price result in lowering the transaction volumes and total 
margins of the chain. These tendencies hence cause a double/multiple marginalisation 
problem. Furthermore, a formal profit maximisation model shows that a firm involved in 
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oligopsony markets is directly linked to the actions of the competitors and suppliers. These 
principles form the theoretical basis for the current study. 
After classifying traders in the gum business into primary traders, transporters and 
wholesalers, we found that these categories of traders are significantly different in the 
characteristics of their transactions. A comparison of buying and selling prices, various 
marketing costs and derived margins show that the wholesalers earn the highest margins 
along the gum supply chain while the transporters earn the lowest margins. Wholesalers 
benefit from the wide deviations between the buying and selling price, and hence earn high 
gross margins. Furthermore, as the wholesalers transact with large quantities, their unit costs 
remain relative low which lead them to even higher net margins. This cost situation remains a 
problem to the business of primary traders because even if they can earn large margins, 
transacting small quantities entails high unit costs which lead them to low net margins and 
little payment to gum collectors. More specifically, this may explain the slow market 
development in Eastern Senegal: because of low production capacity in region, the unit cost 
remains high for all categories of traders specially in terms of labour and transport as the 
region is also constrained by problems of accessibility and remoteness. Fafchamps and Gabre-
Madhin (2006) and Kwoka (1977) also found that the larger traders or firms can earn higher 
margins. The same conclusion also applies by considering the buying circumstances: primary 
traders need to get their supplies in visiting dispersed villages with scattered collectors that 
each sell small quantities, transporters need to visit several markets in the production zones to 
obtain gum from the primary traders, and wholesalers just generally remain established in 
their own shops and are supplied by transporters, hence with lower marketing costs and risks.  
Investigations of whether the performance of the traders was driven by their relative 
power in the market started with the calculation of the market shares of traders and the 
Herfindahl index. Within the markets, there are variations in the shares of individual traders 
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and between markets there are variations in the values of the Herfindahl index. These values 
generally increase from primary traders to transporters and wholesalers implying that the 
upward move along the chain leads to higher market power and stronger oligopsonistic 
tendencies. We found that the share of a trader in a market is influenced by several factors 
that can be grouped into the elements of capital: human capital (experience in business and 
the possibility to communicate); financial capital (possibility to make available funds to be 
used in trade); physical capital (area of operation); and social capital (a network of relatives 
involved in business who can act as source of information and knowledge, and possibly as 
transaction partners). Fafchamps (1996, 1999, 2002, 2006), Fafchamps and Minten (2000) 
and Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin (2006) had also found that traders rely extensively on such 
networks as relationships increase trust by granting and receiving credit, exchanging price 
information, and economizing on quality inspection thereby reducing transactions costs and 
increasing trading margins. At market level, its size and the availability of storage increase the 
trader’s individual market share whereas competition over transactions indicated by the 
number of buyers reduces the market share. While this share can be increased by expansion of 
trading area, barriers due to capital constraints and the legal framework may be significant. 
Capital and market factors could also be the main cause of market accession. 
Computations of market power showed that there were no or very small oligopsonistic 
tendencies in the gum arabic market. Market power was not found to influence the margins 
earned by traders. Rather these margins seem to depend on the supply conditions, marketing 
costs, perception of price uncertainty and risk. According to Harris-White (1997) or Batt 
(2004), shortcomings associated with poor infrastructure and inefficient transport system, and 
lack of market information increase marketing costs. Brorsen et al. (1985), Schroeter and 
Azzam (1991) and Holt (1993) found that price uncertainty and risk indeed influence the 
marketing margins. The magnitude of risk could also be the main cause of market exit. 
  
118 
 
These findings imply that traders in the gum market, while working towards enlarging 
their supplies do not follow the oligopsonistic tendencies or exercise their power in an 
exploitative manner. Such exploitation on the seller would constrain supply and profits for the 
whole chain because the buying price is kept artificially low. Instead, the margins that traders 
keep are a reflection of the costs, uncertainty and risk that they face while conducting their 
trade. The study has therefore shown that traders are not necessarily exploitative in terms of 
using their market power towards producers in the primary markets or other traders in the 
intermediate or wholesale markets; they may pay a low price because they face risk and 
uncertainty, and high costs, especially if they are not able to exploit scale economies. In other 
words, the benefits that they could obtain from gum trading may be limited by poor market 
access conditions such as poor transportation conditions, lack of infrastructure and market 
information in addition to individual and market related risks. Our results show interesting 
similarities on the performance of rural money lenders who act as a source of informal rural 
credit. While they are often accused of being usurious by charging high interests, their returns 
can be justified by their methods of screening borrowers and enforcing repayment in the  
presence of imperfect information (Aleem, 1990; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1995). The study has also 
served to remind about the important functions of rural traders in general and of the gum 
traders in particular in regard to the gum sector despite the difficult marketing conditions.      
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Appendix 4A. 
Table 4A.1. Average market share and Herfindahl index per market and category of 
tradera 
aStandard deviations are in parentheses 
 
 
Market Primary traders Transporters Wholesalers 
Individual share
(percentage) 
Herfindahl 
index 
Individual share
(percentage) 
Herfindahl 
index 
Individual share 
(percentage) 
Herfindahl 
Index 
Sylvo pastoral zone 
Barkédji 10.0 (19.612) 0.590 10.9 (10.461) 0.142   
Dodji 12.5 (6.442) 0.080 25.0 (5.555) 0.018   
GuèyeKadar 16.7 (11.758) 0.166     
Kamb 20.0 (11.566) 0.094     
Linguère 14.3(5.735) 0.039 20.0 (14.789) 0.197   
Labgar 10.0 (10.886) 0.119 20.0 (9.577) 0.058   
Linde 12.5 (8.102) 0.053     
Louguéré  Thioly 14.3 (6.552) 0.065     
Nakara 12.5 (6.665) 0.053     
Ndiayène Fouta 11.1 (4.689) 0.021     
Ranérou 11.1 (6.978) 0.062     
Thiel 10.0 (6.632) 0.044     
Vélingara 6.7 (2.801) 0.014 20.0(21.683) 0.281   
Widou 14.3 (10.132) 0.164     
Yaré Lao 16.7 (19.367) 0.372     
Dahra     20.1 (17.200) 0.148 
Average SPZ 12.0 (9.875) 0.129(0.155) 18.1 (13.355) 0.139 (0.107) 20.1 (17.200)        0.148 () 
Eastern Senegal 
Bala 16.7 (20.711) 0.258 14.3 (10.814) 0.100   
Brifal 20.0 (1.863) 0.002     
Gabou 14.3 (9.196) 0.092 12.5 (8.622) 0.149   
Goudiry 10.0 (6,9526) 0.048     
Kadiel 33.3 (17.271) 0.119     
Séno Youpé 33.3 (26.305) 0.208     
Tambacounda     33.3 (23.575) 0.148 
Average ES 17.6 (14.827)  0.121 (0.096) 13.3 (9.389) 0.125 (0.035)   33.3(23.575)       0.148 () 
Senegal       
Average 13.2(11.307) 0.127 (0.139) 16.4 (12.184)  0.135 (0.088) 25.0 (19.367)  0.148 (0.000) 
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Quality of gum arabic in Senegal: linking the laboratory research to the field assessment 
Abstract  
This chapter links the field assessment of gum quality based on visible attributes of gum to 
chemical analyses based on invisible attributes of gum with a purpose of finding links in the 
definition of gum quality by collectors and traders on the one hand and by users on the other 
hand. We find that good quality as defined by collectors and traders is not always good when 
measured in the laboratory; however, an opportunity to increase good quality on the field 
increases the likelihood of obtaining chemically good gum. Furthermore, we investigated 
determinants of quality supply in terms of two attributes of visual inspection namely the size 
and cleanliness of gum nodules, the latter is especially the basis for obtaining chemically 
good gum. Quality is determined by several factors on which the collector has no influence 
including the selection of tree species, edaphic conditions and climatic factors. However, 
quality maintenance and improvement can be positively influenced by harvest and post-
harvest practices and participation in trainings that sharpen good practices, the behaviour and 
experience of traders, and price expectations especially if these expectations are related to tree 
management. 
Keywords: ordered logit, gum arabic, quality, marketing 
5.1 Introduction  
Gum arabic is widely used in food and non-food industries where it functions as an 
emulsifier, stabilizer, thickener, flavouring or coating agent (Wickens et al., 1995; 
Nussinovitch, 1997; Verbeken et al., 2003; ITC, 2008). These functions are associated with 
certain quality requirements fulfilled by gum properties such as absorption, tastelessness, 
odourlessness, solubility, viscosity and rheological behaviour (Glicksman, 1969). According 
to Chikamai and Odera (2002), these properties are determined by several factors including 
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the botanical sources of Acacia senegal trees, tapping methods and harvesting period, soil 
conditions and climatic factors.  
Gum arabic, similar to agricultural and other non-timber forest products, possesses 
both intrinsic and extrinsic quality attributes. According to van Boekel (2005) and Luning and 
Marcelis (2009), intrinsic quality attributes are physically linked to the product while extrinsic 
quality attributes do not necessarily have a direct relationship with the product properties but 
can affect the users’ quality perception or the product’s acceptance. Extrinsic attributes of 
forest products include for instance being organically or sustainably collected. As gum arabic 
is not directly consumed but just an ingredient in processing, the extrinsic quality aspects may 
be less important in trade; hence, these attributes are not the emphasis of our current study. 
Rather, we focus on intrinsic physical attributes. These attributes may be visible such as the 
gum size and fullness or hardness of its nodules, its colour, and cleanliness; or invisible such 
as the gum’s chemical composition. While certain attributes are permanent, others may be 
changed intentionally (e.g., through post-harvest cleaning) or unintentionally through the 
product’s interaction with the environment (e.g., as the gum matures or dries, it can change 
colour).  
The visible quality attributes are not the only determinant in gum trading, but, they are 
important for grading the gum in absence of any more sophisticated method. Grading is 
important because it helps in targeting markets which are undersupplied, in finding market 
niches suitable to different uses, or in awarding price premiums. These premiums could 
reflect the costs of all efforts in cleaning, sorting and supplying top quality gum. The sum of 
gains of graded gum is supposed to be higher than what the collector would be paid for bulk 
gum. Factors influencing quality attributes need to be well understood if a grading system has 
to be maintained or improved. These influencing factors are human (such as collectors’ 
harvesting practices and involvement in post-harvest activities); environmental (such as soil 
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conditions or climate variability which are different from region to region); or market 
development (such as price premiums, costs, and users’ demands).  
In this chapter, our aim is to investigate the factors that contribute to the current 
supply of quality by gum collectors. In the first instance we analyse the relevance of the 
quality assessment by collectors and primary traders as compared to the users’ requirements 
that are measurable by laboratory tests. It is important to establish a link between the field and 
laboratory assessment of quality because even if these two sides may talk a different 
language, they should converge to the same meaning of quality such that collectors may 
indeed supply what is needed by users and thereby benefit from the maintenance and 
improvement of such quality. Such a link will also pave ways for small gum producing 
countries to establish a grading system which is not just based on the distinction of different 
species (e.g., gum from the Acacia senegal is hard, while gum from Acacia seyal is flaky) or 
different varieties within a species (e.g., Acacia senegal var. senegal found in Sudan and 
Senegal vs. Acacia senegal var. kerensis found in Kenya), but a distinction of quality grades 
within a certain variety itself. Second, we empirically analyse determinants of quality 
attributes namely the size and cleanliness of gum nodules using a dataset constructed through 
monitoring of quality supplied by collectors throughout the gum collection season of 2009-
2010 in 16 markets in the Sylvopastoral Zone and Eastern Region of Senegal. This 
monitoring followed a training conducted at the beginning of the collection season which 
aimed at sensitizing collectors on good practices for quality improvement and maintenance.  
In the next section we introduce the definition of quality and its relevance, and then 
specify the aspects of quality of gum arabic. The section is followed by the methodology and 
subsequently results are presented. In the last section we discuss these results and present 
conclusions. 
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5.2 Quality definition and relevance 
Quality is generally defined as a measure of excellence. It is a widely used concept that 
however remains abstract and complex. In production, quality is a state of being free from 
defects and significant variations, brought about by the strict and consistent adherence to 
measurable and verifiable standards to achieve uniformity of output that satisfies specific user 
requirements (Dale et al., 1997). In business, quality of the goods and services refers to the 
creation of customer satisfaction and is one of the elements that contribute to profitability 
(Evans and Lindsay, 2005). 
Evans and Lindsay (2005) distinguished five perspectives from which quality is 
considered. These are: (1) judgemental perspective of considering quality as absolute and 
universally recognisable; (2) product-based perspective with quality as a function of specific 
measurable variables of the product; (3) user-based perspective that considers the product 
performance within its intended function or use; (4) value-based perspective that takes into 
account the relationship between the product usefulness to its price; and (5) manufacturing-
based perspective where quality is considered as conformance to manufacturing 
specifications. The first four perspectives are important for gum arabic. 
However, it should be recognised that the meaning of quality is not static but evolves 
through time and depends on the people involved in the supply chain. For instance, producers 
might put emphasis on agronomic practices (seeds, disease resistance) while distributors 
might focus more on storage conditions (shelf-life, little waste); the ultimate aim is that the 
end-user/consumer is satisfied (Ruben et al., 2007). Variations in quality perspectives imply 
that from producers to users through traders and distributors, there might different measures 
and rewards of quality. 
Quality has several attributes. On the one hand, in the introduction, a division between 
intrinsic and extrinsic quality attributes of a certain product was suggested. Van Boekel 
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(2005), Ruben et al. (2007) and Luning and Marcelis (2009) explain that intrinsic attributes 
are physically inherent to the product while extrinsic attributes are not directly a physical 
property of the product. Intrinsic attributes can be noticeable by sensory observation and are 
the result of physicochemical and other properties of a product. Examples of intrinsic 
attributes include texture, taste, protein content or microbial condition. Extrinsic attributes can 
affect the consumer’s quality perception or the product’s acceptance. Examples of extrinsic 
attributes include religious rules, organic production, or brand name which can influence the 
consumers’ quality perception or products’ acceptance. On the other hand, Fafchamps et al. 
(2008) suggested that a product’s quality is determined by both observable (e.g., colour, size, 
shape) and non-observable attributes. In their research of non-staple food markets in India, 
they concluded that observable attributes formed the basis for rewarding producers with a 
price premium associated with drying, grading, and packaging the crops whereas agricultural 
practices (irrigation, usage of seeds, or the application of pesticide) did generally not 
influence the price.  
The reward for quality is associated with the fact that even if quality may be seen as 
an attribute of the product, it has its own cost and price. Tollens and Gilbert (2003) explain 
that buyers and sellers trade higher or lower quality products depending on the quality 
premium; in other words, quality is determined by the interaction between the demand for 
quality and the quality level that producers seek to provide. Hence differences in price are 
normally associated with quality differences; these differences may even be translated into 
well-defined grades (Fafchamps et al., 2008).  
Quality is not only used to obtain high prices; according to Alexiades and Shanley 
(2004), producers can choose to supply high quality products in order to access and maintain 
position in high-value markets. Evans and Lindsay (2005) confirmed that quality is an 
important source of competitive advantage generating higher returns on investments and 
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increased market share. However, achieving top quality is not costless because quality needs 
appropriate technology, which may be simple, but costly in labour and time. Furthermore, 
especially in context of international trade, compliance with (more strictly enforced) standards 
and food safety control systems can be difficult to manage or prohibitively expensive in 
particular for small exporters. The consequence of investing in quality may be the reduced 
short-run profitability but in the long-run such investments and related improved capacities 
and awareness lead to improved profitability (Henson and Jaffee, 2006; Belcher and 
Schreckenberg, 2007). 
The positive relation between price and quality is assumed to be the norm implying 
that if the higher quality is not rewarded by a higher price, there are no incentives to improve 
quality. However, if the relation between quality and price is not explicit, there may be cases 
where rising prices result in poor or declining quality of the product. For instance, in the 
forestry sector, Martinez et al. (2007) found that in the market of Linaloe (Bursera aloexylon) 
used for wood, increased competition led to increased levels of extraction of the linaloe 
resource even before maturity thereby leading to low wood quality; Neumann and Hirsch 
(2000) report that in Nepal, when buyers pay according to weight regardless of quality, 
harvesters of non-timber forest products supply without selecting quality products (quoting 
Edwards, 1996) or increased competition leads to harvesting of low-quality immature seeds of 
timur (zanthoxylum armatum) because there is a strong incentive to harvest any seeds before a 
competitor does (quoting Rawal, 1995). The reason for this negative relation between price 
and quality is associated with the nature of resource tenure especially for forest products. In 
private and community-managed forests where competition is regulated, the quality is much 
better whereas in open-access forests where the ‘first come, first serve’ rule operates, insecure 
tenure over collection areas leads to risk of over-exploitation and inability to manage the 
quality (Belcher and Schreckenberg, 2007). Furthermore, quality cannot be rewarded due to 
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low bargaining power of rural producers. Especially of these non-timber forest products, 
collectors are often at a disadvantage in marketing their produce because they produce small 
volumes of inconsistent quality. They sell their ungraded products to traders who, if they 
invest in clean and post-harvest storage, reap the benefits of selling the product in graded 
categories (Enriquez et al., 2006). 
Gum quality has intrinsic and extrinsic quality attributes, of which some are visible. 
Problems with quality are that gum arabic may sometimes be mixed with other types of gums 
to increase weight, harvested immaturely to get it off the tree before other collectors, un-
cleaned of its impurities, dried or stored improperly, and not graded (Seif el Din and Zarroug 
1996; DEFCCS, 2005). Such problems make that quality of gum supplied is neither reliable 
nor consistent unless the collector or any subsequent buyer takes a deliberate effort to clean 
and grade it. Variations in quality have also led to design of artificial gum substitutes that 
have enhanced and reliable properties (Al-Assaf et al., 2007; Aoki, et al., 2007). Therefore, 
gum producing countries, including Senegal, need to realise that maintaining and improving 
the quality of the gum is essential in order to retain and expand their market share. 
Furthermore, there is need for designing price incentives associated with a grading system to 
increase the offer of good quality gum. 
5.3 Aspects of gum arabic quality 
Gum arabic has unique properties that make it useful in a wide range of specific food, and 
non-food industrial applications. Examples of applications in the food industry are shown in 
table 5.1. 
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Table 5. 1. Functions of gum arabic in food products 
Function  Examples of food applications 
Adhesive  Bakery  
Crystallization inhibitor Sugar syrups, pastilles, candies 
Clarifying agent Beer, wine 
Coating agent  Candies 
Emulsifier Caramels, toffees, soft drinks 
Encapsulating agent Powdered fixed flavours 
Flocculating agent Wine  
Foam stabilizer Whipped toppings, beer, marshmallow 
Gelling agent Puddings, desserts, mousses 
Mold release agent Gum drops, jelly candies 
Protective colloid Flavour emulsions (e.g., orange, lime, beer, cola) 
Stabiliser Mayonnaise, beer, ice cream, sherbet 
Suspending agent Chocolate milk 
Swelling agent Processed meat 
Syneresis inhibitor Cheese, frozen foods 
Thickening agent Jams, sauces, gravies 
Whipping agent Icings, toppings 
 Source: Glicksman (1969), Williams and Phillips (2009), Phillips (2012) 
Gum arabic is also used in non-food industries for instance in modern pharmacy where it is 
commonly employed as a demulcent, emulsifier, binder, or for film-forming (Moges, 2004; 
Khan and Abourashed, 2010). It is also used in partial destruction of many alkaloids such as 
atropine, hyoscyamine, scopolamine, homatropine, morphine, cocaine, and physostigmine 
(Khan and Abourashed, 2010). Ali et al. (2009) suggested a possible use of gum arabic in 
dentistry because it enhances dental remineralisation and has some antimicrobial activity. The 
recently discovered health benefits of gum arabic include its anti-obesity effects if used as a 
dietary supplement (Ushida, 2012), and maintenance of uric acid at normal levels in the 
treatment of gout (Osman et al., 2012). 
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Other commercial uses of Acacia gum include its utilization in production of inks, 
pottery pigmentation, water-colours and paints, wax polishes, liquid gum, textiles, and 
lithography (Barbier, 1992, 2000; Fagg and Allison, 2004; Wickens et al., 1995; Idris and 
Haddad, 2012). 
Depending on the uses of gum arabic that are as diverse as just described above, 
different quality grades of the gum are needed. Typically the food and pharmaceutical 
industries require the finest quality whereas the painting industry does not necessarily need 
the best quality.  
Quality grades are assessed by chemical and physical characteristics. Chemical 
characteristics of gum arabic quality have been defined by the Joint FAO/WHO Expert 
Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) and adopted or modified by other regulations such as 
the EU Gum Arabic Specification (E414), the European Pharmacopeia, the United States 
Food Chemical Codex or the United States Pharmacopeia and the National Formulary 
(Williams and Phillips, 2009).  
The physical characteristics of gum arabic are visible features associated with colour, 
size and solidity of the gum nodule, and cleanliness from impurities such as tree bark or dirt. 
Generally ‘good’ gum must be clean, with solid nodules that are orange-brown coloured 
(Macrae and Merlin, 2002). Sudan, Nigeria and Chad have registered their gum grades on the 
world markets such that these grades have become internationally known and command 
different prices (e.g., Sudan’s grades in table 5.2). Small producing countries like Senegal do 
not have such a known grading system.  
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Table 5. 2. Sudan classification of gum arabic 
Grade  Description Percentage 
at sorting 
Hand Picked Selected  Cleanest, lightest colour, and whole nodule, Ø 
>30 mm; most expensive grade 
0 to 5 
Cleaned amber and sifted Clean, siftings are removed, pale to dark amber 
colour, whole or broken nodule, Ø >20 mm 
5-10 
Cleaned Standard grade, contains siftings but dust is 
removed, whole nodule plus fragments, 10 <Ø 
<20 mm 
70 
Siftings   Fine particles left after sorting, contains sand, 
bark and dirt, 2.5<Ø < 10 mm 
5 
Dust  Very fine particles collected after the cleaning 
process, Ø< 2.5 mm 
5 
Red gum Dark and red particles, only for local use   
Ø - Diameter 
Source: Macrae and Merlin (2002), Williams and Phillips (2009) 
The main factors affecting these grades of gum arabic quality are different botanical sources, 
tapping methods and harvesting period, soil conditions and climatic factors (Chikamai and 
Odera, 2002). To maintain gum quality during gum collection, collectors need to apply good 
tapping techniques and tap at the appropriate time (following climatic and ecological cues), 
respecting the waiting period after tapping. They should harvest gum off the tree carefully 
without taking the bark, and prevent it from touching the soil. Post-harvesting handling is also 
important; indeed cleaning, drying or storage improve the quality of gum arabic.   
While different prices are associated with different grades at the export level, the same 
rule should be applicable within the gum producing countries at the level of collectors so that 
a high price rewards the efforts in conversion from low to high quality either during or post 
harvesting. A predicting model that explains relationships between gum grading, costs and 
price is included in the appendix A1. This model investigates reasons as to why collectors 
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seem to supply gum of standard quality and not implement quality maintenance or 
improvement when conversion costs are too high vis-à-vis price premiums (which are quasi-
absent on local markets in Senegal). Yet, arguably, quality maintenance, improvement and 
hence grading can potentially improve the price of gum for collectors and increase their 
incomes. Yet, the model in A1 also attempts to explain why traders do not provide these 
incentives for enforcing quality maintenance or improvement8. 
5.4 Methodology 
1. Formalisation of quality  
A first step in investigating the quality of gum supplied by collectors is to test the 
understanding of its meaning by collectors and traders on the one side and by users on the 
other side. The collector’s assessment of gum quality was done on the field whereas the users’ 
assessment is determined in the laboratory by analysis of the chemical components which 
determine its properties and thereby its usage in different industries. Both assessments are 
brought together in a comparative analysis that is based on specifications recognized by FAO 
and Valdafrique. 
Field assessment 
A field assessment of gum samples was conducted during the visit of 11 random villages from 
the Sylvopastoral zone and Eastern region of Senegal between March and April 2010. In total, 
27 random samples of gum were taken from the gum intended for sale and these samples were 
assessed by collectors and traders in the village. In this assessment, samples were classified as 
of best, first, second or standard quality on the basis of a visual inspection of quality attributes 
including the size of the gum nodule, clarity of colour, and cleanliness.  
  
                                                     
8
 Currently, gum sales are not rewarded according to quality but collectors receive a low price for their product. 
The lack of statistics in relation to different grades of gum arabic has made that the available data could not 
substantiate this model.  
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Laboratory chemical analyses 
Chemical analyses were done in the laboratory to determine the intrinsic invisible quality 
attributes of the gum samples. These samples were ground in powder on a cutting mill 
(Retsch SM100) with a sieve of aperture size of 1mm. They were then solubilized in distilled 
water at a rate of 10 per cent w/w (weight by weight). The solution was then filtrated on a 
filter with porosity P2 in order to eliminate the particles in suspension (sand, bark etc.). The 
laboratory analysis include measurements such as dry matter (determined on gum powder by 
heating at 103°C during 24h), mineral matter or ashes (determined on gum powder by 
combustion at 550°C during 4h), and the specific rotatory power (determined by direct 
reading of rotator power on a Bellingham + Stanley’s ADP220 polarimeter).  
Linking the field to the laboratory  
Results from the chemical analyses were compared with the field assessment to determine the 
extent to which the samples graded in the field fulfilled users’ requirements. Users’ quality 
requirements provided the basis for comparison namely the JECFA specifications for food 
products in general on the international level, and Valdafrique specifications for chemical 
products on the national level. These specifications of gum arabic are found in appendices A2 
and A3 respectively.  
2. Determinants of quality supply by gum collectors 
In the second step we analyse the determinants of supply of quality for two attributes namely 
the size and cleanliness of the nodules: the bigger and/or the cleaner the gum nodule, the 
higher is its quality.  
The variable indicating the size of gum nodules is defined by the quantity brought by 
the collector to market which includes many nodules that are smaller than 2cm (0), a few 
nodules that are smaller than 2 cm (1), a few nodules that are larger than 2cm (2), and many 
nodules that are larger than 2cm (3). The variable indicating the cleanliness of nodules is 
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defined by the quantity brought by the collector to market which includes a few nodules that 
are clean (0), about half of the nodules that are clean (1), and many nodules that are clean (2). 
These values indicate attributes of the ordered observed outcome in the supply of quality. 
Determinants of the attributes of quality include tapping aspects, post-harvest 
handling, market characteristics, and environmental factors.  
Tapping aspects include: 
- Time between tapping the Acacia senegal tree and collecting the gum off the tree: the 
recommended minimum time between tapping and collection is 14 days so that gum has 
sufficiently matured. Any time lesser than 14 days has a negative effect on quality in terms of 
size and hardness, because a wet nodule will easily carry impurities. A dummy variable 
expressing this time takes the value of 1 if 14 days or more are taken between tree tapping and 
collecting gum or 0 if there is no information regarding the time or less time was taken 
between tapping and collection.  
- Forest management: refers to private or common ownership of gum trees and/or plots. 
Private plots are found with collectors who have planted their own trees or through permanent 
ownership by inheritance, requests from village chiefs, or by formal or informal divisions of 
plantations. Communal plots are obtained through temporary ownership or just through 
collection with or without permit from the forestry service. Generally no investment in 
management practices is done (such as pruning, coppicing, or fertilization); hence there is no 
difference in tree management between private and common plots. However, the risk of 
appropriation of the gum oozing from the tree by competing collectors who are unrestricted to 
the common plots is high; hence this is expected to have a negative effect on the quality of 
gum collected. A dummy variable expressing forest management takes the value of 1 if 
collection is organized in communal plots or 0 if collection is organized in private plots.   
Post-harvest handling includes: 
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- Participation in training on quality: a training that pertained to quality aspects of gum 
arabic was specifically organized for collectors at the beginning of the collection season of 
2009-2010. Collectors who participated in such training were expected to supply gum of 
better quality than those who did not participate in the training. The variable expressing 
participation in training takes the value of 1 if the collector participated or 0 if he did not 
participate. 
- Post-harvest time per kg of gum arabic: this is the number of minutes spent in post-
harvest activities such as cleaning, grading and sorting gum before taking it to the buyer. This 
is calculated as the total time (in minutes) the collector devoted to post harvest activities 
divided by the total amount of gum he sold The longer the time, the better the quality.  
Market characteristics include: 
- Sale place choice: village shop owners, whose cost of quality inspection may be low 
because they were established in the village, might enforce quality requirements more 
rigorously than mobile traders. These mobile traders come to the market with an interest in 
gathering large quantities in order to minimize their marketing costs. The variable expressing 
the collector’s choice of sale place9 takes the value of 1 if gum was sold to a village 
boutiquier or 0 if gum was sold to a mobile trader.  
- Trader experience: the effect of the trader’s experience on gum quality depends on the 
supply base and type of markets where the trader in turn sells the gum. A less experienced 
trader who wants to establish himself in business might put a bigger emphasis on the gum 
quality to satisfy the buyer or as he needs to establish a large customer base, he may not need 
to enforce strong quality requirements.  
- Price in previous season: the price received by collectors last year gives an indication 
of the expected price. The higher this price, the higher the incentive to upgrade quality. 
                                                     
9
 Both boutique and mobile trader may accept all grades of gum, but they are mutually exclusive for a single 
transaction: the collector sells to either one place. 
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However, as the number of collectors increases (the higher expected prices may attract non-
professionals), the quality of gum may go down as competition in common forests increases. 
Furthermore, if the price is high, quality may also deteriorate as there is relatively more 
demand for lower quality.  
Environmental factors are control variables on which the collector has no influence. They 
include:   
- Seasonal differences: the time in the season when the quantity is supplied, assuming 
that storage is not done for a long time and, the collector did not bring to the market in period 
2 the gum harvested in period 1. Seasonal differences capture the differences in quality due to 
variations in exogenous climatic differences (e.g., heat). The variable for seasonal time takes 
the value of 0 for collection at the beginning of season, 1 for the mid-season and 2 for the end 
of season. 
- Regional differences: there might also be environmental factors which differ across 
regions (e.g., rainfall) that affect the quality of gum. The variable for region takes a value of 1 
for Eastern Senegal or 0 for the Sylvopastoral zone. 
3. Data and econometric model 
Two training sessions on gum quality aspects were conducted in the Sylvopastoral Zone and 
Eastern region at the beginning of the gum season of 2009-2010 previous to starting 
collection. Following these sessions, monitoring of markets was done between January and 
May 2010 such that the quality brought to the markets was immediately recorded together 
with the specific details that could be the determinants of this quality. This monitoring was 
done fortnightly in 16 markets and resulted in 219 formal records. 
 The analysis of determinants of quality aspects is done through an ordered logit model 
whereby the observed attributes of the size or cleanliness of gum nodules are the dependent 
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variables. According to Greene (2008), the ordered logit model is built around a latent 
regression:   
j∗ = ip + 	E         (1) 
where y* is unobserved.; x is the vector of independent variables, and β is the vector of 
regression coefficients which are estimated.  
Categories of response of response are observed: 
j = 	
qr
rr
s
rrr
t0	A		j∗ ≤ 0																						1	A		0 ≤ j∗ ≤ v'		2	A		v' ≤ j∗ ≤ v(.																															.																															.																																A		v+6' ≤ j∗				
          (2) 
Then the ordered logit technique will use the observations on y, which are a form of censored 
data on y* to fit the parameter vector β,  is the number of categories in the dependent 
variable and µ are the cut-off points. 
Cameron and Trivaldi (2010) show that the ordered logit is a model of cumulative 
probabilities associated with the ordered categories such that: 
Pr(j = ) = 	
qr
rs
rr
tPr(v+6' <	j∗ ≤ v+)																																																	Pr(v+6' <	ip + 	E ≤ v+)																											Pr(v+6' −	ip < 	E ≤ v+ −	ip)		
F(v+ −	ip) − {(v+6' −	ip)						
       (3) 
Where F is the cumulative distribution function of E which is logistically distributed. 
5.5 Results 
1. Assessment of quality  
The classification of samples according to the field criteria and the results from chemical 
analyses are presented in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5. 3. Field assessment of quality and results of chemical analyses for 27 gum 
arabic samples  
Village of 
origin 
 Reference  Field 
assessme
Description DM 
(%) 
MMa 
(%) 
SRPa 
  (º of  angle 
  of rotation) Size of nodules Cleanliness  
L1 CEH1 1st best large pieces  Clean  88.76 4.30 -28.11 
L1 CEH2 1st  small pieces Clean  89.33 3.49 -22.03 
L1 CEH3 1st  small pieces Clean  88.92 9.71 -30.26 
L1 CEH4 2nd  small pieces Dirty  89.89 7.55 -29.17 
G1 CEH5 1st  large pieces Clean  89.10 3.65 -31.48 
G1 CEH6 2nd  large pieces Dirty  89.94 16.58 -32.33 
G1 CEH7 standard  large pieces A bit clean 89.49 4.74 -29.41 
Y CEH8 1st  large pieces A bit clean 88.97 3.99 -32.35 
Y CEH9 2nd  large pieces Dirty  90.00 6.78 -30.50 
V CEH10 1st 'best' large pieces Clean  89.26 3.66 -29.79 
V CEH11 1st  large pieces Not quite 
clean 
88.55 3.44 -32.27 
V CEH12 2nd  small pieces Very dirty 88.59 3.81 -29.54 
T CEH13 1st  large pieces Clean  88.63 3.39 -25.04 
T CEH14 2nd  large pieces with 
debris 
Clean  88.90 3.89 -29.21 
T CEH15 standard  large pieces with 
debris 
Clean  88.73 4.14 -31.70 
L2 CEH16 1st  large Dirty  89.30 3.37 -29.62 
L2 CEH17 2nd  large Dirty  89.42 9.69 -18.96 
L2 CEH18 3rd  large Dirty  88.48 14.47 -28.85 
S1 CEH19 standard  small pieces Clean  88.08 3.01 -30.36 
D CEH20 standard  small pieces Clean 88.33 2.72 -34.11 
G2 CEH21 standard  very small pieces Clean 88.53 3.19 -31.86 
S2 CEH22 1st  small pieces Clean 88.11 8.07 -29.84 
S2 CEH23 2nd  small pieces Clean 88.44 8.22 -27.48 
S2 CEH24 3rd  small pieces with 
debris 
Quite clean 88.40 3.70 -32.19 
K CEH25 1st  very small pieces Dirty 88.69 4.82 -36.96 
K CEH26 2nd  very small pieces 
with debris 
Very dirty 88.90 4.77 -32.66 
K CEH27 3rd  very small pieces 
with debris 
Most dirty 88.63 5.50 -37.30 
DM: dry matter; MM: mineral matter; SRP: specific rotatory power 
a
 Results on DM basis 
There are some clear findings derived from the above analysis: (1) there is a subjective 
description of quality that differs from village to village, what is considered as good quality 
by one village may not be the same in another village; (2) generally, the good quality (best, 
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first or standard quality) is associated with the gum cleanliness whereby the lower mineral 
matter confirms the gum to be less contaminated. 
 The above results were checked to find out whether the two assessments jointly fulfil 
the user’s requirements. The  two quality criteria of gum arabic retained for comparison are 
that (1) Ash content (mineral matter) should not exceed 4% (JECFA, 2006 and Valdafrique, 
2011), and (2) Optical rotation between -26 and -34 degrees (Osman et al., 1993) (Table 5.4). 
Table 5. 4. Assessment of fulfilment of quality requirements for samples of gum arabic  
Village of 
origin 
Total 
number of 
samples 
Laboratory assessment Field assessment 
1st or standard 
(16) 
Field vs. 
Lab 
(16) 
Ash content 
(27) 
Optical rotation 
(27) 
L1 4 1 3 3 0 
G1 3 1 3 2 1 
Y 2 1 2 1 1 
V 3 3 3 2 2 
T 3 1 2 2 0 
L2 3 1   2 1 1 
S1 1 1 1 1 1 
D 1 1 1 1 1 
G2 1 1 1 1 1 
S2 3 1 3 1 0 
K 3 0 1 1 0 
Total  27 13 22 16 8 
 
Out of the 27 tested samples, only 13 samples fulfil the ash content criterion whereas 22 
samples fulfil the optical rotation criterion. Among the 27 samples, 16 samples were 
considered of first (best) or good standard quality (quality that is generally supplied 
irrespective of any quality grading) in the field assessment. In comparing the laboratory 
assessment to the field assessment, only 8 samples among these 16 were correctly found to 
fulfil the optical rotation and ash content criteria. Among the samples of low quality as 
assessed on the field, only 2 were incorrectly classified by collectors as they were found to be 
of good quality in accordance to the laboratory analyses. 
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 Although gum arabic can find usage for almost all quality levels, by jointly comparing 
the field and laboratory assessment of gum quality to the users requirements in the 
international food and local pharmaceutical industries, it is found that (1) low quality is in 
most cases confirmed to be bad by any assessment, the visual attribute for low quality is the 
lack of cleanliness irrespective of any size of the nodule; and, (2) high quality from the 
perspective of collectors and traders on the field is not always good in terms of laboratory 
assessment; in this case, only 50 per cent of high ‘field’ quality samples were correctly 
classified. Furthermore, more samples were considered of bad quality by the laboratory tests 
than after visual inspection. This may influence the rejection rates at higher levels in the 
supply chain. However, if supply of high quality on the field was increased, there would be 
more likelihood to fulfil quality requirements in terms of laboratory assessment; this 
observation leads us to investigating the determinants of quality supply. 
2. Determinants of quality supply by gum collectors 
 
Table 5.5 shows the distribution of gum supplied by collectors with regard to the size and 
cleanliness of gum nodules.  
Table 5. 5. Two-way table: Gum cleanliness by Size of gum nodule 
Gum 
Cleanliness 
Size of gum nodule Total 
Many < 2cm Few < 2cm Few > 2cm Many > 2cm 
Few clean 0 7 11 1 19 
Half clean 72 29 28 7 136 
Many clean 17 38 7 2 64 
Total 89 74 46 10 219 
Pearson o((6) = 52.18*** 
A cross tabulation between cleanliness and size of gum nodules shows that these attributes of 
quality are significantly different. For instance, more than 70 per cent of gum supplied 
contains nodules which are small, at the most less than 2cm in diameter. These small nodules 
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are mostly clean. The gum which is not clean consists of less than 10 per cent of all the gum 
supplied, but this unclean gum is of big nodules, at least larger than 2cm in diameter.  Such 
differences justify the treatment of these attributes as separate dependent variables in 
subsequent analyses 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show the descriptive statistics of the variables used as determinants 
of quality supply in terms of size of gum nodules and cleanliness and the ordered logit results 
for quality supply, respectively. 
  
140 
 
Table 5. 6. Descriptive statistics of determinants of quality supply  
Variable Undistinguished quality Size of gum nodules Cleanliness                        Equality test 
 Senegal 
(219) 
SPZ 
(155) 
ES 
(64) 
Many 
< 2cm 
(89) 
Few < 
2cm 
(74) 
Few > 
2cm 
(46) 
Many > 
2cm 
(10) 
Few 
clean 
(19) 
Half 
clean 
(136) 
Many 
clean 
(64) 
Size X 
region 
Clean X 
region 
Distribution of quality 
attributes 
   0.41 
(0.033) 
0.34 
(0.032) 
0.21 
(0.028) 
0.04 
(0.014) 
0.09 
(0.019) 
0.62 
(0.033) 
0.29 
(0.031) 
 
Time between tap and 
harvest (1 if ≥14 days) 
0.33 
(0.470) 
0.33 
(0.471) 
0.32 
(0.469) 
0.32 
(0.471) 
0.30 
(0.460) 
0.39 
(0.493) 
0.22 
(0.441) 
0.23 
(0.427) 
0.33 
(0.485) 
0.37 
(0.484) 
0.79 1.37 
Forest management (1: 
commune) 
0.52 
(0.501) 
0.39 
(0.490) 
0.84 
(0.368) 
0.44 
(0.527) 
0.37 
(0.488) 
0.67 
(0.471) 
0.48 
(0.502) 
0.61 
(0.502) 
0.41 
(0.494) 
0.73 
(0.445) 
7.45*** 9.92*** 
Unity post-harvest time 
(minute/quantity) 
5.83 
(6.092) 
4.93 
(3.908) 
8.01 
(9.178) 
4.65 
(4.640) 
7.14 
(7.773) 
5.764 
(5.612) 
6.82 
(3.432) 
5.82 
(4.720) 
4.68 
(4.190) 
8.27 
(8.690) 
2.31* 8.04*** 
Participated in training 
(1:yes) 
0.72 
(0.452) 
0.64 
(0.480) 
0.89 
(0.317) 
0.44 
(0.527) 
0.75 
(0.434) 
0.63 
(0.488) 
0.76 
(0.432) 
0.61 
(0.502) 
0.71 
(0.454) 
0.75 
(0.175) 
3.46*** 6.22*** 
Sale place (1: village 
boutique) 
0.56 
(0.497) 
0.63 
(0.484) 
0.38 
(0.489) 
0.45 
(0.500) 
0.58 
(0.497) 
0.76 
(0.431) 
0.44 
(0.527) 
1 0.54 
(0.500) 
0.48 
(0.504) 
5.89*** 6.45*** 
Trader experience (year) 15.6 
(9.387) 
19.0 
(7.596) 
7.3 
(8.169) 
17.7 
(9.099) 
12.3 
(10.303) 
17.2 
(7.757) 
13.2 
(1.716) 
17.2 
(6.907) 
18.1 
(8.730) 
9.9 
(8.975) 
18.03*** 21.74*** 
Price in previous season 
(CFA/kg) 
616.0 
(158.82) 
529.35 
(77.666) 
825.78 
(96.770) 
584.83 
(133.87) 
711.5 
(171.33) 
543.6 
(116.38) 
516.7 
(86.60) 
560.53 
(149.61) 
564.34 
(124.56) 
742.19 
(157.41) 
17.84*** 38.33*** 
Begin-season (1: if harvest 
and sale at start of season) 
0.30 
(0.458) 
0.32 
(0.469) 
0.24 
(0.429) 
0.61 
(0.491) 
0.15 
(0.358) 
0 0 0.06 
(0.236) 
0.37 
(0.484) 
0.22 
(0.417) 
20.99*** 5.75*** 
Mid-season (1: if harvest 
and sale in mid-season) 
0.32 
(0.469) 
0.37 
(0.484) 
0.22 
(0.419) 
0.19 
(0.395) 
0.38 
(0.488) 
0.43 
(0.501) 
0.67 
(0.500) 
0.5 
(0.514) 
0.3 
(0.480) 
0.22 
(0.417) 
4.70*** 5.14*** 
End of season (1: if harvest 
and sale at end of season) 
0.38 
(0.485) 
0.31 
(0.464) 
0.54 
(0.502) 
0.20 
(0.404) 
0.47 
(0.503) 
0.56 
(0.501) 
0.33 
(0.500) 
0.44 
(0.511) 
0.28 
(0.450) 
0.56 
(0.500) 
7.64*** 18.69*** 
Region (1: Eastern Senegal)    0.13 
(0.036) 
0.62 
(0.057) 
0.11 
(0.046) 
0 0.17 
(0.090) 
0.10 
(0.025) 
0.73 
(0.055) 
 
aEquality test refers to ANOVA test for continuous variables and Pearson chi-square test for categorical variables.  
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.      
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Table 5. 7. Ordered logistic results (Nodule size: 4 categories in SPZ, 3 categories in ES; 
Nodule cleanliness 3 categories in SPZ and ES)  
Variable Size of gum nodules Cleanliness 
Senegal 
(219) 
SPZ 
(155) 
ES 
(64) 
Senegal 
(219) 
SPZ 
(155) 
ES 
(64) 
Time between tap and 
harvest (1 if 14 days or 
more) 
0.444+ 
(0.353) 
0.603+ 
(0.486) 
1.140+ 
(0.911) 
0.492+ 
(0.391) 
0.392 
(0.524) 
0.310 
(0.801) 
Tree management (1: 
commune) 
-0.388+ 
(0.328) 
-0.359 
(0.393) 
-1.986* 
(1.117) 
-0.094 
(0.358) 
-0.520+ 
(0.455) 
-0.843+ 
(0.799) 
Unity post-harvest time 
(ln minute/quantity) 
0.251* 
(0.142) 
0.157 
(0.275) 
0.099 
(0.308) 
0.306* 
(0.178) 
0.016 
(0.324) 
0.224 
(0.296) 
Participated in training 
(1:yes) 
0.777** 
(0.404) 
0.321+ 
(0.522) 
1.554+ 
(1.098) 
0.063 
(0.439) 
0.522+ 
(0.580) 
0.615 
(0.956) 
Sale place (1: village 
boutique) 
1.502*** 
(0.366) 
1.311*** 
(0.498) 
2.177** 
(0.988) 
-0.570+ 
(0.410) 
-0.930*                                                                                           
(0.581) 
-1.822*
(1.064) 
Trader experience (year) -0.036* 
(0.023) 
-0.046+ 
(0.031) 
-0.172*** 
(0.066) 
0.036+ 
(0.027) 
0.022 
(0.0388) 
0.036 
(0.067) 
Price in previous season 
(CFA/kg) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.001* 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
Mid-season (1: if harvest 
and sale in mid-season) 
3.172*** 
(0.438) 
7.280** 
(3.099) 
1.564+ 
(0.993) 
-0.453+ 
(0.389) 
-0.999* 
(0.561) 
4.643 
(1.682) 
End of season (1: if 
harvest and sale towards 
the end of season) 
2.391*** 
(0.444) 
7.168** 
(3.133) 
-0.140 
(0.913) 
0.241 
(0.445) 
2.325*** 
(0.757) 
-2.011* 
(1.164) 
Region (1: ES) -1.072 
(0.649) 
  2.692*** 
(0.755) 
  
Cut-off1 0.736 
(1.192) 
5.590 
(3.353) 
-13.259 
(5.649) 
-0.976 
(1.317) 
0.718 
(1.671) 
-11.052 
(5.341) 
Cut-off2 2.819 
(1.204) 
6.859 
(3.360) 
-7.715 
(5.333) 
3.141 
(1.343) 
6.197 
(1.778) 
-9.050 
(5.253) 
Cut-off3 5.122 
(1.228) 
9.217 
(3.367) 
    
Log-likelihood -208.14 -129.46 -36.62 -148.71 -83.81 -36.04 
LR-chi square 106.70*** 104.94*** 25.73*** 82.53*** 34.48*** 20.56** 
Pseudo R-square 0.204 0.288 0.260 0.217 0.171 0.222 
% good predictions 53.88 62.58 76.56 78.08 69.73 65.63 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.       
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In comparing determinants of the nodules size and cleanliness in pooled data or across the 
region, we observe differences in forest management, participation in training, choice of sale 
outlet, the buyer’s experience, price in previous season, and harvest and sale of gum arabic 
either at start or middle of the season.  
Large gum nodules were supplied by collectors who can respect the sufficient duration 
required for gum maturity between tree tapping and gum harvesting, spend sufficient time on 
post-harvest activities (including cleaning and sorting), have participated in training, and 
choose to sell to the boutique. In comparison with the beginning of the season, larger gum 
nodules are best obtained during the mid or towards the end of season of collecting and 
selling the gum. Collection in communal forests has a negative effect on the size of nodule as 
probably the competition to collect gum off the tree leads to picking it before its maturity; 
such competition increases due to higher expected price, hence this also has a negative effect 
on quality. Traders who are newer in gum business prefer large nodules.  
The clean gum is supplied by collectors who can respect a sufficient duration required 
for gum maturity between tapping and harvesting of gum, and spend sufficient time on post-
harvest activities (including cleaning and sorting). Experienced traders prefer cleaner nodules; 
Eastern Senegal is the region where cleaner gum is mostly produced. However, the choice of 
boutique as the sale place and the expected price have a negative effect on cleanliness. 
Furthermore, in comparison to the beginning of the season, the gum collected during the mid-
season is less clean. 
Although quality remains determined by selection of tree species, tapping methods, 
harvesting period, edaphic conditions and climatic factors; the harvest and post-harvest 
handling were also found to have a positive influence on quality implying that there is need 
for an emphasis on the basics of the techniques of gum harvesting and practices to maintain 
and improve its quality. Collectors can acquire the related knowledge and skills through 
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experience, and trainings are also needed specially in terms of linking the collector’s  
knowledge to the quality aspects that are important to the users; the training conducted at the 
beginning of the season proved to be important in that respect. The behaviour of a village 
boutique owner is not consistent in regard to quality attributes: he is interested in large 
nodules whose inspection can be quickly established and hence involves a low cost in 
addition to being associated with quantity. An emphasis on cleanliness may not only reduce 
the quantity to trade but also lead to a problem of enforcing the cleanliness requirements as it 
is hard/costly to reject gum: if a trader consistently rejects the supplied gum, this has a bad 
social outcome and collectors may not go to him in the future which means that he loses a 
market altogether. The effect of the trader’s experience implies that younger traders are 
interested in larger nodules than the older traders probably because the size of nodules is easy 
to monitor and describe, while proper assessment of cleanliness is achieved from experience; 
experienced traders indeed may be more interested in clean gum.  
High price expectations create competition which not only restrain the gum maturity 
but also make the nodules prone to more impurities; this competition mainly results from 
organising collection in communal forests. The effect of price on quality can also be due to 
differences in relative demand for quality: at high price levels, there is relatively more 
demand for lower quality whereas at low price levels, there is relatively more demand for 
high quality; such relationships are further explored below. 
Differences within the season are also observed. These differences confirm the studies 
by Chikamai and Odera (2002) that gum quality is influenced by environmental conditions 
such as differences in moisture, wind or heat. Taking the beginning of season as the base, we 
found that the size of nodules increases throughout the season except for ES where towards 
the end of the season, gum nodules were smaller than nodules harvested at the beginning of 
season; cleanliness declines in mid-season to increase again at the end of season except again 
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for ES where towards the end of the season, gum nodules were less clean than gum harvested 
at the beginning of season. 
With regard to spatial differences, there are soil, rainfall and heat conditions that lead 
to a combination of the size and cleanliness but not always in the same direction. On a 
regional level, SPZ is endowed with bigger nodules than ES whereas ES offers cleaner gum 
than SPZ. Note that ES has 2 cut-offs for the size of nodules. 
As mentioned above, the effect of price received in the previous season on gum 
quality supply deserves our attention. Based on the estimation results of the ordered logit 
model, simulations were performed to illustrate the response to changes in price on 
probabilities associated with quality attributes. The probabilities are computed following 
equation (3). Figure 5.1 shows simulation results of pooled data at the average values in 
Senegal and for specific values of certain explanatory variables separately for the 
Sylvopastoral zone and Eastern Senegal for a gum price ranging from 350 to 900 CFA. 
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Figure 5. 1a. Simulation of quality supply response to changes in price at average values (pooled data) 
 
  
Figure 5. 1b. Simulation of quality supply response to changes in price in SPZ if management=0, training=1, sale choice=1 
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Figure 5. 1c. Simulation of quality supply response to changes in price in ES if management=1, training=1, sale choice=1 
 
           
pno: probability of supplying nodules that are smaller than 2cm  
pn1: probability of supplying a few nodules that are smaller than 2 cm  
pn2: probability of supplying a few nodules that are larger than 2cm  
pn3: probability of supplying many nodules that are larger than 2cm 
pco: probability of supplying a few nodules that are clean 
pc1: probability of supplying about half of the nodules that are clean  
pc2: probability of supplying many nodules that are clean  
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At the average values of the explanatory variables in the pooled data, the probability of 
supplying low quality (pn0 or pn1 associated with nodules of small size and pc0 associated 
with less clean nodules) directly increases with expected price whereas the probability of 
supplying high quality (pn2 or pn3 associated with nodules of large size and pc1 or pc2 
associated with cleaner nodules) declines with expected price increases. Apart from small 
variations, the same results hold for simulations within the SPZ and ES (assuming that 
collection is organised in private property in SPZ or communal forests in ES, collectors are 
trained, and sales are made to the village shop): as the effect of an increase in expected price 
in SPZ, pn0 increases while pn1, pn2 and pn3 decrease, pc0 increases while pc1 and pc2 
decrease. In ES, as the effect of an increase in expected price, pn0 and pn1 increase while pn2 
decreases, pc0 and pc1 increase while and pc2 decreases. 
The simulation results confirm that at high prices, supply of low quality gum increases 
whereas when prices are low, the gum supplied is of good quality. These results can be 
associated with the effort of the collector towards achieving a certain quality level, his 
expected income and competition in communal forests. They can also be explained by the 
trader’s behaviour: at a high price, the collectors whose supply of low quality is not rejected 
by a trader will continue supplying low quality whereas at the low price, the collectors whose 
supply of low quality may be rejected by a trader will have to put more effort to increase 
quality at least to a top segment of the gum quality, in order to reach a target income.  
5.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Linking field assessment to laboratory measurements of quality and then investigating 
determinants of quality has led to several interesting findings. First, the results proved the 
divergence in quality definition not only between collectors and users but also among the 
collectors, and from village to village. Furthermore, it has become apparent that the study of 
quality needs to be inclusive of the main stakeholders in order to achieve a common 
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understanding which can then be translated to each stakeholder’s language and be acted upon. 
In this study of the quality of gum arabic, it was found that the measured quality was not 
always directly in accordance with visible quality attributes in the field. Among visible 
attributes, cleanliness (or low mineral matter) is a good indicator of quality. Hence field 
assessment was found not to consistently correspond to the user requirements; while bad 
quality is identified both on the field and in the laboratory, good quality gum is not always 
correctly identified. 
Secondly, even if any quality of gum arabic can find usage, it became evident that 
collectors should be encouraged to put effort specially in cleaning gum, thereby supplying 
their good quality as this would increase the likelihood of obtaining the true good quality on 
the basis of invisible attributes. The sensitization of collectors should be accompanied by 
price incentives by which high quality is rewarded by a quality premium. As simulation 
showed, quality is not stimulated by price but by price differentiation; consequently, in the 
situation when quality is not differentiated, producers/collectors are paid a price that is only 
associated with low quality (as corresponding to equation (8) in appendix 5A.1). Also Leakey 
and Izac (1996) found that non-timber forest products do not get a premium for their physical 
or genetic improvement. In case conversion is undertaken to achieve high quality, this 
conversion involves a cost which will be in line with the quality premium in efficient supply 
chains: while for welfare reasons it is common to suggest that the premium be paid to 
producers/collectors to improve their livelihoods, quality conversion could still be performed 
by traders who have advantages of economies of scale.  
Thirdly, the improvement in quality calls for practices to be respected both in 
harvesting and post-harvest handling. Lamien et al. (1996) for instance showed that the non-
respect of harvesting practices and notably the maturity time reduces the quality of the 
product. Therefore, even if these practices may not always be directly rewarded as Fafchamps 
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et al. (2008) found, they nevertheless have an effect on the visual attributes such as 
cleanliness and size of nodules as we find for gum arabic. Traders are hereby called upon as 
their behaviour is rather ambiguous towards the quality attributes. As actors in the supply 
chain and intermediaries between the collectors and users, they should have a definition of 
quality that is coherent and responsive to the actions and needs of collectors and users 
respectively. As quality uncertainties may also negatively affect the price that traders pay, 
these traders could play important role on transmission of quality information. 
Finally, the current study has strengthened the need to understand the role of forest 
(tree and/or land) management on the quality of the gum. Clear rules of management are 
needed to counteract the influence of market forces (price) on competition in forests. Forest 
management is also a pertinent issue as recurrent competitions may be detrimental to the 
resource and lead to degradation.  
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Appendix 5A 
5A.1. A theoretical model for quality supply and demand 
 
Let the quality of gum be differentiated into low (ungraded) and high quality on the basis of 
intrinsic attributes. Suppose producers supply a product with a certain quality, and traders 
offer a price, based on demand for this product split into high quality demand and ungraded 
quality demand. Let there be two demand curves: 
| = }| − -||            (1) 
~ = }~ − -~~            (2) 
We expect b >	b, indicating that at high prices, low quality may suffice (~ >	|); but 
when prices are low, more consumers demand high quality ( <	). 
A trader faces supply of q, which can be split into a quantity of high quality qh, and a 
remaining fraction which is sold as low quality. The conversion towards grading and selecting 
high quality can – in the simplest approach – be done a fixed cost per unit. If these costs are c, 
then we have the following set of equations determining the prices and the quantity converted 
into high quality 
| − ~ =              (3) 
| = J|               (4) 
~ = J −	J|             (5) 
Exogenous variables are the total quantity produced (q) and the unit conversion costs (c). 
With the demand equations (1) and (2), this leads to:  
| =  D⁄ + D~ − J D⁄             (6)  
where D = -| + -~ ;  = }| + }~ and D~ = -~ D⁄         
J| = }| − D|( + -~) + D|J             (7)  
where β = b β⁄ 			 
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Thus, with higher supply q, there is higher supply of high quality, which is sold at a lower 
price. Rising costs of conversion c would increase the price of high quality, and lower its 
demand and therefore its supply. Where the trade in high quality rise more or less than 
proportionally with q depends on the sign of the intercept a − β/α + cb2. If this is positive, 
the overall share of high quality will fall with rising q. The intercept will be positive if 
c <  −  , which is the gap between the intercepts of the demand function at the vertical 
price-axis. 
The price received by the producers in this model will equal pl, the price of the 
ungraded quality. It falls with higher overall supply, and it also falls if conversion costs rise. 
If producers are price-sensitive, we can extend the model. Let the supply function be  
J = $ + 1~              (8) 
Combining this with (3) and (6), we can relate equilibrium supply qe to its determinants. The 
solution is that in the long run,  
J = (D$ + 1 − -|1)/(1 + D) and ~ = ( − $ − -|)/(1 + D)      (9)  
These solutions for the equilibrium differ from the standard solution by the term bhc in the 
numerator: the higher the conversion costs, the lower the equilibrium supply and the lower the 
equilibrium price. Conversion costs thus acts as the margin between producer and consumer 
prices and lowering it would benefit all. 
In this setting, producers could also capture the margin between high and ungraded 
quality by supplying high quality directly to the traders. Traders do, however, face demand 
characterized by a certain composition of high and low quality, and cannot accept large 
quantities of high quality if there is not a corresponding supply of ungraded quality.  
Their equilibrium demand is as given above in (9). Therefore, following from (7) in 
equilibrium traders will convert a quantity equal to: 
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J| = }| − D|-~ +	-| 6%6W%%,W 	        (10) 
The higher the conversion cost, the lower will be the quantity of high quality converted by the 
trader. The conversion cost per unit of product may fall through economies of scale.  
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5A.2.  JECFA specifications for gum arabic10 
 
Prepared at the 51st JECFA (1998) and published in FNP 52 Add 6 (1998); republished in 
FNP 52 Add 7 (1999) to include editorial changes. Supersedes specifications prepared at the 
49th JECFA (1997), published in FNP 52 Add 5 (1997). ADI "not specified", established at 
the 35th JECFA in 1989. 
Synonyms Gum arabic (Acacia senegal), gum arabic (Acacia seyal), Acacia gum, 
arabic gum, INS No. 414 
Definition Gum arabic is a dried exudate obtained from the stems and branches of 
Acacia senegal (L.) Willdenow or Acacia seyal (fam. Leguminosae). 
Gum arabic consists mainly of high-molecular weight polysaccharides 
and their calcium, magnesium and potassium salts, which on hydrolysis 
yield arabinose, galactose, rhamnose and glucuronic acid. Items of 
commerce may contain extraneous materials such as sand and pieces of 
bark, which must be removed before use in food. 
C.A.S. number 9000-01-5 
Description Gum arabic (Acacia senegal) is a pale white to orange-brown solid, 
which breaks with a glassy fracture. The best grades are in the form of 
whole, spheroidal tears of varying size with a matt surface texture. 
When ground, the pieces are paler and have a glassy appearance. Gum 
arabic (Acacia seyal) is more brittle than the hard tears of gum arabic 
(Acacia senegal). 
Gum arabic is also available commercially in the form of white to 
yellowish-white flakes, granules, powder, roller dried, or spray-dried 
material. 
An aqueous solution of 1 g in 2 ml flows readily and is acid to litmus. 
Functional uses Emulsifier, stabilizer, thickener 
Characteristics   
IDENTIFICATION   
Solubility (Vol.4) One gram dissolves in 2 ml of water; insoluble in ethanol 
Gum constituents 
(Vol.4) 
Proceed as directed under Gum Constituents Identification (FNP 5) 
using the following as reference standards: arabinose, galactose, 
mannose, rhamnose, galacturonic acid, glucuronic acid and xylose. 
Arabinose, galactose, rhamnose and glucuronic acid should be present. 
Additional spots corresponding to mannose, xylose and galacturonic 
acid should be absent. 
  
                                                     
10
 http://www.fao.org/ag/agn/jecfa-additives/details.html?id=766  
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Optical rotation Gum from Acacia senegal: aqueous solutions are levorotatory 
Gum from Acacia seyal : aqueous solutions are dextrorotatory 
Test a solution of 10 g of sample (dry basis) in 100 ml of water (if 
necessary, previously filtered through a No. 42 paper or a 0.8 µm 
millipore filter), using a 200-mm tube. 
PURITY   
Loss on drying 
(Vol.4) 
Not more than 15% (105º, 5 h) for granular and not more than 10% 
(105º, 4 h) for spray dried material. Unground samples should be 
powdered to pass through a No. 40 sieve and mixed well before 
weighing 
Total ash (Vol.4) Not more than 4% 
Acid-insoluble ash 
(Vol.4) 
Not more than 0.5% 
Acid-insoluble 
matter (Vol.4) 
Not more than 1% 
Starch or dextrin Boil a 1 in 50 solution of the sample, cool and add a few drops of Iodine 
T.S. No bluish or reddish colour should be produced. 
Tannin-bearing 
gums 
To 10 ml of a 1 in 50 solution of the sample, add about 0.1 ml of ferric 
chloride TS. No blackish colouration or blackish precipitate should be 
formed. 
Microbiological 
criteria (Vol.4) 
Salmonella spp.: Negative per test 
E. coli: Negative in 1 g 
Lead (Vol.4) Not more than 2 mg/kg 
Determine using an atomic absorption technique appropriate to the 
specified level. The selection of sample size and method of sample 
preparation may be based on the principles of the method described in 
Volume 4, “Instrumental Methods.” 
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5A.3. VALDAFRIQUE specifications for gum arabic11 
 
VALDAFRIQUE® 
LABORATOIRES CANONNE 
FICHE TECHNIQUE 
GOMME INSTANTANEE GAS-60-120 TYPE SENEGAL 
 
Description 
Nature Gomme arabique atomisée soluble purifiée type 
Sénégal (gomme dure) 
Aspect Poudre blanchâtre sans odeur ni goût 
Classification E 414, 96/77/Ec, 95/2/Ec, USP/NF, Fcc 
Norme Pharmacopée européenne 
Propriétés physico-chimiques 
pH solution à 25% 4,2 – 4,8 à 25°C 
Couleur solution à 25% (méthode 
Lovibond) 
B5 – B6 
Viscosité Brookfield solution à 25% Entre 60 et 120 mPa/s à 25°C 
Perte à la dessiccation < 10 % à 105°C 
Matières insolubles < 0,1 % 
Cendres < 4 % 
Pouvoir rotatoire -20° à -40° 
Tanin Non décelable 
Propriétés microbiologiques 
Germes totaux < 10 000 g/g 
Salmonelle Absence / 25g 
E. Coli Absence / 2g 
Conditionnement 
Sacs double enveloppe de 25 kg net 
Stockage Stocker l'abri de la chaleur et de l'humidité 
Durée de stockage Maximum 3 ans recommandé 
Propriétés fonctionnelles 
Facilement soluble dans l'eau. La viscosité peut être ajustée en fonction de l'utilisation 
souhaitée. 
                                                     
11
 http://www.valdafrique.com/ftech_gomme_eng.htm  
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Private versus communal tenure systems in gum arabic collection 
Abstract 
Communal management systems of acacia stands are still prominent in the semi-arid gum 
producing areas. Competition in the plots leads to lower quantities per household and 
compared with private access systems, the gum collected is of lower quality. These communal 
systems also decrease the collectors’ incentives for tree management, may lead to 
overexploitation and even be sources of conflict over resources. Private systems are emerging 
in some villages either at the individual level or through companies; in a gradual transition, 
mixed systems are found in which privately owned properties and communal forests co-exist. 
This study investigates factors that influence the currently observed transition from communal 
to private collection systems at the village level. We derive a theoretical model to show the 
advantages of either system in relation to population density and tree productivity. Using data 
from 53 villages in Senegal, a probit model is used to analyse the choice of organising 
collection in communal systems or mixed systems and a fractional logit model explains the 
gradient of transition in systems of collection. Mixed system are preferred if resource is 
available, markets are developing, labour for collection is available, competition for resource 
is high, forests where gum is collected are located near to the village, or market prices are 
high enough to attract occasional collectors who reinforce the effect of competition. 
Keywords: resource governance, evolution, transition, fractional logit, gum arabic. 
6.1 Introduction 
Theories of transition in farming systems suggested on the one hand, that the shift to 
agriculture/animal husbandry was due to decreasing productivity in hunting and gathering 
production systems (Grigg, 1974; Jones, 2001); the causes of decreasing productivity include 
increased population pressure and sedentism, and the resulting overexploitation of the 
environment. Technological progress was hence regarded as pushing the shift to agriculture 
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(Grigg, 1974; Myers and Marceau, 2006). Environment is also among the recognised factors 
of change; Layton et al. (1991) suggested that climatic change pushed the shift from hunting 
and gathering to intensive husbandry. An interplay between population pressure and 
technological sophistication in explaining the adoption of agriculture was suggested by Baker 
(2008) following the theories developed by Boserup. According to him, societies that practice 
agriculture are indeed more technologically sophisticated, have greater population densities 
and operate in environments which appear to be richer and more amenable to agriculture. 
Specific to animal husbandry, besides the influence of the above factors, animal 
domestication was driven by resource conservationism (Alvard and Kuznar, 2001). Resource 
conservation is also one the main reasons for domesticating forest trees but their morphology 
may be a constraint to its adoption especially for thorny trees such as Acacia senegal (Mallet 
et al., 2002). 
Changes in farming systems, animal husbandry or tree domestication were almost 
always accompanied by a change in resource governance from open to exclusive property 
rights system. North and Thomas (1977) confirmed that the private system provided a direct 
incentive for innovation in order to improve efficiency. According to Ruttan (1989, 2002), the 
change in governance systems originates both from the demand for and supply of institutions. 
On the demand side, changes in factor productivity and product demand; and on the supply 
side, distribution of political resources, cost of achieving social consensus and cultural 
endowments (e.g., ideology and religion) could explain the change in institutions. Ruttan 
(2002) gave examples of the enclosure movement in England during the 15th and 16th 
centuries whereby the expansion in the export demand for wool required the conversion of 
open arable and common lands to private pastures. Also, an increase in the demand for rice in 
Thailand in 19th century made investments in land development for rice production profitable. 
This induced a demand for the reform of property rights. Note that authors like Cohen and 
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Weitzman (1974) however dispute the wool trade story as a factor of enclosures, arguing that 
the opposite was the case. What is important here is to realize the contribution of market 
developments to the dynamics of transition by adding value to the resource and motivating 
decisions to enforce property rights which are necessary to give individuals the long-term 
incentives to invest in resources and use them efficiently (Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972; Behnke, 1997). Another source of institutional change includes land scarcity. 
Production in agriculture can be increased from expansion in land area by deforestation which 
however reduces the stock of natural resources; as continued population pressure constrains 
the availability of land, a formalisation of land ownership becomes a requirement in order to 
undertake investments so that the land productivity can be increased (Ruttan, 1989; 
Quisumbing and Otsuka, 2001; Grimm and Klasen, 2009). 
Similar to farming, market developments and higher demand or prices provide 
incentive for increasing the production of non-timber forest product. According to Belcher 
and Schrekenberg (2007), higher production can be achieved through intensive or extensive 
harvesting or by intensified management. Intensive harvesting to obtain more product per unit 
area may lead to over-exploitation of the species and a decline in resource base depending on 
the resource tenure system and the reproductive capacity of the resource: in conditions of 
open access and common management, increased value leads to uncontrolled competition for 
resources, inefficient and damaging harvesting through the pressure to harvest immature 
product, or harvest beyond sustainable levels with the explanation that another person would 
harvest the product. Marshall et al. (2006) support that in such circumstances, profits for 
harvesters are pushed to the minimum. Extensive harvesting implies the possibility of 
extending the area under collection which can happen when competition for the resource and 
hence pressure are low. In situations where the resource base is limiting and the competition 
among harvesters is too high, intensified management (such as cultivation or tree 
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domestication) is the only option for increasing the quantity of production. Intensified 
management can also give better quality products and more control over the timing of 
production. Hence, as demand or prices increase, the rewards for intensified management also 
increase. Intensive production is possible where producers have access to individually held 
land or trees or if the resource is held under communal tenure with clear management rules.  
From the above review, private property is always presumed to be efficient and to 
increase production whereas open resource management is found not only to decrease the 
producers’ incentives for resource management, but also to lead to overexploitation and cause 
conflicts over resources (e.g., Hardin, 1968; Dafinger and Pelican, 2006). The question 
remains however that if the private property system is recommendable, why are there still 
several cases where communal and open systems are preferred? In other words, it is pertinent 
to understand reasons behind the slow transition to private property. To answer this question, 
an exogenous context is needed whereby the influence of factors such as population pressure, 
market, resource availability (land or trees) on resource governance systems can be 
investigated. Gum collection in Senegal provides a relevant study case: the currently observed 
slow transition from communal to private collection systems helps us to analyse why 
communal systems continue to exist despite that competition may intensify in communal plots 
and decrease the individually collected quantity (in chapter 3) and that these communal 
systems directly have negative consequences on the quality of gum collected (in chapter 5). 
As collection is mostly done through tapping (the collector makes a cut to the tree and 
returns to the tree several days later to harvest the gum that has exuded), the collector should 
hold certain ownership or user rights to the tree and/or property such that he has certainty to 
find the gum; hence private collection systems would generally emerge together with tapping. 
These private systems also provide an incentive to plant and manage trees as suggested by 
agroforestry literature (e.g., Fortmann, 1985; Wiersum, 1997). In Senegal, however, even if 
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tapping has been performed as early as the 18th century, the communal system of management 
of Acacia plantations is still prominent. Private systems slowly emerge in some gum 
producing villages where collectors or companies (e.g., Asylia Gum Company) can have 
ownership of forest plots12. In such gradual transition, mixed systems are found where 
privately owned properties and communal forests coexist. We examine whether the transition 
in systems of gum collection may be explained by the expansion of the market for gum 
arabic, competition in and for property, or resource availability.  
In the next section, we present an account of the historical evolution of the gum arabic 
collection systems. A methodology section then follows where we first develop a model 
showing the household’s behaviour in different collection governance systems and secondly 
present an empirical strategy of analysing factors that influence the choice of collection 
systems. Subsequently results are presented. In the last section we discuss these results, and 
present conclusions. 
6.2 Brief historical evolution of the gum arabic collection systems in Senegal 
Gum collection in West Africa was practiced as early as the 15th century when Muslim 
merchants (Trarza emirs in Southwest Mauritania) used to send slaves into forests to collect 
gum either as organized slave groups or as part of their daily labour; these emirs tightly 
controlled trade with the Djolof (an area which is part of the current Sylvopastoral zone in 
Senegal) (Freudenberger, 1993a; Webb, 1985, 1995). Until the 18th century, wild collection 
prevailed in the Djolof, and it is only during the 19th century that the black maures (from 
Mauritania) introduced tapping and showed the use of bush fire to induce higher yields from 
Acacia senegal trees. With the colonisation, the French administration built an infrastructure 
of roads, wells and railroad in an effort to draw Wolof cultivators and fulbe pastoralists into 
gum collection: villages were coerced to collecting gum through debt peonage by European 
                                                     
12
 A distinction was not made between land rights and tree rights because it is not evident that they are 
substitutes (see for e.g. Bruce and Fortmann (1999) for cases when tree rights substitute for land rights). 
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merchants in which villagers were required to pay back in terms gum arabic the loans granted 
at usurious rates. By the 1910s, gum arabic had become one of the principal cash crops 
exchanged for over-valued imported items such as fabrics. Hence Acacia senegal rapidly 
evolved from being a user-value species, long employed by the fulbe and wolof for livestock 
forage and timber, into an exchange-value species highly esteemed for the readily marketable 
gum (Webb, 1985). 
According to Freudenberger (1993a), the expansion of the market for gum arabic 
stimulated a transformation in labour relations and in the tree tenure systems that determined 
access rights and resource management practices: the wolof nobility was granted access to the 
areas with the densest concentration of Acacia senegal and hired the black maures to harvest 
and transport gum to the market centres; the wolof farmers collected gum in a second zone 
found primarily around the villages of the Senegal river valley, here heads of lineages 
received gum collection rights from the chief and then allocated subsections to relatives and 
dependents. Surprisingly, the maures were also granted access to the forests in the far north-
eastern of the Djolof through seasonal collection rights. This was achieved through the 
intervention of Muslim clerics who in turn received tithes in form of the collected gum.  
In the 1930’s, French hydrologists discovered the Maestrichian aquifer which enabled 
the construction of boreholes. As a consequence, pastoralists changed their transhumance 
patterns in the dry season and settled around these boreholes and their presence in the zone 
attracted them to gum collection: young fulbe herders could furtively collect gum nodules 
after the maures had tapped their trees (Freudenberger, 1993a,b; ISRA/BAME, 1999). 
Moreover, while pastoralism by transhumant fulbe was previously complementary to gum 
collection by maures along the seasonal patterns, competition over gum resources ensued 
especially as the settled fulbe also took on gum collection. The competition increased even 
more during the Great sahelian drought of 1968-1974 that decimated the livestock; 
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pastoralists took collection as a coping strategy (Adriansen 1999; Wane et al., 2006). Conflict 
over the forest areas followed and the fulbe were granted collection rights on trees found 
within the immediate vicinity of their scattered encampments. Maures migrated to the south-
eastern part of Linguère (in SPZ) were they pioneered gum collection. There, they were in 
competition over land with wolof agriculturalists. Continued mobility of collectors in search 
for trees and land lead to the spread of gum collection farther to Eastern Senegal. However, 
the decrease in international prices of gum arabic in the 1990s resulted in a decline of gum 
collection to a marginal activity, used as a survival strategy (Adriansen 2006, Freudenberger, 
1993a).  
The historical overview of gum collection in the Sylvopastoral zone reflects the 
involvement of different ethnic groups through their establishments and economic activities, 
differences in collection rights, and market pressures. It has also shown problems associated 
with competition over resources induced changes in collection systems, based on ethnicity 
and movement. The boxes illustrate such process of change towards the current collection 
systems where we observe not only the traditional communal collection but also a trend 
towards privatisation by division of the area into individualised family plots and formal 
acquisition of private plots. 
Illustration 1. Louguéré Thioly, Sylvopastoral Zone 
Lougéré Thioly was formed around 1920 by migrant fulbe pastoralists who found a water 
pond and pastures and camped in the area. In 1950s with the construction of a borehole 
(DPS, 2005), the pastoralists were joined by wolof agriculturists. The borehole facilitated 
sedentism; occasional livestock migrations only occur during the dry season towards the 
southern Fouta. Cultivators who grew millet during the rainy season were the first to 
discover the importance of Acacia senegal using its bark as ropes for tying their sacks of 
millet. In decorticating the tree off its bark, these cultivators noticed the gum oozing from 
163 
 
the tree. They collected and sold it to traders who passed by the village in search of water. 
The gum attracted not only the attention of agriculturalist, but also of pastoralists and later 
of the maures who were professional gum collectors. The maures settled in and they would 
go into the forest, tap trees and collect gum until the end of the season. While forests were 
open to collection by anybody, the increased number of collectors led to the division of 
forests into individualised plots according to the size of the family. In this division, 
markings were made on trees such that each mark would be associated with a single family; 
a family could have several plots. Such markings ushered in privatised systems with clear 
distribution of plots and recognised exclusion rights. Theft cases were referred to authorities. 
However, these markings confer only seasonal or at the most lifetime ownership; permanent 
ownership is only conferred by legal registration. Nevertheless, as competition over land is 
not excessive, the need for registration has not yet arisen.  
(Recorded in Louguéré Thioly, 15-03-2010) 
Illustration 2. Kadiel, Eastern Senegal  
In the old times, agriculture used to be the main economic activity in Kadiel. But due to 
declining soil productivity resulting from degradation, the agro-pastoral system is now 
common practice in the village; it is supplemented by gum exploitation. There are about 30 
gum collectors in the village. They collect mainly from natural forests; but there are also 
plantations by past tree planting projects such as PROVOBIL (Projet de Boisement 
Villageois) (Dione and Sall, 1988) and private initiatives (e.g., Tijaane, a Muslim 
community, planted more than 2000 seedlings); some collectors have even started 
plantations on their own land properties whereas other collectors obtained portions of the 
forests through formal requests from the rural community administration. 
There are different management systems of the above properties: owners of private plots are 
able to exclude collectors who are not their relatives with the advantage of having 
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permanent control over the use of the product and appropriation of the income realized from 
collection. The common forests/plantations are so large that rules of collection have to be 
agreed upon by six other villages that also have access to these forests/plantations.  
Within the coverage of Kadiel, an informal division of the forest exists, however, there are 
many cases of theft when a collector deliberately crosses the limits of his ‘property’ to 
harvest gum from another person’s property. Such conflict cases are generally resolved 
within the village. Private properties seem to produce more gum than common property. 
Soil degradation and bushfires are the main problems faced by the village; they lead to 
declines in tree density and production.  
(Recorded in Kadiel, 16-04-2010) 
6.3 Methodology  
The above historical trend and illustrations show that a change is slowly taking place in 
systems of governance of gum arabic collection. The change is not however spontaneous; it is 
part of a decision that involves an optimization of utility from collection. Such decision is 
theoretically modelled in terms of the number of trees and distance between them, 
competition in labour time between collection and leisure, and competition over resources. 
Beshai (1984) believed in the existence of resource excess capacity such that collection only 
depends on the intensity of effort and there is no diminishing marginal productivity. We 
hereby show that the utility of a collector reduces if there is competition from others 
especially when collection is unregulated. 
A model of gum arabic collection  
Consider first a single household in a setting without competition. Let production per tree be 
dependent on the labour per tree: 
	 = 	(ℓ), say ℓ, with 0 <  < 1          (1) 
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Let the distance walked per tree take a time equal to . Total time needed to collect 
gum from  trees then equals (ℓ + ), yielding a production of 	(ℓ). 
Let the utility function of the household be: 
B = B[	(ℓ);  − (ℓ + )]         (2) 
where  is the time endowment of the household. We can then derive the first-order 
conditions for the labour time spent per tree and the number of trees that the household 
harvests: 
for the time:   
B'	 = B(, so that 	 = .d        (3) 
for the number of trees: 
B'	 = B((ℓ + ) so that 	 = .d	 (ℓ + d)  or 	 = 	(ℓ + )    (4) 
The ratio .
d
 represents the value of time for the household resulting from the trade-off 
between collection and leisure, expressed in units of gum in this case. The ratio is seen to 
affect both the time spent per tree and the number of trees, but actually time per tree and 
production per tree can be derived; if we use the exponential production function		(ℓ) = ℓ, 
we can derive that in the optimum: 
ℓ =

'6
	           (5) 
 	∗ = (

'6
)            (6) 
ℓ +  =

'6
            (7) 
Hence B = B[	∗,  − +
'6
] and the optimal number of trees then follows from: 
 
.
d
= 	∗
('6)

            (8) 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the influence of the number of trees on labour productivity and value of 
time. 
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Figure 6. 1. Labour productivity and value of time 
The marginal product of labour (	) in the optimum tends to be lower if trees are farther apart 
(at large , more time is spent per tree). As normally the value of time is a positive function 
of , the optimal number of trees will be smaller for larger distances. 
For a simple Cobb-Douglas utility function B = ?	( − 0)9, where ? is income and 0 
is time spent in collection, it is straightforward to derive that the optimal number of trees 
would be: 
 = (,9)(ℓ,) or ('6)(,9)          (9)  
This equation shows that the number of trees picked increases if the household has more time 
available, attaches more value to income (parameter }), or less to leisure (-), or the forest is 
more dense (lower d). 
If the household would not have 	 as income ?, but other sources of income too, say 
, then the expression for optimal  changes to: 
 = ('6)69 ∗⁄(,9)                                (10) 
in which the relative importance of other income, expressed as ∗ , induces the household to 
spend less time in collection. 
B(B' 
	’	}0	1&}	
	’	}0	}$	 
	, .d 
 
 
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More households with competition for trees  
If there are more households collecting gum, and the total optimally chosen number of trees 
of the households exceeds the total number of available trees, two options arise to regulate 
competition as of privatisation of the resource or to let competition follow from unregulated 
collection.  
In the privatization process, trees are allocated to households. Typically, if we have & 
households (presumed identical) that optimally would each exploit ∗ trees, a case may arise 
that &. ∗ > , the total number of trees available. Privatization would then entail a division 
of the  trees over the m households, each receiving  = a. This implies that an individual 
household will collect less than the optimal number of trees, and the only optimizing variable 
is the amount of time it will spend in collection. Thus only the first of the first-order 
conditions will apply. The restricted lower level  will imply that the ratio .d will be lower, 
leading to a lower shadow price for the labour of the household, and (using (3)) somewhat 
lower marginal product of labour 	, implying that more time per tree is spent. 
In the example of a Cobb-Douglas utility function, the optimum with a restricted value 
for n is given by: 
ℓ = (+ − ) ( 9 + 1)n             (11) 
This expression is different from what we had before in (5). In the unrestricted case of a 
single household, time spent per tree increased with distance, and the adjustment was made in 
the number of trees (∗ falls if  increases). In the restricted case, larger distances between 
the trees induce the household to spend less time per tree so that the household can visit the 
given number of trees. Total time spent in the optimal case (and the simple Cobb-Douglas 
function) would be +∗'6, with ∗ as shown above in (9), or optimal labour equal to ,9 − . In 
the restricted privatized case, total labour time for gum picking comes at ,9+,9 . From this, 
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the corresponding utility can be derived. This case applies where the community responds to 
competition by regulating access and dividing the trees equally amongst collectors.  
Suppose there is an exogenous factor  that affects the productivity of labour such as 
making a good collection in a year if  > 1 or bad collection if  < 1. The production per tree 
is thus 	 = λ		(ℓ). This factor does not have any effect on the household’s value of time but 
leads to new equations for the optimal number of trees in the unrestricted case and optimal 
labour in the restricted, privatized case respectively as: 
 = (,9)(ℓ,)                    (12) 
ℓ =  +⁄ 6(9 ⁄ ,')                     (13)  
This implies that in a good year, the collector needs to harvest fewer trees or spend less time 
in collection (for e.g., harvesting from nearby branches) whereas the reverse would happen in 
a bad year. 
Furthermore we can extend the case of regulation to include a monitoring cost. The 
process of entering into privatisation itself involves a cost to reach an agreement as to how to 
divide the area. Additional costs are fixed (e.g., investment in fencing or lump sum payment 
to a third-party to assure protection of trees) and variable (labour for monitoring). Suppose 
that the household pays a fixed cost G out of his income ?. Then the expression for optimal 
labour becomes: 
ℓ = +(,9)6(9F ∗⁄ )              (14)  
The household utility falls with increasing cost of privatisation and due to the relative cost F∗, 
the household has to spend more time in collection. 
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Unregulated access with competition 
The unregulated case is elaborated to allow for competition even when trees are still 
abundant. It reflects the possibility that households can hinder one another by (deliberately or 
not) harvesting trees that are also visited by other households. Hence, we model this case as if 
households randomly select trees, for each tree covering a distance , and collect gum from 
the tree if it is there. If another household had selected this tree before, no gum is there and 
the time costs  are made without returns to this effort. 
Let there be & households interested in gum collection, all presumed identical. The 
first trees selected (out of  trees) will bring each household gum, 	 = 	(ℓ). The effort 
involved is  + ℓ. The trees selected form a share  of all trees  = a. The second collection 
round costs  again, but a share  of the trees visited will bear no gum anymore. A share 
1 −  will be picked with an effort ℓ again. Hence production is (1 − )	(ℓ); effort is 
 + (1 − )ℓ.  The | round will require an effort of  + (1 − )+6'ℓ with a harvest of 
(1 − )+6'	(ℓ). In total, therefore, picking  trees will require  plus the sum of the 
picking efforts which is ℓ with:  
 = ∑ (1 − )+6' = = '6('6)b                    (15) 
Each household then maximizes utility B = B(?,  − 0) with ? being the gum collected equal 
to 	(ℓ) and 0 being the time spent in collection equal to ℓ + . First-order condition for a 
maximum of B[	(ℓ),  − (ℓ + )] for ℓ is that: 
B'	 = B( or 	 =	.d                               (16) 
First-order condition for  requires differentiation of: 
 + = − ' (1 − )+ ln(1 − ) = ¢                  (17) 
The condition for optimal  then becomes: 
B'¢	 = B((¢ℓ + )                    (18) 
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so that  now 
	 = 	 Yℓ + Z                    (19) 
This is different than 	in the original case (equation (4)). 
To get a grasp of the significance of this result, consider that the share  is the ratio of 
households to trees or a. Typically &.  ≈  (roughly all trees are harvested), so that  could 
be roughly '+. Inserted in the formula for , this would lead to:  
 = '6('6)b ≈ [1 − Y1 − '+Z+	]                      (20) 
The limit of (1 − '+)+	 for  tending to ∞	is ' or roughly 0.37, so that for larger ,  comes 
close to 0.63 which means that  visits to trees lead to 0.63 visits that are successful, i.e., to 
trees that are bearing gum. This shows the inefficiency of the system which occurs even when 
the resource is not fully utilised. As the number of competitors increases, the number of trees 
being the size of the resource on which the household has control gets smaller and smaller, 
households therefore need to spend more time per tree to obtain higher production per 
harvested tree. Table 6.1 illustrates the effect of the number of household and trees on effort. 
Table 6. 1. Values of ¦§ at  N=1000 
                 5 10 20 
50 0.89 0.79 0.64 
100 0.79 0.63  
200 0.63   
The table also shows that even with underutilization of the resource there can be substantial 
inefficiency if tree selection would be completely unregulated: with 5 households and 50 trees 
per household, only a quarter of trees is harvested, but 11 per cent of the trees visited would 
have already been picked by others. For & rising to 10, this increases to 21 per cent. 
Furthermore, the first derivative of  with respect to , ¢, takes on values in the range of 0.3 
to 1. As shown by the equation (19), this implies that the unregulated competition acts as if 
	 &	
171 
 
the distance between trees increases from simply  to something that can be as 3 times as 
large.  
Equation (13), in combination with an assumed production function of 	(ℓ) = ℓ, 
leads to optimal labour: 
ℓ	 = '6 .                       (21)	
so that total labour input 0 = 	ℓ +  comes at:  
0 = 	 +'6 ;Y  + 	− 1Z 	 + 	1<                    (22) 
The factor +'6 is the labour input without competition or restriction, which is multiplied by a 
term which is greater than 1 if  + > 1. This is normally the case; e.g., for the values in Table 
6.1, the ratio  + ranges from 1.72 on the diagonal to 1.13 in the top-left cell. Hence more 
labour in total is typically spent compared to the situation without competition irrespective of 
the value of , and the more so, where the competition for scarce resources is fiercer. 
As to the choice of number of trees to be visited, a larger 	leads to smaller ¢, and 
thereby to marginally larger optimal values of ℓ. While more effort per harvestable tree may 
be made, a smaller share of harvestable trees is found as  increases. The optimal number of 
visited trees was given in equation (9). To include the effect of competition,   is replaced by 
, so that the new expression for an approximate value of the number of trees in the 
unregulated case is: 
	¨+© ≈ ('6)(,9) = 	¢. ª=©                  (23)	
This number of trees is typically much lower than in the original case.  
The model shows that utility of a household increases with less competition; in case of 
privatisation, a maximum utility will be reached such that for fewer competing households, 
more trees will be (privately) available than the household would choose to use. The utility of 
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a household in an unregulated environment continues to improve with less competition, as 
there will be some interference even with a few households. The regulated case of 
privatisation of the resource is preferable to unregulated competition, unless the net gains 
from privatisation (having taken into account the cost of monitoring) do not exceed the 
decline in utility due to competition in unregulated system. Figure 6.2. illustrates the 
comparison of unregulated system with regulated systems following equations (8), (14) and 
(16). 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 
 
Figure 6. 2. A comparison of the regulated and unregulated systems  
In the unregulated system, utility falls even at low levels of competition. In the restricted 
system, with low levels of competition, households can maximize their utility which is fixed 
as long the available number of trees that they can visit exceeds the optimum ( > ∗). With 
an increase in number of collecting households (m) such that a household does not have 
access to ∗, the utility falls. Without costs (k=0), utility in the regulated system is always 
higher than the utility in unregulated system. A maximum is reached when m is large, because 
then more trees are privately allocated. With costs (k>0), the utility curve of the regulated 
system shifts downward and becomes steeper, so that for higher values of m, utility falls 
m 
U 
Ureg; k=0 
Ureg; k>0 
Uunreg 
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below the unregulated system. At low values of m, the unregulated system is preferred, but 
this is due to the application of the cost even when the regulated system is not constraining. 
This will not normally occur as it implies that something is regulated at a cost without 
bringing additional benefits. In case where the cost is low, even at low population levels, a 
private system is preferred. But with increasing population and fixed costs per household, the 
unregulated system may be again preferred. This is counterintuitive, but is explained by the 
fixity of the costs per household, which weigh heavily in case of small allocations of trees 
(and large m).   
A threshold line of the ratio of the population to the cost of regulation can be derived 
at which the household chooses to change from unregulated to a regulated private system 
(Figure 6.3.) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 3. Threshold in tenure systems 
There are clear cases of preference of tenure system: private regulated system is preferred 
when competition is high and regulation cost is low (high m, low k) and the communal 
unregulated system is preferred when competition is low and cost is high (low m, high k). 
Moreover, due to the fixed costs per household, the threshold level where mixed systems may 
occur is identified such that when competition is low and cost is low (low m, low k), 
k 
m 
Threshold line 
Unregulated 
system 
Regulated 
system 
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privatisation is preferred, whereas when competition is high and cost is high (high m, high k), 
communal system is preferred. In conclusion, the (fixed) cost of regulation seems to be more 
as important as competition in the choice of governance system: where the cost is high, 
unregulated systems are preferred and when the cost is low, private systems are preferred13.  
Empirical strategy 
Determinants of the choice model as to why a village organises collection either in private or 
communal system are mainly derived from our theoretical model. The model predicted factors 
that are important in the governance systems of gum collection. These include the number of 
trees (n), distance between trees (d); total labour availability (T) competition in labour time 
between collection and leisure14; outside sources of income(c), competition over resources 
with other collectors (m); environmental influences on the productivity of tree (λ); and cost of 
regulation (e.g., monitoring cost) (k). Furthermore, following Yang et al. (2009), we also 
include market characteristics. Different sources of data were used to obtain variables 
associated with the above determinants that are exogenous to the choice of a collection system 
(Table 6.2).  
Table 6. 2. Exogenous variables and data sources to the analysis of transition in gum 
arabic collection systems in Senegal  
Variable Description Data source  
Number of trees  
Tree coverage The land covered by shrub trees gives an 
indication of the presence of Acacia senegal trees 
in the domain area where the acacia species is 
prevalent. 
GLCN (2009) 
Distance between trees 
Tree density The amount of tree material per hectare. The 
density is very important in accounting for the 
sparseness of trees. 
GLCN (2009) 
  
                                                     
13
 The model can also include the cost of governance of unregulation, such as organising collection collectively.   
14
 We assume the labour/leisure ratio to be constant. 
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Income source   
Livestock 
ownership 
 
The average TLU per household is an indication 
of the village’s source of livelihoods and income 
but also of dependence on the tree resource. TLU 
values are 1.4 camel, 1.0 cattle, 0.5 donkey, 0.1 
sheep/goat (FAO, 2004) 
Survey (2009, 
2010) 
Labour availability 
Village size If at least one adult person per household is able to 
collect gum, the village size roughly indicates the 
size of prospective collectors 
PEPAM (2006) 
Competition over resource 
Collector density The average number of people per square 
kilometre of land covered by trees, the higher this 
density, the higher the competition for trees. 
GLCN (2009) 
Environmental influence 
Rainfall  Average of the cumulated rainfall during June-
October in the period 1991-1998; it gives an 
indication of degradation  
UMR 
HydroSciences 
(2005) 
Monitoring cost 
Average distance 
to furthest property 
If the tree plot is located far from the village, 
monitoring for protection (surveillance) will be 
very costly unless it can be collectively organized.  
Surveys (2009, 
2010) 
Market sources of competition 
Change in average 
gum sale price 
This is the change in average gum price between 
2008 and 2010. As an incentive to collection, an 
increase in price attracts collectors. 
Surveys (2008, 
2010) 
Distance to nearest 
market 
Access to market increases acts as an incentive to 
collection 
Surveys (2009, 
2010) 
GLCN: Global land cover network 
PEPAM: Programme d’eau potable et d’assainissement du millénaire  
Survey refers to primary data collection by researcher. 
 
 
Additionally, we include a regional dummy as a control variable; regions correspond to the 
gum arabic production areas in Senegal which include the villages in Sylvopastoral Zone and 
in Eastern Senegal. 
There is concern about the endogeneity of the livestock ownership and collector 
density to the governance system. The availability of resource may be constrained by 
livestock herding where over-grazing causes the resource deterioration. This is especially 
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relevant because the negative impacts of grazing on tree and land resources in arid/semi-arid 
regions are strong.  Schlesinger et al. (1990) and Milchunas and Lauenroth (1993) found that 
(over) grazing causes the loss of soil fertility and leads to desertification of formerly 
productive grassland. All the same, while these effects are important at the village level, the 
emphasis on livestock ownership in the current analysis is its income generating capacity 
function to the household. On the other hand, the collector density is perhaps the closest 
representative of competition for Acacia trees as where the Acacia area is vast in communal 
forests, the collector density tends to be low. Forests that are efficiently managed tend to 
attract many collectors such that collector density remains high until some regulation can be 
put into operation. As no valid instruments were found to control for the possible correlation, 
the estimation results shall be carefully interpreted. 
The theoretical model was developed at household level while the empirical model is 
done at village level, as reflected in the choice of variables. This level of analysis does not 
influence the main results and it has the advantage of explicitly recognising that a change in 
governance is effected from the higher level15. Data relate to 53 random villages in the 
Sylvopastoral Zone (22 villages) and Eastern Region (31 villages) in Senegal. Twenty-four 
(24) villages continue to organise collection in a communal system whereas 2 have purely 
adopted a private system, the remaining 27 villages have mixed systems where communal and 
private systems coexist. 
Econometric analysis 
Two models are proposed for the empirical analysis:  
(1) A probit model is used where the observed outcome is either to exploit gum in communal 
management systems (0) or in mixed systems (1). The presence of only 2 villages which 
                                                     
15
 Collectors can collectively demand for a change in system of governance, but the change is often effectively 
realised at the village level whereas an individual collector will choose to implement the change and enforce his 
rights  in consideration of the behaviour of other collectors. Young (2002) and Berkes (2002) established that 
there are interplays between institutions at different level while de Meza and Gould (1992) showed how an 
individual decides to enforce his rights. 
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adopted the pure private system did not enable us to have a separate category for a 
multinomial analysis; hence these villages were included in the category of mixed systems. 
(2) A fractional logit model is used with the dependent variable as the gradient of transition; 
the extremes represent the communal and private systems (values of 0 and 1 respectively) and 
in-between are the proportions of collectors who manage their collection in private systems 
within the village sample. The motivation for using a fractional logit model is the explicit 
recognition that collection systems are not always binary but that they are mixed at different 
levels. The fractional logit model generates efficient estimates because the dependent variable 
is a proportion between and including 0 and 1; the model is fitted with the generalized linear 
model command (for details see Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). 
6.4 Results 
Table 6.3 compares the statistics of determinants of the choice of a village’s organisation of 
collection system between villages according to the management of gum collection in a 
communal management system (CMS) and mixed management system (MMS).  
Table 6. 3. Characteristics of collection management system  
Variable All villages 
(53) 
CMS villages 
(24) 
MMS villages  
(29) 
Equality 
testa 
Tree coverage (‘000 km2) 0.33 
(0.890) 
0.20 
(0.232) 
0.44 
(1.183) 
0.92 
Tree density (tree/km2) 34.6 
(19.363) 
41.7 
(14.059) 
28.7 
(21.335) 
6.51** 
Livestock ownership 
(TLU) 
17.8 
(12.856) 
12.3 
(8.665) 
22.3 
(14.097) 
9.11*** 
Village size (households) 40 
(25.889) 
31 
(25.367) 
47 
(24.379) 
5.53** 
Collector density 
(person/km2) 
0.42 
(0.622) 
0.30 
(0.379) 
0.52 
(0.760) 
1.64+ 
Rainfall (‘000 mm) 0.54 
(0.112) 
0.60 
(0.081) 
0.48 
(0.104) 
22.81*** 
Average distance to 
furthest property (km) 
15.8 
(9.560) 
18.7 
(9.881) 
13.6 
(8.817) 
3.80* 
Distance to market (km) 11.5 
(8.437) 
14.3 
(9.453) 
9.2 
(6.804) 
5.32** 
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Change in average gum  
sale price (percentage) 
34.86 
(45.59) 
42.23 
(52.892) 
28.76 
(38.442) 
1.15+ 
 
aANOVA test: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 
15% level.    
In comparison with villages that organize gum collection communally, the villages that have 
adopted mixed (and purely private) collection systems have significantly lower tree density, 
higher livestock ownership, high collector density and lower rainfall levels. Furthermore, 
these villages are larger, organize collection in forest plots located at shorter distances, and 
are on average established nearer to physical markets, whereas they have experienced a 
smaller increase in average gum sale prices in the period from 2008 to 2010.  
A closer look at these villages in mixed systems enabled us to have a gradient of 
transition which is the proportion of collectors in the village who organize their collection in 
private systems. The gradient ranges from 0 to 1 from communal to private systems 
respectively; the intermediary values represent mixed systems. The average gradient of 
transition within mixed villages is 0.58. Certain characteristics of mixed systems are shown in 
table 6.4; the classification of villages into communal or private dominant is based on the 
gradient of transition: if the gradient is 0.50 or smaller, the village has a tendency to 
communal dominance. 
Table 6. 4. Characteristics of mixed management systems 
 MMS 
(27) 
Communal 
dominant (14) 
Private 
dominant (13) 
Equality testa  
n cases 157 61 96  
Categorical factors (%) 
Acquisition of property 
through inheritance 
39.5 31.1 44.8 2.91* 
Acquisition of property 
through request 
55.1 61.7 51.0   1.91+ 
Use of exploitation 
permit  
52.9 49.2 55.2 0.54 
Tree markings in 
property 
41.4 19.7 52.9 19.41*** 
High frequency of thefts 42.0 45.9 39.6 1.09+ 
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occurrence 
Continuous factorsb 
Experience in collection 
(years) 
24.5  
(11.413) 
24.2  
(11.043) 
24.6  
(11.697) 
0.044 
Tree age (years) 10.5  
(5.123) 
11.4  
(4.968) 
10.0  
(5.170) 
2.901* 
Labour productivity 
(kg/day) 
34.3  
(16.023) 
34.4  
(15.390) 
34.2  
(16.491) 
0.011 
a
 Chi-square test for categorical variables, ANOVA test for continuous variables.  
b
 Standard deviation in brackets 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.    
Within mixed villages whether they are communal or private dominant, there are no 
significant differences with respect to the use of exploitation permits, average experience of 
the collectors, or average daily labour productivity. There is no active land market in gum 
producing villages in Senegal. Hence, in villages where the private collection system is 
dominant, inheritance is the main mode of the acquisition of property whereas in villages 
where the communal collection system is dominant, property is acquired mainly through 
request from the village chief, however, the cases of continued collection in the same 
communal forests are commonly found. Tree marking as proof of property is more popular in 
villages where private system is dominant than in villages where communal system is 
dominant each family has its unique marking16. The frequency of thefts is higher in villages 
where communal system is dominant than in villages where private system is dominant. 
 Determinants of the choice of organisation of gum collection systems are analysed 
through probit and fractional logit (flogit) models (Table 6.5).   
  
                                                     
16
 The intuition behind the marking of tree resembles that of traditional livestock branding in pastoral 
communities where livestock is marked in order to identify the owner.  
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Table 6. 5. Probit model (0: CMS, 1: MMS) and Flogit Model (Gradient of transition) of 
transition in gum arabic collection systems in Senegala  
 Probit Model (53) Flogit Model (53) 
 I II III IV 
Tree coverage (‘000 km2) 0.009 
(0.060) 
0.005 
(0.059) 
0.035* 
(0.024) 
0.039* 
(0.027) 
Tree density (tree/km2) -0.160 
(0.317) 
-0.110 
(0.319) 
-0.056 
(0.364) 
-0.001 
(0.353) 
Livestock ownership (TLU) 0.522** 
(0.269) 
0.543** 
(0.276) 
0.130+ 
(0.207) 
0.106+ 
(0.200) 
Village size (households) 0.284+ 
(0.243) 
0.437* 
(0.284) 
0.149+ 
(0.264) 
0.313+ 
(0.261) 
Collector density (person/km2) 0.055 
(0.129) 
0.079 
(0.137) 
0.197+ 
(0.100) 
0.142* 
(0.098) 
Rainfall (‘000 mm) -0.264 
(1.385) 
0.691 
(1.641)  
-0.806 
(1.182) 
0.108+ 
(1.370) 
Average distance to furthest property 
(km) 
-0.583** 
(0.313) 
-0.557* 
(0.325) 
-0.400* 
(0.313) 
-0.397* 
(0.322) 
Distance to market (km) - 0.147 
(0.248) 
 -0.176 
(0.328) 
Gum sale price change - 0.142* 
(0.115) 
 0.227* 
(0.199) 
Zone (1: Eastern) -0.489+ 
(0.283) 
-0.516*** 
(0.258) 
-0.411+ 
(0.364) 
-0.635+ 
(0.425) 
Log (pseudo) likelihood -19.353 -18.538 -22.493 -21.977 
LR Chi-square 34.29*** 35.93*** - - 
Correct classification (%) 77.36 81.13 - - 
Pseudo R-squared 0.470 0.492   
Predicted probability (y=mixed 
system) 
0.641 0.654 - - 
Predicted mean (y=gradient of 
transition) 
- - 0.303 0.300 
CMS: communal management systems 
MMS: mixed management systems 
a
 Marginal effects (standard errors):  
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level, + significant at 15% level.    
Model I and III show the influence of the resource availability, labour availability and 
competition over resources, other sources of income, environmental influences, monitoring 
costs and market characteristics on the (gradual) choice of a village to organise collection 
either in a communal or mixed system. High livestock ownership and a large size of the 
village increased the likelihood of organising collection in mixed systems whereas long 
distances to the plot decreased the likelihood of organising collection in mixed systems. 
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Besides in Model III, the collector density positively influenced the transition towards mixed 
systems (although the effect is weakly significant). 
Model II and IV include market competition in addition to the resource availability 
and village competition. The above results are robust and in addition, the increase in average 
market price positively influenced the choice of transition towards private collection systems.  
The marginal effect analysis shows that on the one hand, one per cent increase in 
livestock ownership and village size (I and II), rainfall, gum sale price change and distance to 
market (II) increased the probability of shifting towards mixed system by more than one per 
cent; also livestock ownership, village size and collector density (III and IV), rainfall and gum 
sale price change (IV) increased the gradient of transition towards mixed systems by more 
than one per cent. On the other hand, one per cent increase in tree density and average 
distance to furthest property (I and II) and rainfall (I) decreased the probability of shifting 
towards mixed system by more than one per cent; also rainfall (III), average distance to 
furthest property (III and IV) and distance to market (IV) decreased the gradient of transition 
towards mixed systems by more than one per cent. 
The probit and flogit models reveal interesting results behind the process of transition: 
the probability to move towards mixed (and private systems) is high with about 60 per cent of 
villages that have shifted from communal systems. However, the gradient of transition is still 
low with on average only 30 per cent of collectors in villages who have readily shifted from 
communal systems.  
In terms of tree coverage, the availability of resource is found to be important in 
making the change. It suggests that attempts to regulate the resource are interesting if in the 
first instance enough trees are available, and in other words, degraded areas are not attractive 
for privatisation.  
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Ownership of livestock also influences the tendency towards private/mixed systems 
despite that pastoralism is another source of income that would normally indicate less 
dependency on gum resource for livelihoods and hence less competition. This is not the case 
however, as in the first instance, income from livestock (sales of animals or animal products) 
is not profitably generated in the dry season when gum is collected. In the second instance, 
livestock ownership as sign of wealth at the village level can be linked to institutional 
development and better market access.  
Competition within the village implies that on the one hand, large villages, which are 
an indication of the number of prospective collectors, prefer to orient collection towards 
private/mixed systems as stronger competition in the forest would lead to lower collection 
quantities for each collector. The cost of communal organisation or the risk of conflict over 
resource may also be very high if the number of involved potential users is high. Indeed, if 
there are several collectors competing for the resource such that the collector density is high, 
the village would prefer to adopt a mixed system.  
If the plots/forests where gum is collected are located far away from the village, then 
communal systems are preferable because the monitoring cost is too high for a private owner 
to enforce his rights and protect the plot. Also in this case, not many collectors would venture 
into those plots and hence competition is also lower.  
Market competition is straightforward in impact: higher prices attract occasional 
collectors whose behaviour is in contrast with that of professional gum collectors. 
Professionals are regular collectors but occasional collectors collect only when the price and 
market conditions are good. They do so because there are no (strong) exclusive mechanisms 
to the communally governed forests. Such non-professional behaviour leads to reduced 
productivity in communal resources and thereby creates the need for organising collection in 
private/mixed system.  
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6.5 Discussion and conclusions  
Theories of origin and transition in farming systems advanced population pressure, 
environmental aspects and technological developments as the main factors influencing a shift 
in farming systems. These changes were accompanied or associated by changes in systems for 
resource governance. In the current study, we investigate the case of a non-timber forest 
product, gum arabic, with respect to changes in governance systems of collection from 
communal systems towards private systems, with mixed systems in the transition. These 
systems are distinguishable by the mode of the acquisition, with tree marking as an effective 
proof of property that limits the frequency of thefts; such markings are an indication of 
exclusive use rights (Wiersum, 1997).  
The theoretical model confirms the early theories whereby the utility of a household 
was found to increase with less competition (or less pressure); factors that might influence the 
change in governance systems include resource and labour availability, competition over 
resources, monitoring costs, and market characteristics. 
Empirical results confirm that the choice of private systems depends on resource 
availability. This is important as it directly determines the amount that a collector can expect 
to harvest and gives incentives for possible division of resource area into private plots. If the 
resource area is large, there is a possibility to practice extensive collection and at the same 
time increase productivity and quality of the harvested product (Belcher and Schrekenberg, 
2007). However, it should be noted that very large resource areas may be difficult to manage 
(Yang et al., 2009); hence the area should be proportionate to the available labour as 
exemplified by the village size. The reverse side implies that resource degradation should be 
contained. Not explicitly included in the current study, but also an important factor causing 
the resource degradation in gum producing regions are bush fires as consistently found in the 
monitoring of such fires by the Centre de Suivi Ecologique in Senegal (CSE, 2009); if these 
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fires are not controlled, they can be devastating. Privatisation the resource can thus be 
associated with limiting destructive action and resource conservation (Homma, 1996; Alvard 
and Kuznar, 2001).  
Livestock ownership and gum collection were presumed to be complementary sources 
of livelihoods which means that earning some income from livestock eases the necessity to 
collect gum and hence reduces the burden on the resource. Perhaps, a direct measure of 
income (which could be generated off-farm or by remittances) would have clarified the 
relationship between supplementary income and collection. What is observed here is a 
possible market development. Livestock ownership can be associated with development of 
livestock markets which can subsequently attract buyers of gum. As the markets develop and 
buyers are not exploitative as found in chapter 5, there is a possibility to increase income 
through collecting and marketing gum. However, these market developments will attract an 
increasing number of collectors and the result suggests that competition indeed plays a role in 
governance choice or change. This competition was found mainly to be the result of price 
incentives. In case of rise in price, these occasional collectors compete with professionals in 
plots to collect gum thereby reducing the individual quantity of gum obtained by each 
collector. Also in order to obtain the gum before the other collector gets it, gum may be 
harvested before maturity, thereby leading to inconsistent quality. The influence of market 
and related competition on systems of collection is also found in commercialisation of 
agricultural products (e.g., Quisumbing and Otsuka, 2001) or other non-timber forest products 
(e.g., Yang et al., 2009). These trends are in line with Ruttan’s (2002) description of the 
change in governance. 
While the organization of collection in private system is preferable for the purpose of 
increasing productivity and quality, preventing overexploitation of the resource, and 
generating short and long term incentives for tree management, there are cases when the cost 
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of enforcing such system is economically and socially too prohibitive such that communal 
systems are maintained. This cost is for instance related to monitoring: the monitoring cost 
would depend on the size of and distance to the collection area. If the area is located far away 
from the village, surveillance is efficiently done collectively by the villagers. Another reason 
not directly included here is of the mutual insurance offered by communal area. As resource 
users live in drylands where income streams are uncertain, communal systems may be indeed 
be more appropriate as they allow flexible and mobile responses to uncertainty and risk. In the 
case of study, this implies that the collector will not be restricted to his private plot 
particularly in a bad year. Hence, as popularised by authors like Grell and Kirk (2000), 
communal systems of resource governance would be preferred because they are an insurance 
mechanism in high-risk environments. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
7.1 Introduction  
Senegal is in the rank of small producers whose exports total to less than 5 per cent of world 
export, its registered exports have not exceeded 1,000 tons in the last decade (ITC, 2008; 
COMTRADE, 2011). Low exports imply that the country may lose some export revenues and 
that collectors of gum arabic may fail to see their livelihoods improved from larger incomes 
that could have been generated from the sale of gum. Such livelihoods, in the arid and semi-
arid regions where gum arabic is harvested, revolve around short and erratic rains, and poor 
and fragile soils on which agriculture is not widely suitable except for some cereals and 
irrigated vegetables. Pastoralism is practiced in these regions, allowing for transhumance in 
the drought period.  
Acacias species including Acacia senegal trees are among the drought-tolerant 
vegetation naturally suitable for the arid and semi-arid regions. These trees which have 
ecological benefits, household functionalities and palatable attractiveness to animals, also 
exudate gum arabic. Collection of gum arabic, similar to other non-timber forest products, is 
done with the purpose of labour diversification, consumption smoothing, coping with 
emergencies or accumulating wealth.  
In Senegal, gum arabic is collected in the Sylvopastoral Zone (SPZ) commonly called 
the Ferlo and the agro-sylvopastoral zone also known as Eastern Senegal (ES). The SPZ 
covers almost all parts of the regions of Louga, Saint Louis and Matam; ES covers the region 
of Tambacounda. An average collector of gum arabic could annually harvest and market near 
to 900 kilograms in the SPZ and 120 kilograms in ES (in chapter 3), thereby earning about 
500,000 CFA and 120,000 CFA respectively17; at prices prevailing in the season of 2009. 
Such income is substantial to the household given that collection is often a secondary activity. 
                                                     
17
 About 760 EUR and 180 EUR respectively. 
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Collection is open to rural households; however, continued low production and exports levels 
observed in the country imply that there might be inefficiencies on the marketing side that 
result from the lack of necessary price incentives. These prices are indeed very low compared 
to the efforts that are needed to collect gum. Hence the current study’s main aim was to link 
the market side to the collection side in order to investigate sources of inefficiencies and 
explore ways to improve the performance of markets and thereby collection 
production/collection. Four questions became the focus: (1) do collectors have enough 
incentives from the market in terms of the net returns from collection and marketing? (2) do 
consecutive traders along the marketing chain exploit each other leading to low prices to 
collectors and therefore low supply? (3) are collectors supplying the gum of quality that is 
required by users? and (4) why is the transition from communal systems is slow despite their 
too many inefficiencies? Chapters of this thesis are an attempt to respond to these particular 
issues. 
7.2 Summary of the main findings 
Market incentives are fundamental to gum collection 
The behaviour of gum collectors involves a decision of whether to collect or not with an 
intention to participate in the market where they can sell their product (as gum is only 
marginally consumed by households and a decision to collect can be made instantly at harvest 
time). The purpose of the decisions is to maximize their net expected returns. These returns 
are a function of the expected price excluding marketing costs and taking into account the 
distance to the nearest town and honouring the commitment to transact with a certain trading 
partner. The amount of gum collected is optimised depending on availability trees, usage of 
inputs and level of competition in gum producing forests.  
Once the gum is collected, a choice of where to sell gum among the available 
alternative markets either in the village or at distant town market needs to be made. This 
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choice depends on the assessment of differences between village and town market prices 
which should be large enough to pay for going to the market. The choice also depends on the 
level of competition between collectors and the preference for certain a trader. While 
transport costs restrain the collector from going to a distant market, the investment incurred in 
concluding a transaction and repeated transactions with a trader increase the probability of 
going to the town market particularly when the household is able to combine its other 
activities with travelling to the market in order to sell gum.  
The results suggested that gum collection is largely determined by marketing 
incentives in terms of price expectations. The choice of physical market where he sells his 
gum is the result of an evaluation of the price prevailing in markets and other market 
characteristics but also the level of proportional costs and the possibility to reduce the 
household labour opportunity cost through combining gum sales with other activities such as 
acquisition of household items. Methods to increase the amount collected can be adopted such 
as increasing labour productivity and regulating competition in forests, yet, market incentives 
are essential for the continuation of collection; they should be sufficiently high to cover for 
the costs of collection and marketing gum.  
Traders cannot always be accused of exploitation 
Traders of gum arabic operate in oligopsonistic market structures. These structures are 
observed consecutively along the gum arabic supply chain in Senegal, from primary traders to 
transporters and then wholesalers. The latter earn the highest margins as they transact large 
quantities and their unit costs remain relatively low because of economies of scale. High unit 
marketing costs are found in primary markets because of the small size of transactions 
occurring in dispersed markets. As a consequence, payments to gum collectors are low. 
In this chapter, market shares of traders in their respective markets were computed and 
corresponding Herfindahl indices were derived. The results proved an increase in market 
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power as the number of buyers becomes smaller along the supply chain. However, they were 
not sufficiently high to confirm strong oligopsonistic tendencies.  
The findings implied that, traders in the gum market, while working towards enlarging 
their supplies, do not necessary behave as oligopsonists by exercising their power in an 
exploitative manner. Their entry and performance in the market depends on the capital 
invested (human, financial, physical, communication and social capital) but they are 
constrained by competition. The value distribution along the chain (margins taken by each 
trader) depends on marketing costs, supply conditions, uncertainty and risk. The magnitude of 
risk could also be the main cause of market exit. 
Benefits that traders obtain from gum trading are limited by poor market access 
conditions such as poor transportation, lack of infrastructure and market information in 
addition to individual and market related risks. The study also reminds of the important 
functions that these traders play in the gum sector in spite of the difficult marketing 
conditions. It is also a contribution towards breaking the myth that traders are always 
exploitative. 
Supply of quality does not always meet the user’s requirements  
Gum quality assessed by collectors and traders does not always coincide with the users’ 
assessment of quality. Collectors and traders’ assessment is highly subjective and differs from 
village to village. The bad quality recognised by collectors and traders is confirmed by the 
users’ assessment, but good quality from the perspective of collectors and traders may not 
always be good in terms of user’s requirements; the link between the assessment by collectors 
and traders and that of users is cleanliness or low mineral matter which is a visible attribute of 
quality. Yet, other minimal quality attributes are also needed. This finding implies that when 
gum is supplied as being good quality, it may be rejected by users when this quality does not 
meet the users’ requirements. Yet, the increase in the supply of good quality after visual 
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inspection increases the probability of obtaining the quality that meets the users’ 
requirements. 
Important are also the findings on how this quality could be increased. Quality supply 
in terms of the size and cleanliness of the gum nodules depends on harvest and post-harvest 
practices. It is also a response to market conduct and market-driven collection incentives. The 
market conduct shows inconsistencies in the preference for quality attributes because the 
traders’ knowledge of quality is not very much higher than that of collectors unless they have 
long experience in the trade.  
Results also showed that undifferentiated price incentives offered by the market 
restrict the supply of good quality because these incentives create competition in communal 
forests where gum is collected by attracting occasional collectors. Competition for gum 
inhibits its maturity as the collector targets to harvest the gum before another collector. 
Immature gum has high probability of not reaching its full size and is more likely to attract 
impurities. These price incentives also have an effect on the relative demand for quality: at 
high price levels, there is relatively more demand for undifferentiated or lower quality 
whereas at low price levels, there is relatively more demand for high quality. An incentive to 
supply high quality gum is a price differentiation such that good quality is rewarded by its 
premium.  
Change of tenure systems is mainly driven by economic considerations 
 
Communal systems are preferred to private systems when the cost of regulation is high 
particularly when competition over resource is low. In Senegal, the current change in tenure 
of Acacia senegal resource from communal to private collection systems is slow; mixed 
systems are found in a gradual transition where privately owned properties and communal 
forests coexist.  
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The study found that private systems emerge when the resource is sufficiently 
available in proportion to labour such that the collector can expect to increase his collection. 
The environmental function of privatisation is thus acknowledged where the collector has the 
incentive to protect the resource and limit destructive action.  
Market developments and incentives are a source of competition that also generates 
the need for moving towards private systems. The competition arises from the unrestricted 
entry of occasional collectors. These findings imply that privatisation is undertaken because 
of its economic benefits by regulating competition which may not only restrict the quantity 
but also the quality of gum collected. 
Results confirmed the reason for the maintenance of communal systems as the high 
cost of regulation; e.g., if monitoring cost that depends on the size of and distance to the 
collection area is high, communal tenure is preferred because surveillance can be efficiently 
done by the community. The social function fulfilled by these systems in the community is 
also very important: communal systems may be more preferred than private systems because 
they act as an insurance mechanism in the drylands. As such, a collector can spread the risk 
from environmental uncertainties instead of solely relying on his own plot. The transition 
from communal organisation of collection to efficient private collection systems hence 
depends mainly on the assessment of economic benefits and costs. However, the importance 
attached to environmental and social considerations may also play a role in the process of 
change. 
With the objective of investigating factors that influence the performance of the gum 
arabic supply chain, the study has therefore found that (1) the main determinants of the 
collector’s decision to collect gum and amount to collect are the expected marketing 
incentives whereas the choice of physical market where a collector sells his gum is 
determined by the comparison of prices and costs associated with different market outlets ; (2) 
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value distribution along the gum arabic supply chain depends on market power and also 
marketing costs, supply conditions, uncertainty and risk in trade; (3) the quality supplied by 
collectors does not consistently correspond to users’ quality requirements as good quality gum 
is not always identified on the field and harvest and post-harvest practices, market conduct 
and market-driven collection incentives are the main factors influencing the supply of quality 
by gum collectors; and (4) the transition from communal organisation of collection to 
efficient private collection systems mainly depends on an evaluation of the benefits and costs  
associated with any governance system of collection taking into account the environmental 
and social considerations. 
7.3 Policy implications 
Interventions in the gum arabic sector require a wide approach that ranges from aspects of 
resource governance to functioning of markets. Some policy opportunities are suggested for 
improving collection and marketing of gum arabic. 
Acacia senegal resource 
Although (Acacia senegal) trees are naturally grown, the resource base should be expanded, 
or at least maintained. Hence, efforts in tree planting and maintenance are required to preserve 
the resource base such that production/collection and supply of gum are sustained. The 
community and forestry services should be empowered to control degradation through social 
and economic means or by law enforcement respectively. Most importantly, the population 
should constantly be sensitized to improve their knowledge of resource potential in order to 
limit destructive action and conserve the resource.  
 Clear rules of management are needed to counteract the influence of market forces 
(price) on competition in forests and motivate collectors to manage their plots and thereby 
increase collection and quality of the product. The legislative and institutional aspects of 
managing acacia trees offer the best strategy; but these should also take into account the 
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consistency between the formal codes and forestry opportunities for people to manage trees. 
Also the role of government, particularly the forest administration should be clearly outlined.  
As forest resources serve to improve the livelihoods of resource users who live in the 
high-risk drylands where income streams are uncertain, there is need to explore and extend 
the diversification of livelihoods sources not only off-farm but also off-forest in order to 
reduce over-dependence on resource especially in the dry season. 
Direct market interventions 
Direct market interventions are required. These would involve a consolidation of the position 
of Senegal as a producer country so that a regular demand can be maintained: this regular 
demand implies that traders would be insured of having a market for the acquired products 
and hence act competitively towards their suppliers. An emphasis on market regularity is 
needed because of the fragile balance between the professional collection and casual high 
demands lead to over-harvesting of gum trees thereby destroying the resource.  
Another option is the provision of price incentives in terms of higher price or price 
guarantees. For the price transferred by traders to really be an incentive, this price should be 
attractive. As this price is a transfer from the international price, it is important that exporters 
aim to achieve a higher price in international markets. On these markets, several factors could 
influence price such as the availability of industrial substitutes. Market consolidation should 
be explored and the supply of good quality gum emphasized so that users who have 
discovered the uniqueness of the gum arabic continue to demand the product. There might be 
a need for market regulation in terms of supply or price stabilization to retain incentives for 
efficient and sustainable collection. A clear price differentiation policy should also be 
formulated to stimulate quality in the supply of the product.  
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Training 
Continuous sensitization of collectors and traders is desirable. It can be achieved through 
trainings where knowledge and skills are exchanged. These training would focus for instance 
on harvesting practices, post-harvesting handling and quality upgrading, management of 
forest resources, or market requirements. These exchanges lead to improving product quantity 
and quality and an opportunity to explore different market niches with a purpose of obtaining 
a higher price. Sensitization is needed as knowledge and awareness creation are probably the 
first entry points in markets in the absence of a third control party.  
Organisation of the marketing system 
A better organization of the marketing system is required with the purpose of distinguishing 
professional collectors and reducing costs from marketing. In this context, a market 
information system can be developed at the local level so that collectors have easy access to 
information on market demands and prices. This can lead to various choices regarding the 
market outlets with the advantage of reducing the cost associated with selling gum and 
benefitting from better market opportunities.  
Traders will also benefit from such information systems which provide information on 
market and product quality in terms of reducing transaction costs and price and quality 
uncertainties. Infrastructural developments are required in terms of road construction and 
maintenance so that transport costs are reduced. Financial institutions should be improved in 
terms of easy access to credit such that traders could improve access to the capital needed to 
conduct their business. 
Associations 
Associations of collectors should be encouraged: marketing groups/associations reduce 
transaction costs and thereby encourage production. They also bargain higher prices because 
they are in direct contact with buyers. Associations can stimulate partnerships with exporters 
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and industry and be a channel through which services could be provided such as financial 
assistance or training.  
The possibility of creating a traders’ cooperative can also be explored so that provision of 
trade services could be done collectively at a low cost. Such services could for instance be in 
relation to market assurance, design and enforcement of contracts, provision of market 
information, building storage facilities, and facilitating access to finance. However, the 
cooperative should act in accordance with certain regulations to avoid that it curbs the 
interests of collectors. It should encourage competition for better market performance and 
serve as a potential entry and expansion of the market.  
7.4 Limitations and future research 
Further research is recommended to keep improving our understanding of aspects of the gum 
sector in Senegal. In general, the current study has focused on supply markets of gum arabic 
in Senegal. However, it has become apparent that the study of a component of the supply 
chain needs to have information of other components which may not be its direct target. 
Therefore, it is important to have information on the consumer side and understand the 
functioning of demand markets.  
Specific to the study of quality aspects in chapter 5, we presumed that as different 
prices are associated with different grades at the export level in countries that have adopted a 
grading system, the same rule should be applicable within the gum producing countries at the 
level of collectors so that a high price rewards the efforts in conversion from low to high 
quality either during or post harvesting. A theoretical model that explains relationships 
between gum grading, costs and price was suggested (appendix 5A.1). It would be interesting 
to test the applicability of this model to investigate reasons as to why collectors seem to 
supply gum of standard quality and not implement quality maintenance or improvement when 
conversion costs are too high vis-à-vis price premiums and why traders do not provide these 
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incentives for enforcing quality maintenance or improvement. Furthermore, there is need to 
know the influence of specific environmental factors on quality so that collectors can 
anticipate quality changes between and during seasons, such a study would be beneficial in 
terms of determining the consistency of quality.  
While it was suggested that associations should be encouraged, there are specific areas 
that should be explored in the performance of such associations. A research area would be to 
investigate their role in the adoption of grades and standards aimed at improving quality and 
safety of products. As such adoption may be constrained by capital and transaction costs that 
might hinder the development of high quality products (Vandeplas et al., 2009), it is 
presumed that these associations can better deal with these challenges compared to individual 
producers/collectors; research would confirm whether the associations are indeed able to be 
pro-active in the issue of gum quality improvement and maintenance. This is pertinent as 
previous studies (e.g., Francesconi, 2009) found that cooperatives/associations may not do 
well in terms of quality improvement and products safety. 
Specific to chapter 6, we concluded that social and environmental considerations may 
be important in the change of systems of tenure. While the environmental aspect has received 
attention in the early farming theories, the role of social factors should also be studied. 
Finally, another aspect of research could be to explore other forms of institutions in 
the gum supply chain (such direct contracts with collectors) and investigate their effects on 
livelihoods of collectors and performance of other stakeholders in the gum sector. 
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Summary 
Gum arabic has an important international market due to its in various industries. Senegal is a 
small producing country whose exports are low probably due to problems of developing 
internal markets resulting from the lack of price incentives. The study’s main aim is to link 
the market side to the collection side in order to investigate factors influencing the 
performance of the supply chain of gum arabic. Two themes are the main focus: (1) market 
effectiveness in terms of behaviour, decision making process and performance of gum 
collectors and  gum traders; and (2) market-driven production effectiveness in terms of 
quality aspects in marketing of gum and aspects of governance systems of gum collection. 
The study area comprises the Sylvopastoral zone and Eastern Region of Senegal where 
Acacia senegal trees are found and gum arabic is commercially exploited. 
Chapter 2 describes the context of gum arabic collection and trade in Senegal, 
highlights the livelihood settings in the study area and lists the constraints to gum marketing 
which also limit the people’s incentives to collect gum. 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the market effectiveness in terms of the behaviour and 
performance of market chain actors. Chapter 3 examines the behaviour of gum collectors 
concerning the decision and amount of gum to collect and subsequently the choice of where 
to sell among the available alternative markets. The hypothesis is that access to better and 
more remunerative markets provides incentives to collect and market gum; these incentives 
are restrained by high transaction costs. Collectors choose to collect and participate in market 
with the aim of maximizing their net returns. The quantity collected increases with better 
market incentives (i.e., higher expected price), through the use of more inputs such as labour 
and by expansion of the area under harvest. Although price is an incentive factor to collect 
and sell, it is associated with competition in the communally governed forests. Collectors 
prefer to sell in a market where the price is highest and competition with other collectors is 
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lowest or prefer to transact with a regular partner particularly when there are no differences in 
prices offered by different traders. In the price-cost trade-off for alternative markets, 
collectors also take into consideration transaction costs proportional to the quantity to sell and 
the possibility to combine travelling to the market with other activities such as buying 
consumer goods.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the sequential chain of gum traders and investigates whether the 
oligopsonist structure of the chain leads to lower prices following multiple marginalisation 
tendencies. Gum traders are classified in primary, transport and wholesale markets depending 
on the size of their transactions. Benefiting from economies of scale, wholesalers earn the 
highest margins whereas primary traders have high unit costs, which results in low payments 
to gum collectors. Shares of traders in markets are calculated and corresponding Herfindahl 
indices are derived. The Herfindahl indices are not sufficiently high to point to strong 
oligopsonistic tendencies. The market share of a trader is positively influenced by their access 
to capital and market infrastructure and negatively by the level of competition in the market in 
which they operate. The market power does not influence the margins earned by traders. 
These margins seem to depend more on supply conditions, marketing costs, perception of 
price uncertainty and risk. High risk perception is probably the most important cause of 
market exit.  
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the production/collection effectiveness in terms of the 
quality of the gum supplied and the property rights systems for gum collection. In chapter 5, 
the field and laboratory assessments of quality are compared. On the field, collectors and 
traders classified gum samples based on visible quality attributes. The laboratory assessment 
was based on the analysis of chemical components of these samples which were matched to 
the minimal chemical quality requirements set by users (defined in terms of cleanness and low 
mineral matter). The comparison of field and laboratory assessments shows that the 
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assessment of good gum quality by collectors and traders does not always match the 
laboratory minimum standards. The assessment by collectors and traders is highly subjective 
and differs from village to village. The bad quality gum as indicated by collectors and traders 
was also bad in the chemical assessment, but  gum that was classified as good by collectors 
and traders was not always good in terms of user’s requirements. An examination of the 
determinants of quality supply for two visible attributes (size and cleanliness of gum nodules) 
shows the importance of good harvest and post-harvest practices. Supply of quality gum is 
also a response to market conduct and market-driven collection incentives. The market 
conduct shows inconsistencies in the preference for quality attributes because the traders’ 
knowledge of quality is not much higher than that of collectors, except for traders with a long 
experience. In the current market setting, no price premiums are given for better quality gum. 
High gum prices in one season seem to attract occasional collectors to the communal forests, 
which again reduces the collector’s incentive to invest in gum quality. These price incentives 
also have an effect on the relative demand for quality because at high price levels, demand for 
undifferentiated or lower quality gum increases whereas demand for high quality gum is 
relatively higher at low price levels. Therefore, only quality premiums may have a positive 
effect on the supply of good quality gum.  
Chapter 6 investigates factors that influence the currently slow transition from 
communal systems of gum collection to efficient private systems. The theoretical model 
predicts that private systems may be preferred to communal systems when competition 
increases because the household utility declines and communal systems are preferred when 
the cost of regulation is high. The systems of management of Acacia resources in Senegal are 
distinguished by the mode of acquisition, and tree markings, these are an indication of 
exclusive use rights. Empirical results confirmed that the emergence of private systems in 
gum collection depends on the availability of the gum resource which should be proportionate 
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to the available labour in such a way that the collector can expect to increase his collection. 
Market developments are also important but they lead to an increase in competition over 
resources notably when the price is sufficiently high to attract occasional collectors. Private 
systems are preferred because of their economic and potential environmental benefits. 
Communal systems are maintained when the monitoring cost of regulation and enforcement 
of the property rights in private systems is economically and socially high and when the 
insurance function performed by these communal systems is important. While the transition 
from communal organisation of collection to efficient private collection systems mainly 
depends on the assessment of economic benefits and costs, the transition process is guided by 
the importance attached to environmental and social considerations. 
In chapter 7, the main findings of the study are summarized and their policy 
implications are discussed. The study limitations and future research areas are also given. The 
findings are that, first, productivity-enhancing methods may be adopted such as increasing 
labour productivity and regulating competition in forests where gum is collected. Market 
incentives are also fundamental for the continuation of collection; they should be sufficiently 
high to cover for the costs of collection and marketing gum. Secondly, traders in the gum 
markets do not necessarily take advantage of their oligopsonistic structure and exercise their 
power in an exploitative manner. A trader’s accession and share in the market depends on the 
access to various forms of capital and the market characteristics. The margin he earns reflects 
the costs, uncertainty and risk of trade which may even cause his exit from the market. 
Thirdly, quality as required by the user may not be directly linked to the visible quality 
attributes in the field; an opportunity to increase good quality on the field increases the 
likelihood of obtaining chemically good gum. Good harvest and post-harvest practices are 
crucial to the supply of quality. To stimulate the supply of good quality gum, a price 
differentiation is required such that good quality is rewarded with a premium. Finally, the 
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transition from communal organisation of collection to efficient private collection systems 
depends mainly on the assessment of economic benefits and costs. However, the importance 
attached to environmental and social considerations may also play a role in the process of 
change of governance systems especially in the drylands where gum arabic is collected. 
The main policy implications include the need for expansion and maintenance of the 
Acacia senegal resource base, direct market interventions, continuous sensitization of 
collectors and traders, and a better organization of the marketing system. Furthermore, 
associations of collectors and of traders could potentially contribute to market access because 
of the various functions that these associations may possibly perform in the gum sector. 
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Samenvatting  
De internationale markt voor arabische gom is belangrijk voor verschillende industriële 
sectoren. Senegal is een klein productieland voor arabische gom; het lage productiecijfer is 
mede een gevolg van problemen die de ontwikkeling van een interne markt verhinderen, 
waardoor de prijs die aan gom producenten/verzamelaars wordt aangeboden, te laag wordt 
bevonden.  Het doel van deze studie is om marktontwikkeling te linken aan de productie-
aspecten om zo de factoren te kunnen bepalen die een invloed hebben op het functioneren van 
de keten voor arabische gom. De focus ligt op twee thema’s, namelijk (1) de markt 
effectiviteit in termen van het gedrag, de besluitvormingsprocessen en de economische 
bijdrage van producenten, en  handelaren in gom; en (2) de marktgestuurde effectiviteit van 
productie in termen van kwaliteit en het beheer van de productie gebieden van gom. Het 
studiegebied is de Sylvopastoral zone en de Eastern Region van Senegal waar Acacia senegal 
bomen voorkomen en arabische gom wordt gecommercialiseerd.   
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft de context waarin arabische gom wordt verzameld en 
verhandeld in Senegal; het bespreekt de vormen van levensonderhoud in het 
onderzoeksgebied en geeft een overzicht van de beperkingen in de handel van gom, die op 
hun beurt de prikkel tot het verzamelen van gom negatief beïnvloeden.  
Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 bespreken de markteffectiviteit in termen van het gedrag en de 
prestatie van de actoren in de markt. Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeert de beslissingen van verzamelaars 
om al dan niet gom te verzamelen en hoeveel gom er wordt verzameld, met daaropvolgend de 
keuze in welke van de alternatieve toegankelijke markten de gom wordt verkocht. De 
hypothese is, dat de toegang tot een betere en meer winstgevende markt een aansporing zal 
zijn tot het verzamelen en vermarkten van gom: deze prikkel wordt echter sterk beïnvloed 
door de hoge transactiekosten. Verzamelaars van gom kiezen er voor gom te verzamelen en te 
vermarkten met het doel om netto winsten te maximaliseren. De hoeveelheid gom die wordt 
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verzameld, neemt toe met betere marktprikkels (meer bepaald door een hogere verwachte 
prijs), met een grotere inzet van inputs zoals arbeid en een uitbreiding van het gebied waarin 
de gom wordt verzameld. Een hogere prijs wordt echter geassocieerd met een grotere mate 
van concurrentie van verzamelaars in de wouden die gemeenschappelijk beheerd worden. 
Verzamelaars verkiezen om hun gom te verkopen in een markt waar ze de hoogste prijs zullen 
krijgen en waar de concurrentie met andere verzamelaars het laagst is, of ze verkiezen om hun 
gom te verkopen aan een vertrouwde handelspartner als er geen duidelijk prijsverschil is 
tussen de prijzen die worden aangeboden door de verschillende handelaren. De verzamelaars 
houden ook rekening met variabele transactiekosten (dit zijn de transactiekosten die 
proportioneel zijn aan de te verkopen hoeveelheid) en de mogelijkheid om het transport naar 
de markt te combineren met andere activiteiten zoals het aankopen van algemene 
benodigdheden van het gezin.  
Hoofdstuk 4 focust op de opeenvolgende handelaren in de keten van gom met het doel 
te onderzoeken of oligopsonistische structuren leiden tot lagere prijzen als gevolg van 
meervoudig marginalisatie in de keten. Verschillende groepen handelaren in gom kunnen 
worden onderscheiden op basis van de omvang van hun transacties, meer bepaald gaat het 
over primaire handelaren, transporteurs, en groothandelaren. Als gevolg van schaalvoordelen 
kunnen groothandelaren de hoogste marges realiseren, terwijl de primaire handelaren de 
hoogste kosten per eenheid hebben wat resulteert in een lage prijs die wordt betaald aan 
gomverzamelaars. Het marktaandeel van de individuele handelaren in de markten werd 
berekend evenals de overeenkomstige Herfindahl indices. Deze zijn echter niet voldoende 
hoog om te kunnen zeggen dat er sterke oligopsonistische tendensen zijn in de markten. Het 
marktaandeel dat een individuele handelaar realiseert, is positief gerelateerd met diens 
kapitaal en marktinfrastructuur terwijl meer concurrentie in de markt het marktaandeel van 
een handelaar doet dalen. Kapitaal en marktkarakteristieken bepalen eveneens de mogelijke 
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markttoegang. Marktmacht heeft ook verder geen invloed op de marges die de handelaren 
realiseren. Deze marges blijken af te hangen van het aanbod, marketingkosten, en perceptie 
van onzekerheid over de prijs en risico. Een hoge perceptie van risico is waarschijnlijk één 
van de belangrijkste oorzaken van het verlaten van de markt. 
Hoofdstukken 5 en 6 bepalen de effectiviteit in productie/verzameling in termen van 
de kwaliteit van gom en het systeem van eigendomsrechten voor gomverzameling. In 
hoofdstuk 5 worden kwaliteitswaarnemingen in het veld en uit laboratoriumtesten vergeleken 
op basis van specificaties die de gebruikers aangeven. In het veld werden verzamelaars 
gevraagd om de gomstalen te klasseren op basis van visuele kwaliteitsattributen. De resultaten 
uit het laboratorium zijn gebaseerd op een analyse van de chemische componenten van deze 
stalen. Een vergelijking van beide resultaten toont dat de waarnemingen van gomkwaliteit 
door de verzamelaars en de handelaren niet altijd overeenkomen met de evaluatie in het 
laboratorium van wat gebruikers aan chemische kwaliteit van de gom eisen. Verzamelaars en 
handelaren bepalen kwaliteit op een subjectieve manier en de beoordeling verschilt van dorp 
tot dorp. Gom die door verzamelaars en handelaren als van slechte kwaliteit wordt 
beschouwd, werd ook steeds zo aangeduid door de laboratoriumtesten. Gom die door de 
verzamelaar of handelaar als van goede kwaliteit werd aangeduid, voldeden echter niet aan de 
minimale chemische kwaliteitsnormen van de gebruikers. Voor de waarneming van kwaliteit 
door zowel de verzamelaars en handelaars, en de gebruikers, zijn helderheid en laag mineraal 
gehalte van belang. Een analyse van de determinanten van gom kwaliteit gemeten door de 
twee visuele attributen (grootte en zuiverheid van de gom klompjes) wijst op het belang van 
oogsttechnieken en de verwerking na de oogst. De kwaliteit van de aangeboden gom reageert 
ook op de markt en de prikkels die deze verschaft. De markt lijkt niet consistent te reageren 
op de voorkeur voor kwaliteitsattributen omdat de handelaren kwaliteit niet beter kunnen 
onderscheiden dan verzamelaars tenzij zij al een langere tijd in de handel van gom actief zijn. 
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De prijs is niet gedifferentieerd naar de verschillende kwaliteitsniveaus van gom, waardoor 
het aanbod van gom van betere kwaliteit beperkt blijft. Dit is ook omdat bij een hogere prijs 
meer verzamelaars worden aangetrokken om gom te verzamelen in de communale bossen. De 
prijs zou ook een effect hebben op de relatieve vraag voor kwaliteit. Bij hogere marktprijzen 
is er een grotere vraag naar niet-gedifferentieerde gom of gom van lagere kwaliteit, terwijl de 
vraag naar gom van hoge kwaliteit groter is wanneer de marktprijzen relatief laag zijn. Er 
ontstaat dan een prijstoeslag die aanzet tot het aanleveren van gom van hogere kwaliteit.   
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de factoren die een invloed hebben op de trage transitie van 
een communaal systeem van gomverzameling naar een efficiënter privaat systeem. Het 
theoretische model voorspelt dat private systemen te verkiezen zijn boven communale 
systemen wanneer de concurrentie van verzamelaars toeneemt omdat het nut van een 
individueel huishouden dan afneemt. De netto winsten van privatisering moeten echter ook 
groter zijn dan het nut van het communale systeem. Dit communale systeem is te verkiezen 
wanneer de kosten van regulering te hoog oplopen. De beheerssystemen van Acacia bomen in 
Senegal zijn te onderscheiden naar de manier waarop de bomen zijn verworven, en de 
aanduiding op de bomen. Deze aanduidingen geven exclusieve gebruiksrechten weer. De 
empirische resultaten bevestigen dat huishoudens gom verzamelen op privaat land als er 
voldoende Acacia bomen aanwezig zijn, en als er navenant voldoende arbeidskrachten zijn in 
het gezin om de gom te verzamelen. De ontwikkeling van de markt is ook belangrijk maar het 
verhoogt de concurrentie om Acacia bomen, zeker wanneer de prijs voor gom voldoende 
hoog is om occasionele verzamelaars aan te trekken. Private systemen zijn te verkiezen 
omwille van de economische voordelen en het mogelijk positief effect op de 
milieubescherming. Communale systemen blijven behouden wanneer de sociale en 
economische kosten voor het controleren van het naleven van de wetgeving en het opleggen 
van de toegangsrechten hoog zijn, en wanneer het communale bos een vorm van verzekering 
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betekent voor de huishoudens. De transitie van een communale organisatie van de 
gomverzameling naar een efficiënte privaat systeem voor verzameling hangt voornamelijk af 
van een afweging van economische baten en kosten, terwijl het transitie proces meer afhangt 
van het belang dat wordt gehecht aan milieu en sociale randvoorwaarden.  
Hoofdstuk 7 vat de belangrijkste bevindingen van de studie samen en bespreekt de 
beleidsimplicaties. De beperkingen van de studie en de mogelijke vragen voor toekomstig 
onderzoek worden gegeven. De bevinding zijn dat, ten eerste, er maatregelen om de 
productiviteit te verhogen kunnen worden genomen: de arbeidsproductiviteit kan hoger en de 
concurrentie in het bos waar gom wordt verzameld kan beter geregeld worden. Verder is de 
markt bepalend om van gomverzameling een blijvende activiteit te maken. De prikkels door 
de markt gecreëerd, moeten voldoende groot zijn om de kosten van verzameling en het 
vermarkten van gom te dekken. Ten tweede, handelaren in de markten van gom profiteren 
niet noodzakelijk van de oligopsonische structuren en ze buiten hun markmacht niet uit. Het 
toetreden van een handelaar en het marktaandeel hangen af van de toegang tot verschillende 
vormen van kapitaal en marktkarakteristieken. De marge die een handelaar verdient, is meer 
een weergave van de kosten, onzekerheidsgevoel en perceptie van risico; deze factoren 
kunnen zelfs een exit uit de markt betekenen. Ten derde, kwaliteit zoals minimaal 
aanvaardbaar door de gebruiker is niet steeds gelinkt aan de uiterlijke kwaliteitskenmerken 
zoals die in het veld kunnen worden waargenomen; toch is de kans groter op een goede 
chemische kwaliteit als de gom ook als goed werd bevonden in het veld. Gepaste oogst- en 
na-oogsttechnieken zijn cruciaal voor het aanleveren van kwaliteitsgom. Om het aanbod van 
kwaliteit te stimuleren is echter wel een prijsdifferentiatie nodig. Tot slot, hangt de transitie 
van een communale organisatie van Acacia bossen naar meer efficiënte private 
verzamelsystemen voornamelijk af van het afwegen van economische baten en kosten. 
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Daarnaast is zijn ook sociale aspecten en milieu belangrijk in het veranderingsproces van de 
beheerssystemen, voornamelijk in de droge gebieden waar arabische gom wordt verzameld.  
Een belangrijke implicatie voor het beleid zijn de vragen naar een uitbreiding en 
onderhoud van de bossen met Acacia senegal, directe marktinterventie, voortdurende 
sensibilisering van verzamelaars en handelaars en een betere organisatie van het 
marktsysteem. Daarenboven kunnen associaties of groeperingen van verzamelaars en 
handelaren worden aangemoedigd omdat deze op tal van vlakken mogelijk kunnen bijdragen 
tot de gomsector.  
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Résumé 
La gomme arabique a un marché international important dans diverses industries. Le Sénégal 
est un petit pays producteur de la gomme arabique dont les exportations sont faibles sans 
doute en raison des problèmes de développement des marchés internes, ceux-ci résultent de 
l'absence des prix incitatifs. L’objectif principal de cette étude est de relier le côté du marché 
à celui de la récolte de la gomme arabique afin d'étudier les facteurs qui influencent la 
performance de la chaîne de valeur de la gomme arabique. Deux thèmes font l’objet principal 
de l’étude: (1) l'efficacité du marché en termes de comportement et de processus décisionnel 
des récolteurs de la gomme, ainsi que le comportement et la performance des commerçants de 
la gomme; et (2) l'efficacité de la production axée sur le marché en termes d'aspects de la 
qualité lors de la commercialisation de la gomme, et des systèmes de gouvernance de la 
récolte de la gomme. La zone d'étude comprend la Zone Sylvopastorale et la Région Orientale 
du Sénégal où les arbustes d’Acacia senegal sont localisés et la gomme arabique y est 
exploitée commercialement. 
 Le chapitre 2 décrit le contexte de la récolte et du commerce de la gomme arabique au 
Sénégal, souligne les moyens de subsistance de la zone d'étude et dresse la liste des 
contraintes à la commercialisation de la gomme qui, également limitent les incitations des 
gens pour récolter la gomme. 
 Les chapitres 3 et 4 examinent l'efficacité du marché en termes de comportement et de  
performance des acteurs du marché dans la chaîne de valeur. Le chapitre 3 examine le 
comportement des récolteurs de la gomme concernant la décision d’effectuer la récolte et la 
quantité de la gomme à récolter. Par la suite, le choix  se porte sur le marché de vente parmi 
les marchés alternatifs disponibles. L'hypothèse de l’étude est que l'accès aux marchés plus  
efficaces et plus rémunérateurs est un facteur incitant  la récolte et la commercialisation de la 
gomme; l’effet incitatif est atténué par les coûts de transaction élevés. En effet, les récolteurs 
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choisissent de récolte et de participer au marché dans le but de maximiser leurs rendements. 
La quantité collectée est stimulée par le marché (meilleurs prix) tout en augmentant l'usage 
d’'intrants tels que le labeur ou l'expansion de la zone de récolte. Bien que le prix est un  
facteur d'incitation à récolter et vendre la gomme, il est associé à la concurrence dans les 
forêts gouverne en commun. Lors de la commercialisation, les récolteurs choisissent un point 
de vente où le prix est plus élevé et la concurrence avec d'autres récolteurs est  plus basse. 
Dans plusieurs cas, ces récolteurs préfèrent traiter avec un partenaire régulier et en particulier 
quand il n’existe pas de grandes différences dans les prix offerts par différents commerçants. 
Dans leurs décisions, les récolteurs prennent également en considération les coûts de 
transaction proportionnels à la quantité à vendre, et la possibilité de combiner la fréquentation 
du marché avec d'autres activités telles que l'acquisition d'autres articles ménagers. 
 Le chapitre 4 enquête sur la chaîne séquentielle des commerçants de la gomme. Le but 
de l’étude est de savoir si leur structure oligopsoniste conduit à une baisse des prix dans une 
tendance de marginalisation multiple. Une classification des commerçants de la gomme 
arabique est effectuée dans les marchés primaires, de transport et des grossistes en fonction de 
la taille de leurs opérations. Grâce aux économies d'échelle, les grossistes gagnent de très 
élevées marges tandis que les commerçants primaires ont des coûts unitaires élevés qui 
résultent de faibles paiements aux récolteurs de gomme. Les parts des commerçants dans les 
marchés ont été calculés et les correspondants indices de Herfindahl ont été tirées. Ces indices 
n'étaient pas suffisamment élevées pour confirmer de fortes tendances oligopsonistiques. La 
part d'un opérateur dans un marché dépend positivement du capital et de l’ infrastructure du 
marché alors que la concurrence sur le marché la réduit. Les caractéristiques du capital et du 
marché déterminent également les possibilités d'accès au marché. Le pouvoir du marché n'a 
aucune influence sur les marges perçues par les commerçants. Ces marges semblent dépendre 
des conditions d'approvisionnement, des coûts de commercialisation, de la perception de 
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l'incertitude du prix et du risque. L'ampleur du risque est probablement la cause la plus 
importante de la sortie du marché. 
 Les chapitres 5 et 6 examinent l'efficacité de production/récolte en termes de la qualité 
de la gomme et des systèmes des droits de propriété associés à la récolte de la gomme. Dans 
le chapitre 5, une comparaison basée sur les spécifications des usagers de la gomme arabique 
a été effectuée. Cette comparaison incluait différentes évaluations de la qualité de la gomme, 
l’une faite sur terrain par les récolteurs et les commerçants de la gomme arabique et l’autre 
faite au laboratoire. Sur terrain, les récolteurs et les commerçants ont classé les échantillons 
de gomme en fonction des attributs visibles de la qualité. L'évaluation au laboratoire a été 
basée sur l'analyse des composants chimiques de ces échantillons. La comparaison montre 
que l'évaluation de la qualité de gomme par les récolteurs et les commerçants ne coïncident 
pas toujours avec l'évaluation de la qualité par les utilisateurs. L’évaluation par les récolteurs 
et les commerçants est en fait très subjective et diffère d’un village a un autre. La mauvaise 
qualité reconnue par les récolteurs et les commerçants est néanmoins confirmée par 
l'évaluation des utilisateurs, mais la bonne qualité du point de vue des récolteurs et des 
commerçants n’est pas toujours trouvée bonne en termes des besoins des usagers ; le lien 
commun entre l'évaluation par les récolteurs et commerçants et celle des utilisateurs est la 
propreté ou la faible contenance de la matière minérale. L'analyse des déterminants de l'offre 
de la qualité de la gomme arabique en termes de deux de ses visibles attributs (taille et 
propreté des nodules de gomme) montre l'importance du respect des procédures de récolte et 
d’après la récolte. La qualité dépend également de la conduite des marchés et des incitations 
de récolte axées sur le marché. Le comportement du marché montre des incohérences dans la 
préférence des attributs de qualité parce que la connaissance de la qualité par les commerçants 
n'est pas plus élevée que celle des récolteurs à moins qu'ils aient une longue expérience dans 
le commerce. Les prix plurivalents offerts par le marché limitent l'offre de bonne qualité parce 
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que les prix incitatifs créent une concurrence dans les forêts communales où la gomme est 
recueillie en attirant les récolteurs occasionnels. Ces incitations par les prix ont également un 
effet sur la demande relative de la qualité : en raison des prix élevés, la demande pour la 
qualité indifférenciée ou moins bonne est plus élevée alors que la demande de haute qualité 
est relativement plus élevé à un bas prix. Par conséquent, une incitation effective à fournir la 
gomme de haute qualité est une différenciation des prix de telle sorte que celle de bonne 
qualité est récompensée par sa prime. 
 Le Chapitre 6 examine les facteurs qui influencent la lente transition en cours dans les 
systèmes de gouvernance de la récolte de la gomme des systèmes collectifs aux systèmes 
privés efficaces. Entre les extrêmes de ces systèmes se trouvent des systèmes mixtes. Le 
modèle théorique prédit que les systèmes privés peuvent être préférés des systèmes collectifs 
lorsque la concurrence s'intensifie, parce que l'utilité recueillie par les ménages baisse, alors 
que les gains nets provenant de la privatisation dépassent l'utilité acquise lors de la récolte 
dans les systèmes collectifs. Ces derniers sont préférés lorsque le coût de réglementation est 
élevé. Les systèmes de gestion des ressources d'acacia au Sénégal se distinguent par le mode 
d'acquisition et le marquage des arbres. Celui-ci est une indication des droits d'utilisation 
exclusifs. Les résultats empiriques ont confirmé que l'émergence des systèmes privés dans la 
récolte de gomme dépend de la disponibilité des ressources qui doivent être proportionnée à 
un main-d'œuvre disponible de telle sorte que le récolteur peut s'attendre à augmenter sa 
collection. L'évolution du marché est également importante, son seul inconvénient est qu’elle 
conduirait à une augmentation de la concurrence sur les ressources, notamment lorsque le prix 
est suffisamment élevé pour attirer les récolteurs occasionnels. Les systèmes privés sont 
préférés en raison de leur potentiel économique et des avantages environnementaux. Les 
systèmes collectifs sont maintenus lorsque le coût des droits de réglementation et leur 
application est économiquement et socialement élevé en termes de coût de la surveillance et la 
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fonction d'assurance effectuées par ces systèmes. Alors que la transition de l'organisation 
communale de la récolte aux systèmes de récolte privés dépend principalement de l'évaluation 
des avantages et des coûts économiques, le processus de transition résulte de l'importance 
accordée aux considérations environnementales et sociales. 
 Dans le chapitre 7, les principales conclusions de l'étude sont résumés et leurs 
implications politiques sont discutées. Les limites de l'étude et les domaines de recherche 
futurs sont également indiqués. Les conclusions sont que, premièrement, pour accroître la 
productivité, différentes méthodes peuvent être adoptées telle que l'augmentation de la 
productivité du travail et la régulation de la concurrence dans les forêts où la gomme est 
recueillie. Les incitations du marché sont également fondamentales pour la poursuite de la 
récolte, ils devraient être suffisamment élevées pour couvrir les coûts de récolte et de 
commercialisation de la gomme. Deuxièmement, les commerçants dans le marché de la 
gomme arabique ne sont pas nécessairement exploiteur de leur structure oligopsoniste en 
exerçant leur pouvoir de manière abusive. L'entrée d'un commerçant dans un marché et ses 
parts dépendent de l'accès à diverses formes du capital et aux caractéristiques du marché. La 
marge qu'il gagne reflète les coûts, l'incertitude sur les prix et les risques du commerce qui 
peuvent même causer sa sortie du marché. Troisièmement, la qualité tel que requise  par 
l’usager n’est pas toujours directement liée aux attributs de la qualité observés sur le terrain; 
une occasion d'améliorer la qualité dès la collecte augmente la probabilité d'obtenir une bonne 
gomme selon une analyse chimique. De bonne pratiques lors de la récolte et post-récolte sont 
cruciales pour la provision de la qualité. Pour stimuler cette provision, une différenciation des 
prix est nécessaire de telle sorte que celle la bonne qualité soit récompensée par une prime de 
qualité. Enfin, la transition de l'organisation collectif aux systèmes privés de récolte dépend 
principalement de l'évaluation économique des avantages et coûts. Toutefois, l'importance 
accordée aux considérations environnementales et sociales devrait également jouer un rôle 
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dans le processus de transition dans les systèmes de gouvernance des ressources en particulier 
dans les milieux arides où la gomme arabique est récoltée. 
 Les implications politiques principales comprennent une nécessité d'expansion et 
maintenance des ressources de base, notamment Acacia senegal, des interventions directes sur 
le marché, une sensibilisation continue orientée aux récolteurs qu’aux commerçants de la 
gomme et une meilleure organisation du système de commercialisation. En outre, les 
associations des récolteurs et celles des commerçants devraient être explorées et encouragées 
en raison de différentes fonctions qu’elle pourraient éventuellement effectuer dans le secteur 
de gomme. 
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